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    This study examines the information operations strategy of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham (ISIS), focusing on the 2014-2016 period. Using extensive case studies of ISIS-related 
information warfare operations, the study examines the online manoeuvre tactics deployed by 
ISIS to survive counter-operations aimed against its propaganda networks. The thesis uses a 
conceptual framework informed by John Boyd’s OODA loop model, actor network theory, 
and stigmergic swarm operations in digital media environments. The study argues that 
anonymous sharing platforms such as justpaste.it and Telegram, and to a lesser extent, 
Twitter, have been instrumental in allowing individual jihadists to generate content, 
disseminate propaganda, and communicate freely while routing around filtering practiced by 
popular social media networks (SMNs). The study suggests that the failure of ISIS’ 
adversaries in operating inside the OODA loop of ISIS led to the organisation’s survival, the 
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Timeline of ISIS’ operations 2014-2016 
2014   
January: ISIS takes over Raqqa and declares it the capital of the ISIS emirate. 
February 3: Al Qaeda officially cuts ties with ISIS. 
June 10: ISIS takes over Mosul, launching its largest offensive to date.  
June: 96,000 ISIS Twitter accounts were identified (Morgan, 2014). 
June 11: ISIS militants take over Tikrit (the birth city of Saddam Hussein). 
June 18: Iraq asks the United States to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. 
June 29: ISIS announces the establishment of a caliphate under the leadership of Abo Baker 
Al-Baghdadi. 
July18: Operation degrading ISIS’ digital capabilities launched.  
2015 
February: Telegram application used as prime hub for ISIS.  
May 17: ISIS takes over Ramadi, Iraq.  
May 20: ISIS seizes the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra. 
May 21: ISIS militants takes full control of Sirte, Libya – Muammar Qaddafi's hometown. 
June: Marks the highs of microblogging platforms (Justpaste, Sendvid) used by ISIS.  
 Dec 27: Iraqi military forces seize Ramadi from ISIS. 
2016 
March 27: The Syrian army supported by Russian airstrikes recaptured the city of Palmyra 
from ISIS. 
May 19: Iraqi forces retake the western town of Rutbah. 
May 23:  Iraqi forces, aided by U.S. and coalition airstrikes, advanced on Fallujah, which 





May 24: Kurdish forces backed by U.S. airstrikes launched an offensive on territory north of 
Raqqa, Syria. 
June 26: The Iraqi army retakes Fallujah from ISIS. 
October 16: Iraq launches a U.S. backed campaign to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State. 
December 11: ISIS fighters recapture Palmyra from the Syrian government. 









Your military force is attacking us daily in Iraq, your strikes caused casualties among 
Muslims, you are no longer fighting an insurgency we are and Islamic army and a state. Any 
aggression against our state will result in bloodshed against your own people1. 
 
These were the words of Mohammed Emwazi,2 who left the music industry to become a well-
known Islamic terrorist who appears in ISIS’ first HD video propaganda. He was dressed in 
black, with his victim in red, in front of a film set-up scene. A coded message was uploaded 
to the internet, with many more to come. On 19 August 2014, Mohammed Emwazi appeared 
in ISIS’,3 first beheading video,4 titled Message to America.5 In this video, ISIS utilised, 
arguably, professional tools of media production, including GoPro cameras, multiple angle 
screenshots, professional montage, and use of sound devices. Overall, this marked the first 
time a terror organisation had produced a high-quality video through its own media outlet 
(Rose, 2014). A decade ago, Al-Zarqawi himself beheaded Nick Berg,6 during a live 
                                                          
1 Jihad John’s message to the US government depicted in ISIS’ first media production “Message to 
America. 
2 Also known as Jihadi John, a British rapper who joined ISIS in 2013 and appeared in ISIS’ first 
propaganda video production. 
3 Also known as IS (Islamic State), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) and Daesh (Arabic acronym for 
Dawlah Islamyah fe Eraq wa Sham). In this thesis I use ISIS as the most popular acronym for this 
organisation, as used by world governments and scholars. 
4 The video was produced by Al-Hayat media productions and first appeared on the Al-Hayat Twitter 
account.  
Historically, the first beheading video posted to the World Wide Web by Al-Qaeda was of Daniel Pearl in 
2002. 
5 This is the first message produced by ISIS. 





propaganda event on the internet, but the footage was of amateurish quality compared to ISIS 
propaganda productions. 
 
However, compared to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda productions, ISIS has strengthened its 
propaganda machine by producing well-crafted videos uploaded to a plethora of digital media 
environments. These images have a memetic value – that is why they spread so fast and have 
such propaganda value. According to Gladwell (2010), “ideas and products and messages and 
behaviours spread just like viruses do” (p. 7).  
 
To understand the need for ISIS to establish communication networks in the digital 
information environments,7 it is necessary to examine the geographical space they operate in, 
the political structure of its organisation, its need for jihadi and military logistics, and the 
number of active combats in which they are involved. It must be noted that ISIS has created a 
new tendency and paradigm shift8 in terror communication in comparison to other terror 
organisations such as Al-Qaeda, El-Shabab, and Boko Haram. This shift appears through 
three strategic developments harnessing of digital media environments that include, social 
media sites and services, anonymous sharing portals, and encrypted communication 
applications. It is the strategic combination of the use of these platforms that has 
distinguished ISIS from all other terror networks. 
 
                                                          
7 According to the US’s DOD “The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organisations,  
 
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information” (cited in Prisco, 2012, p. iv). 
 
8 Thomas Kuhn (1996) defined paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a  
 





First, ISIS’ weaponisation of digital media platforms aims to achieve information operation9 
(IO) objectives. The United States Department of Defence (DoD) defined IO as “The 
integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network 
operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security, in concert 
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO” 
(DoD, 2006). That is, ISIS used digital media platforms as narrowcasting command and 
control (C2) operation centres and domains for information manoeuvre warfare. According to 
Owen (2008), “Manoeuvre warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the 
enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions, which create a 
turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (p. 1).That 
is, ISIS strategically used social media platforms, encrypted media platforms, blogs and other 
anonymous portals to confuse, subjugate and influence the efforts of its adversaries in 
establishing an effective countering strategy. As Nissen (2015) noted, “Command and 
Control is a question of using social network media for communication and coordination and 
synchronisation of activities” (p. 60). 
 
Second, stigmergic10 swarming of multiple information environments was a successful 
strategy that maintained ISIS’ networking structure and flow of information. In this shift, 
ISIS members are affiliated to swarm digital media environments with propaganda materials 
and creation of accounts to maintain flows of information, while stigmergy is used as a 
mechanism to explain the swarming activity (see sections 7.6 and 7.7). The third strategic 
                                                          
9 Will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
10Stigmergy is the indirect coordination between the network actors. I will discuss the notion of stigmergy 





activity involves an ISIS paradigm shift from using popular SMNs such as Facebook and 
YouTube, to carry out manoeuvring operations via digital information environments giving 
them superiority over their adversaries. That is, the agility and speed of ISIS’ IO in 
production tactics and dissemination made it operate around the information loop of its 
adversaries.11 In other words, the emergence of the digital information environments, such as 
anonymous sharing portals (e.g., JustPaste.it, dump.to and sendvid.com), encryption 
telephone applications (e.g., Telegram, Signal and WhatsApp), and other digital media tools 
(e.g., bots and applications) have enabled ISIS to maintain its networking structure and flow 
of information in the face of the US and its allies waging operations designed to degrade ISIS 
capabilities. This is what war strategist and historian Von Clausewitz (1832) called “an 
increasing continuation of war by other means”. Therefore, the emergence of digital 
information environments, “presents new challenges and requires dramatic shifts in strategic 
thinking regarding national security and countering terrorism” (Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & 
Chen, 2016, p. 61).   
 
Arguably, in the face of ISIS, the world faces one of the most sophisticated terror networks 
ever. However, it is dependent on an IO strategy that is based on strategic narrative and 
attentive propaganda, which will be examined in Chapter three. Through this strategy, ISIS 
has managed to create powerful messages, targeting international audiences for potential 
recruits. ISIS adversaries (e.g. the US, Iraqi and Syrian governments, Shia militias, collective 
and individual hackers) must design and implement policies to tackle this growing 
phenomenon, particularly after the number of recruits increased from less than 1000 in 2011, 
to more than 3,500 Jihadists in Iraq in 2012, to an estimated 30,000 Jihadists by the end of 
                                                          





2015 (Schmid, 2015, p. 1). The United States (US) strategy of degrading terror organisations 
resulted in unprecedented information-centric warfare between ISIS and its adversaries. A 
part of this strategy involves degrading ISIS’ digital media capabilities through suspending its 
accounts on social media platforms and other information environments. These approaches 
are known as a ‘Whack-a-Mole’ and ‘Interaction and Isolation’ which are examined in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
 
The origin of ISIS can be traced back to Al-Zarqawi and his affiliation with Al-Qaeda in 
2004. Al-Zarqawi led an insurgency, operating under Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein (Atwan, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015). Al-Zarqawi targeted both US troops 
and Shia, sparking a bloody sectarian rift between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Fighting US 
troops in the Sunni stronghold of Anbar Province, Al-Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Omar Al-
Baghdadi, named his organisation Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006 (Ignatius, 2015). In 
2010, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi12 succeeded Abu Omar after he was killed by a US air strike. 
ISI was a powerful player during the Anbar uprisings in March 2013. The Iraqi government’s 
rejection of protesters demands, and the use of military forces to crush the Anbar protests, 
created an alliance between the tribal Sunni militias and ISI fighters (Ignatius, 2015). This 
alliance led to an attack in Mosul, Iraq, in 2013 and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was asked by his 
supporters in Anbar to declare Islamic caliphate. As Stern and Berger observed in March 
2014, “ISIS launched a Twitter hashtag campaign, with its supporters seemingly rising as 
populist mass to tweet, ‘We demand Sheikh Al-Baghdadi declare the caliphate’” (Stern & 
Berger, 2015, p. 17). Ultimately, the events of the Syrian and Anbar uprisings led to the rise 
of ISIS. The pattern of ISIS is a top-down structure were Abo Baker Al- Baghdadi was the 
                                                          





command in chief aided by ‘shura council’. The way ISIS are managing their operations was 
based on ‘Auftragstaktik’13, which means that their decision is centralised while execution is 
based on decentralization of command and control (C2) operations14.  The notion of 
‘Auftragstaktik’ helps to understand ISIS’ C2 operation and how ISIS has weaponised 
information domains, such as social media platforms and mobile phone applications, to 
achieve its mission. To ISIS, the Al-Baghdadi was the highest command who designed 
operations to the individual actors that work independently in the network to achieve a 
successful mission, while social media platforms, and other encrypted communication 
channels, acted as control operation centres that mediate ISIS messages and all other 
information operation missions. In other words, ISIS’ organisational and technical attributes 
depends on information resources that are employed as C2 operations to achieve its 
ambitions.  
 
Interestingly, before the emergence of ISIS, social media platforms have been credited as 
instrumental in galvanising the Arab spring uprisings. SMNs had a profound role in shaping 
these events (Howard, 2011; Dabashi 2012); however, their use changed dramatically 
throughout the uprisings. SMNs have been praised for having a significant role in tipping the 
balance of power in the interest of the grassroots movements (Meyer, 2011, Shehabat 2015). 
In the context of Iraq, these were ad-hoc alliances between disaffected Sunni, radicalised 
Jihadi elements, and tribal coalitions. Through these movements, SMNs helped grassroots 
                                                          
13 Auftragstaktik was developed as a military doctrine by the Prussians following their losses to Napoleon, 
when they realised they needed a systematic reorganisation of their centralised command structure. The 
term denotes mission-based orders, providing commanders with tactical freedom and a C2 culture of 
decentralised improvisation (Kallmes, 2017). This term will be discussed in Chapter 7. 





movements and rebel forces to outmanoeuvre, and sometimes topple, governments in the 
region. These platforms allowed communication and coordination to flow around 
government-imposed control. 
 
The advancement of communication technologies - in particular, the proliferation of web 2.0 
platforms,15 the ubiquitousness of internet connectivity and affordability of mobile phone 
technologies - have had an even greater impact on empowering anti-government movements 
and protests. Moreover, web 2.0 played a critical role in organising anti-World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) protests, worldwide Occupy movements, the London riots and 
democratic movements in the Arab world during the evolution of the Arab Spring uprisings. 
The widespread use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social media 
applications in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, created new avenues of 
political activism. This new wave of technologically generated political activism had a 
critical role in the pervasive social uprisings and political mobilisations that led to the 
downfall of the Mubarak, Ben Ali, Al-Qaddafi and Saleh governments in 2011 (Aday, 
Farrell, Lynch, Sides & Freelon, 2012; Anderson, 2011; Dabashi, 2012; Khamis, Gold & 
Vaughn, 2012). 
 
The significant role played by social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube have even caused academics and journalists to refer to these events as the 
                                                          
15 Web 2.0 platforms, a term which proliferated in 2004, led to a new paradigm of social interaction which 
was beyond the imagination of the original web creators. The term, ‘Web 2.0’, was coined in 1999 by 
Darcy DiNucci; it was then popularised by Tim O’Reilly at the O’Reilly Media Web 2.0 conference in late 
2004. Web 2.0 is a trend in the use of World Wide Web technology and web design that aims to enhance 





‘Facebook and Twitter revolutions’ and the ‘YouTube uprisings’ (Khamis et al., 2012). 
Castells (2012) called digital media platforms ‘networks of outrage and hope’. However, it is 
worth clarifying at this point that social media platforms offered tools for people to 
communicate and for other commercial purposes. People revolt, not tools. These tools had a 
key role in accelerating movements, raising awareness of abuses and atrocities, and 
facilitating political mobilisation. However, it is also worth noting, that governments 
harnessed these platforms to disseminate misinformation, monitor groups through 
surveillance techniques, and gather intelligence. Social media platforms also notified 
governments of upcoming events, which allowed them to trace charismatic leaders and the 
voices of anti-government movements. As a result, individuals could be identified and 
arrested, as was done in Egypt and Syria. 
 
Pro-government organisations and individuals utilised social media platforms to counter anti-
government movements. As such, the social media revolution began to display a darker side 
(Morozov, 2012); social media platforms became the weapons of information-centric warfare 
between pro and anti-government groups. Social media networks established political and 
ideological polarisation, which penetrated society, furthered political mobilisation, and 
catalysed information-centric warfare between anti and pro-government actors. Also, the rise 
of political Islam in the aftermath of the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Al-Qaddafi, 
and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, during the years 2011 - 2012 bifurcated society, resulting in the 
emergence of two, strong subgroups. These subgroups replaced what was once a large 
network of participants, who marched together in public squares. For example, in Syria, 
Egypt and Iraq, information-centric warfare emerged between pro-Islamists and anti-
Islamists; this led to the emergence of new networking tendencies, which destabilised and 





mainly Facebook.16 Thus, these new possibilities for networking also invited the emergence 
of ‘networks of antagonism and hate’ (Shehabat, 2015, p. 17). 
 
The events of the Arab Spring uprisings have, arguably, led to the rise of new types of terror 
organisations, such as those that hijacked the uprisings in Iraq and Syria. A new 
organisational form emerged from and ended up shaping the future of Arab uprisings - that is, 
the emergence of ‘networks of terror’. One could argue that dissenter groups’ (e.g. We Are 
All Hamzah Al-Khateeb, the Syrian revolution 2011) established on social media 
(particularly on Facebook) has shifted from facilitating ‘networks of outrage and hope’ 
(Castells, 2013) to creating ‘networks of antagonism and hate’ (Shehabat, 2015) and 
ultimately, ‘networks of terror’. 
 
In the Arab Spring uprisings in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged as 
power players and game changers in the destruction of these countries. These organisations 
were distinguished by their sophisticated use of digital media logistics to establish their 
political status. In this thesis, logistics does not refer to military logistics (e.g., ammunition, 
petrol and food supplies), but rather media logistics (e.g., hardware and software). These 
tools of content creation and dissemination became the logistics of performativity. That is, 
through their use of social media platforms, anonymous sharing portals and encrypted 
communication channels, terror organisations have created international associations and 
enrolment processes that support the activation of potential recruits. 
 
                                                          
16 Facebook was the preferred social media platform by Arab youth during the 2011 uprisings (Dubai 





For non-state actors who were engaged in asymmetrical (i.e., uneven in terms of military 
capability) war, digital logistics became the hub for C2 operations and a domain for 
information warfare. Nissen (2015, p. 72) proposed six ways that social media could be used 
to support military C2 operations: intelligence collection, targeting, cyber operations, 
defence, C2, and influencing information through psychological warfare operations 
(PSYOP)17. Thus, terror organisations have weaponised social media platforms and other 
digital information environments to achieve their political ends. ISIS aims to generate a 
global effect by spreading messages of fear to increase sympathy, recruitments and, media 
coverage. The network form of ISIS emerged as it exploited multiple digital media logistics, 
including media production tools and software logistics. Therefore, digital media logistics 
have played a pivotal role that shaped the generation and dissemination of terror around the 
globe. As Nissen (2015) argued: 
 
The weaponisation of social media translates into “military” activities such as targeting, 
intelligence, psychological warfare, cyber-operations (offensive and defensive), and 
command and control in support of the achievement of political or military effects created in 
and through social network media. (p. 81) 
 
In his 1838 text, The Art of War, the French military strategist Antoine-Henri de Jomini (as 
cited in Neilson, 2012) argued that, “logistics is not merely a ‘science of details’ but a 
‘general science’ that plays a leading role in the organisation of war and the execution of 
strategy and tactics” (p. 5). Neilson (2012) agreed with this assumption, considering the 
                                                          
17 This thesis only examined PSYOPS carried out by ISIS in online media platforms, not on the physical 
ground and its effects of gain of territories. The discussion of the impact of PSYOPS on the physical 







developments of warfare and the civilian logistics revolution. He argued that, “strategic 
decisions are limited by the resources at hand and tactical manoeuvres unfold within a 
situation defined by lines of information and supply” (Neilson, 2012, p. 5). The aim of 
adapting information logistics is to gain advantage over adversary. For example, ISIS adapted 
encrypted communication channels to secure information and anonymity of users. The 
utilisation of anonymous sharing portals has helped ISIS to launch a tactical, manoeuvring 
warfare to evade degrading operations and sustain information flows.  
 
When discussing the information logistics of terror networks, it is important to note that 
information has been a strategic weapon of non-state actors, who fight physical wars with the 
most advanced militaries in the world. The use of information logistics during wartime will 
advance the organisations cyber-warfare capabilities. As Saad, Bazan and Varin (2011) 
stated, “Cyber-warfare is hence an asymmetric warfare that requires non-conventional means 
of action. An asymmetric war is a conflict opposing two unbalanced forces, most of the time 
a State against a non-State actor” (p. 3). When fighting an unbalanced war, information has 
always been a strategic tool to network, spread, and produce propaganda and disinformation. 
Internet based tools have expanded these strategies, as Saad et al. (2011) further argued: 
 
In this context, non-conventional methods are used, and Web-related actions are progressively 
considered as part of that a generation of weaponry. The Web is a virtual territory, a virtual 
target. But it is also a direct tool of aggression, in terms of strategic content production and 
disinformation. (p. 3) 
 
To understand the sophistication of message assemblages in the information age, and the 
objectives of IO, and the planning of ISIS flows of information that have emerged, it is 





a key role in creating an association between the ISIS capital in Iraq and ISIS sympathisers 
and affiliates around the world. Further, it changed the dynamics of communication (see 
sections 4.8, 6.5 and 6.13). This change includes the settings and mechanisms of 
communication tools (e.g., coded formatting, encryption, machine disseminations) and the 
use of these communications as C2 operation centres. That is, harnessing and exploiting 
digital information environments enabled ISIS to communicate directly with sympathisers 
and affiliates around the world (e.g., sending encrypted one-to-one and one-to-many 
messages, and sharing manuals and instructions via Dropbox, Google Drive, JustPaste.it and 
SHAREit). As a result, thousands of foreign-fighter recruits have pledged allegiance to the 
caliphate, and many more acted on behalf of ISIS to destabilise the West by unprecedented 
terror attacks (Cohen 2015; Archetti, 2015). 
 
Since ISIS managed to spread their propaganda online and capturing news headlines, the US 
and its allies determined at an urgent meeting in 2014, in Hanover, Germany, that ISIS’ 
message must be stopped, and its digital infrastructure rooted out. However, the countering of 
ISIS’ propaganda on popular social media platforms only encouraged ISIS to seek other 
anonymous digital platforms, such as JustPaste.it, Sendvid, Kik, Pinterest, dump.to, SHAREit 
and archive.org. More recently, ISIS established channels on Telegram and Tumblr networks, 
which were extensively utilised by ISIS affiliates and members. 
      
Research Questions 
   This study examines the role of digital media logistics in ISIS IO, strategic narrative and 
propaganda from a network warfare perspective. The primary question of inquiry, and the 





1. What was the role of ISIS’ digital media logistics in resisting attempts to degrade 
its IO objectives between 2014-2016?   
2. Were the three phases of the countering operation (disruption of information 
flows, countering narratives and open hacking) successful in their attempts to 
degrade ISIS IO objectives between 2014-2016?  
3. Did ISIS’ three communication strategies of weaponisation of information 
environments, stigmergy, and manoeuvring operations enable it to counter 
attempts to degrade its propaganda and recruitment networks? 
      
Theoretical Base 
   The main argument in this thesis is that a paradigm shift in terror communication has 
emerged, involving: weaponisation of digital media environments, stigmergic swarming 
operations, and a strategy of manoeuvre within information warfare operations. Arguably, 
this shift has helped ISIS to carry out and achieve its IO objectives in the period between 
2014-2016. 
 
To understand how ISIS managed to survive account suspension on popular social media 
platforms and maintain success in information warfare, tracing of the information logistics of 
its networks is necessary, as suggested by Actor- Network Theory (ANT). ANT is important 
to the understanding of information logistics. The framework of ANT clarifies how 
information is distributed, perceived, and acted upon from interacting agents to achieve their 
goals. In other words, information can be translated into indirect forms (e.g., information 
sign) or pheromone trails that can be used by other network actors to act upon. Callon (1986), 
Latour (1996), and Law (1992) argued that ANT attempts impartiality between all actors—





and technological. Using the ANT approach, all the factors (both human and non-human) that 
influence the adaption of multiple information environments are defined as actors. 
The framework of ANT can explain how ISIS established and connected to networks outside 
its territories, as Law (1986) proposed in his long-distance control essay. It also explains how 
networks are developed and maintained by interactions of human and non-human actors (e.g., 
WhatsApp and Telegram channels). Law (1986) argued: 
 
The envelope of mobility and durability in the face of a range of environments was extended 
by a combination of technological artefact and human resources. That long-distance social 
control depended upon creating a structure of elements, both human and natural, capable of 
generating an envelope of durable mobility for vessels. (Law, 1986, p. 10) 
      
The value of using ANT to understand the network logistics of ISIS is twofold. First, ANT is 
a first step to understanding how networks emerged and maintained themselves through 
processes of translation and enrolment (see section 4.12). Second, tracing the logistics of 
terror networks (as proposed by ANT) provides necessary insights into message assemblages 
and other digital toolkits used by ISIS, which will be essential in strategic operations to 
counter and thwart terror networks. Further, tracing network actants (and ISIS’ information 
logistics) as network actors can highlight the communication patterns of ISIS networks. 
Tracing information logistics as network actors, leads to an exploration of processes, 
information flows, and coordination between human actors in the network. Therefore, to 
understand the processes of information logistics and trace of information flows; ISIS media 
productions produced by media outlets such as Al-Hayat media, Al-Forgan and Anjad media 
outlets were traced in chapter 4. These media outlets were responsible of ISIS’ information 






Also, using screenshot methodology is another way to trace information flows of ISIS 
networks. Screenshots were obtained from primary resources of ISIS communication 
channels such as Telegram application, Justpate, sendvid and dump.to, that lead to understand 
the pattern of ISIS’ communication across its networks. Furthermore, to understand how ISIS 
maintained its network structure and established affiliated networks outside its regional 
territory, in chapters 6 and 7, tracing of microblogging platforms, encrypted applications and 
anonymous sharing portals were necessary.  Another way ANT helps to understand network 
actors and trace of ISIS communication has been highlighted in chapter 5 through the tracing 
of specific hashtags ISIS widely celebrated across the Twitter sphere.  
 
Therefore, ANT can be more: technically described as a material-semiotic method, mapping 
relations that are: 
 
             simultaneously material (between things) and semiotic (between concepts). Everything 
in the social and natural worlds does not exist separately but is being constantly 
generated by relationships between actors in networks. (Law, 2007 cited in 
O'Connell, Ciccotosto, & De Lange, 2014) 
 
To understand how these networks are built, it is important that no assumptions are made by 
the researcher regarding the positions or beliefs of the actors within the network, including 
how the actor defines and associates with other actors (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005). 
The logistics approach in this thesis acknowledges that logistics forge the network’s 
existence.18 
                                                          







The weaponisation processes of anonymous sharing portals can be understood through the 
agency of network actants.  The concept of actants in a network stresses the interaction 
between material and human factors in any process (Latour 2009). An actant can be a human, 
laptop, or computer software. These actants establish the Actor Networks. Using ANT in the 
context of ISIS media logistics is important as it leads to the understanding of the network 
structure and know the tools of its information operations and propaganda strategy to 
establish the best practises for counter-narrative strategies. Tracing of network actants can 
also uncover media operations and communication strategies, used by ISIS, to maintain its 
network structure and information flows. The utilisation of ANT increased my knowledge on 
the methods used by ISIS to encrypt communication platforms and anonymous sharing 
portals. These portals and platforms played a pivotal role in establishing the global terror 
network that spread fear into many parts of the world.  
 
To better understand ISIS’ IO objectives, strategic narrative and propaganda, it is important 
to trace the network actants. Creating and disseminating compelling messages requires a 
large amount of resources—both human and non-human actants. These resources have helped 
ISIS to establish their actor networks. The human actants presented in this thesis are ISIS 
jihadists, affiliates, and sympathisers who played a role in sustaining flows of information. 
The non-human actants can be the following: digital media logistics (i.e. software, platforms 
and applications), technical tools (i.e. computers, cameras, mobile phones), and other 






 ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996; Law, 1992) attempts to understand the role of all network 
actors—whether human or non-human—and makes no distinction between the social and the 
technological. As such, ANT is key to understanding the logistics of ISIS’ networks. Thus, as 
Krieger and Belliger (2014) note, understanding networking means “understanding those 
normative principles that guide those particular communicative activities that build, maintain, 
and transform networks. This is where new media studies come in” (p. 9). I believe that the 
conceptual toolkit of ANT offers an important perspective in understanding the 
communication strategies of ISIS’ affiliated networks. It also helps to understand how the 
networks emerge, are leveraged, and maintain themselves through processes of translation 
and enrolment.  As Krieger and Belliger (2014) argued “actor networks are much more like 
processes, performances, socio-technical rituals, and enactments […] They are driven by the 
dynamics of making connections, of binding things together, of extending associations, of 
“translating” and “enrolling” actors into networks”. That is, ANT focuses on how 
connections are established between network actors. ANT argues that as long as the network 
actants keep interacting with each other, the actant network will look stable, and when the 
interaction ends, the actor network will breakdown. In other words, the relations between 
human actors and non-human actors establish networks as long as these network actors are 
connected to each other. Therefore, to maintain a connection between network actants to 
sustain flows of information, ISIS managed to translate and enrol many network actors. This 
includes encrypted communication channels, anonymous portals, and all other digital media 
networks. Stern and Modi (2010) argued, terrorists’ manoeuvre in different environments that 
shape their mission, therefore information logistics are important to sustain the messages of 






From an ANT perspective, the associations between hardware and software logistics produce 
actants (Latour, 2005, p. 54).  These actants have agency, “which means that they make a 
difference: hitting a nail with and without a hammer, boiling water with and without a kettle, 
fetching provisions with or without a basket” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). The same could be said 
for digital media tools, mobile phone applications, malware, military clothing, and guns. To 
apply this to ISIS’ terrorism, an individual jihadist—who has access to digital technologies, 
weaponry, and video production equipment—may commit an act of terror. “Action is 
therefore not the property of humans only but of associations of actants” (Latour, as cited in 
Archetti, 2012, p. 10).  
 
In this thesis, the logistics analysis approach is used to understand how the network is 
brought into existence,19 understanding network assemblages and information logistics, 
which are “the planning of information flows” (Sandkuhl, 2007, p. 47). As Krieger and 
Belliger (2014) suggested, “flow opens up black boxes20 and transforms purely functional 
intermediaries into actors, participants, and mediators. When interactions among large 
numbers of actors become the rule and knowledge reconfigures itself into a cloud” (p. 144). 
 
Utilising multiple digital communication platforms has allowed ISIS to leverage their 
networks and enlist new actants, which assisted in the emergence of new networks (see 
chapter 6). Efforts to degrade ISIS’ digital logistics, control its flows of information, and 
disrupt its channels of communication on popular SMNs has been challenged by the 
emergence of anonymous digital platforms, sophistication of message assemble, and speed of 
                                                          
19 That is, anonymous digital networks helped in creating new terror networks and established channels of 
information dissemination which is part of their IO strategy. 





dissemination. Anonymous sharing platforms immediately stand out, because they act as 
accelerators of information flows, while making it harder to trace the logistics of how these 
flows are performed. 
 
From a swarming perspective, ISIS’ speed of command in harness of microblogging 
platforms and other encrypted applications, has the preference to maintain its flows of 
information. Tracing of ISIS’ digital logistics can explain how swarming activity occurred 
and how the interaction between ISIS Jihadists and the digital media platforms has shaped the 
organisational form of ISIS networks that enabled it to carry out IO and engage in Network-
Centric Warfare (NCW).  
 
The utilisation of new digital information environments in the context of OODA loop can 
generate an NCW effect. This effect can be examined through observation of ISIS and its 
opponents’ OODA loops. Tracing of ISIS’ online activity can explain how swarming activity 
occurred and how the interaction between Jihadists and the online environments has shaped 
the organisational form of ISIS networks. 
From the lenses of ANT, swarming activity of ISIS has changed the agency of the online 
environment. In other words, Justpaste.it, Telegram and Sendvid were created to share videos 
and files, the extensive use of these portals by ISIS have changed its agency and became hubs 
and tools that helped ISIS’ propaganda to flourish. 
 
As a result, attacking ISIS’ digital logistics on social media platforms, with the purpose of 







    Fighting terrorism in the digital sphere is not a new phenomenon. However, based on the 
issues briefly listed above, this thesis identifies three main challenges involved in countering 
the ISIS narrative: 
● The sophistication of message assemblages (e.g., high definition [HD] productions, 
editing, screening and casting). 
● The processes of dissemination and redistribution (e.g., automation and speed in 
redistribution processes). 
● The proliferation of anonymous sharing portals and the capacity for information 
sharing to be powered by the internet. 
 
David Kilcullen (as cited in Kalb & Saivetz, 2007) noted, “if bin Laden didn’t have access to 
global media, satellite communications and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave” 
(p. 7). That is, the internet facilitates both terror communication and the pervasiveness of 
terror narrative; the weaponisation of information environments promotes terror narratives by 
using marketing strategies, permitting the promotion of its brand to a potential global 
audience. 
 
The internet and terrorism are both very fast-changing phenomena. Information logistics 
(e.g., hardware and software) enabled ISIS to produce over 38 items of visual propaganda 
every day in 2015 (Winter, 2015b), and thousands of other digital artefacts, which were 
posted to Twitter (see section 4.11) and Telegram (see section 6.18). Files and other photo 
documents were shared via JustPaste.it and dump.to (see sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.3), Russia 
Mail and SHAREit. The massive social and technical assemblage that involves technologies, 
people, networks, geographies, and technical materials enabled ISIS to produce the huge 





The main challenge facing the US, and ISIS’ other adversaries, is how to counter ISIS’ 
strategic narrative and disrupt its information loop. To achieve this end, in chapter 5, this 
study argues that there have been three distinct strategic phases concerning the countering of 
ISIS’ online messages and attacking its digital logistics. 
 
In phase one (see section 5.3), this thesis discusses the main challenge of disrupting ISIS’ 
information loop, which was a degrading and destroying mission. Part of degrading the 
mission that was discussed was the role played by Twitter and Google to delete ISIS’ active 
accounts on their platforms. This measure resulted in deleting hundreds of thousands of 
accounts and messages, which also led to ‘influence warfare’ (Forest, 2009) between ISIS’ 
affiliates and opponents (see section 5.4). 
 
Phase two involved countering ISIS’ propaganda (see section 5.6). To compete with ISIS’ 
propaganda, in 2014 the US government expanded the Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC), which was established in 2011, to counter Al-Qaeda’s 
communication activities (Higham, 2015). The CSCC released its first video production, 
Welcome to ISIS Land in 2014. According to Scott Higham (2015), “The video became a 
viral phenomenon—viewed more than 844,000 times on YouTube—and a cause of 
significant irritation to its target”. The CSCC also launched the ‘Think Again Turn Away’ 
platform on Twitter to stop foreign fighters joining ISIS and documenting atrocities 
committed by ISIS jihadi. However, in return, ISIS launched the ‘Run Do Not Walk to U.S. 







Phase three involved hacking activities carried out by hacktivists groups such as (anonymous 
and CtrlSec). Although disrupting ISIS’ information loops, discussed in phase one and phase 
two are part of information warfare, in this phase, this thesis focuses on the role of hacktivist 
groups who declared #Operation-ISIS and #OpIceISIS. According to Griffin (2015), these 
operations “ha[ve] largely focused on finding and shutting down social media accounts and 
websites of ISIS”, using denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and reporting ISIS accounts to 
Twitter. The hacking activity has paralysed hundreds of channels of information 
dissemination such as ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings’ (#op_ISIS, 2015). According to Berger 
and Morgan (2015), the ‘Dawn of Glad Tidings’ application was “an official ISIS product 
promoted by its top users, [and was] advertised as a way to keep up on the latest news about 
the jihadi group”. 
The sophistication of ISIS’ swarmcast21 operations, which started in 2014, demanded that the 
world adopt a holistic approach to counter the new terror threat it represented. Tracing ISIS’ 
digital activity from one domain to another, is beyond the capacity of states and intelligence 
services. That’s because of the complexity of ISIS’ IO, the scale of its operations, and 
anonymity of its users. Meanwhile, ISIS sympathisers and affiliates tried to protect their 
digital legacy (e.g. circulation of propaganda videos and statements of its charismatic leaders) 
and channels of dissemination. As a result, information warfare occurred between ISIS and 
its adversaries. This cyberwar was not limited to social media platforms, but reached to other 
information environments, including Sendvid, JustPaste.it, Woodvid, Telegram, and 
archive.org. In addition, web site creators and administrators have recently designed artificial 
intelligence (AI), to locate information that is uploaded by ISIS affiliates before it reaches a 
                                                          
21 The use of multiple information environments from all directions to generate and disseminate messages. 





wider audience22. AI and people’s intelligence formed an alliance to counter ISIS’ narrative 
and paralyse its IO across various information environments. However, to maintain 
networking structures and the flow of information, ISIS mobilised hackers, disseminators, 
information aggregators, and propagandists. For example, the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC) 
are hackers who have waged information warfare against ISIS’ adversaries and have often 
managed to disrupt their information flows (see section 6.18.2). 
 
To summarise, this thesis argues that between 2014 and 2016, ISIS managed to survive 
attacks that targeted their digital infrastructure and other attempts to disrupt their IO. The 
ISIS paradigm shift included the weaponisation of IO objectives, the use of stigmergic 
swarming strategies, and advanced manoeuvring within digital media environments, which 
included the rapid production of HD propaganda videos, which have helped ISIS to maintain 
its networking structure and secure flows of information. That is, ISIS managed to maintain 
an information feedback loop by translating and enrolling multiple information environments, 




   To understand the role of information in promoting a terror narrative and the creation of 
distributed decentralised networks, this thesis sets out to understand issues highlighted in the 
rational section that were:  
1] The capacity and objectives of information uploaded by ISIS. 
                                                          
22 In early 2018, Facebook adapted AI technologies to trace ISIS propaganda videos. However, AI hasn’t  
 





2] How ISIS managed to manoeuvre across digital media platforms and maintain its 
networking structure in the period between 2014 and 2016. 
 
These issues are approached from two perspectives. The first approach involves dealing with 
information as a paradigm; this aims to understand the purpose and process of message 
assemblages. The second approach aims to understand digital information warfare and how 
ISIS managed to survive degrading operations against it by adapting their warfare strategies 
based on the OODA loop model. 
 
To understand the paradigm shift that appeared after the rise of ISIS, and how ISIS managed 
to leverage its networks by creating networks of affiliates around the world, Raber’s (2003) 
three-paradigm approach to information is used to explain this phenomenon. These three 
paradigms are: physical paradigm, cognitive paradigm, and social informatics. This approach 
provides insight into how information is transmitted and retrieved across information 
environments, the volume of information disseminated, the dynamics of video productions, 
the processes of recruitment and radicalisation, the internal and external communication 
between ISIS members and affiliates, and how the audience perceive and interpret 
information. 
 
The second approach involves taking on board the concepts developed in information-centric 
warfare, the OODA loop warfare model. This approach is important as this thesis 
demonstrates that ISIS adversaries launched information warfare strategy to tackle the rise of 





developed by Colonel John Boyd in 1974.23 Safranski (2008) recognised three significant 
Boydian ideas that apply to network-centric warfare (NCW): 
 
● The idea of manoeuvre warfare. 
● Swarming operations, dependent on units acting in synchronicity—which Boyd 
referred to as auftragstaktik —from a decentralised C2. 
● Information superiority as a decisive advantage in completing OODA loop cycle 
accurately and rapidly. 
 
These operations depend on complex information systems. The OODA loop model provides 
an understanding of how ISIS deepened on the roots of its network structure across digital 
communication platforms and how information-centric warfare was performed. The OODA 
loop identifies the dynamics of how information-centric warfare arose in the networked 
digital media environments. It also allows a way of thinking about warfare, model of conflict, 
and a theory of manoeuvre warfare strategy. The outcome of this approach is that “the side 
that can make the quickest decisions is most likely to win” (Osinga, 2005). 
 
Aims and Scope of the Study 
   The emergence of ISIS, within the political struggle in Iraq and Syria, added a new 
complexity to the socio-technical debate on the use of digital technologies by terror 
organisations (Nacos, 2016; Stohl, 2006). This study aims to map, analyse, and provide an 
                                                          
23 Boyd did not publish his work but preferred to present his theory through many hours, long slide 






understanding of the logistics of ISIS’ digital media networks, which have been employed 
strategically to achieve ISIS’ political objectives. This study analysed the role of digital 
media and communication channels, prior to the emergence of ISIS. Chapter 1 provides an 
outline of terror organisations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaeda, and how these 
organisations operated in the Middle East through mass media channels and web 
technologies. Chapter 2 reviews the significance of the emergence of web 2.0 on the Arab 
Spring uprisings until the rise of ISIS. This chapter argues that SMNs aided in the 
establishment of political and ideological polarisation, which penetrated social fabric and 
inspired political mobilisation. Chapter 3 aims to understand strategic narrative and 
propaganda produced by ISIS. This chapter contains an in-depth analysis of the media 
strategy of ISIS, used to achieve its political objectives in establishing a global caliphate. 
Chapter 4 aims to understand the construction processes of terror messages, including its 
assemblages and flows of information across digital networks. This chapter will analyse the 
dynamics and function of the tools that helped the generation and dissemination of these 
messages from the ANT perspective. Chapter 5 provides insights into the operation for 
degrading ISIS’ digital media logistics. This chapter aims to answer this thesis’s secondary 
question: how has the suspension of Twitter and YouTube accounts impacted on ISIS’ 
networking performance? In this chapter, I identify the phases of the degradation operation: 
degrading and destroying, countering ISIS’ propaganda, and hacking and information 
warfare. Chapter 6 is divided into two case studies that explores the new digital media 
logistics that ISIS adapted in the aftermath of the degrading operation. Case study 1 (see 
section 6.2)24, highlighted the role of Anonymous sharing portals in sustaining the 
                                                          
24 An early version of this case study was published as journal article on perspectives on Terrorism. Cited  
As: Shehabat, A., & Mitew, T. (2018). Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Platforms and  






information loop of ISIS.   Case study 2 (see section 6.3)25 demonstrates how the use of the 
Telegram helped ISIS maintain its network structure. Chapter 7 aims to identify the tactics of 
digital manoeuvre warfare established by ISIS to survive the degrading operation initiated by 
its adversaries. In this chapter, I emphasise that the IO of terror organisations is not limited to 
a certain application of networking and communication channel. Rather, the emergence of 
anonymous digital environments (e.g., JustPaste.it and Sendvid) and encryption 
communication applications (e.g., Telegram and WhatsApp) have enabled ISIS’ IO and 
helped ISIS to maintain its networking structure.26 
 
While many scholars, journalists, and academics have addressed the processes of 
radicalisation, recruitment, and fundraising as the ultimate purpose for ISIS’ use of SMNs 
(Bermingham, Conway, McInerney, O’Hare & Smeaton, 2009; Gerdes, 2011; Neumann, 
2010), this thesis examines the perspective that SMNs, anonymous sharing portals, and 
encrypted communication channels, played a pivotal role at the strategic management of 
ISIS’ media logistics. Tactically, ISIS was able to maintain information flows, distribute a 
pervasive terror narrative, enlist actors, and secure communication channels. Strategically, 
ISIS was able to craft a consistent narrative and execute its psychological operations and 
propaganda at a global scale. The ultimate goal of this was, and still is, to establish a global 
                                                          
25 An early version of this case study was published as journal article on the journal of strategic security.  
Cited as: Shehabat, A., Mitew, T., & Alzoubi, Y. (2017). Encrypted Jihad: Investigating the Role of 
Telegram App in Lone Wolf Attacks in the West. Journal of strategic security, 10(3), 3.  
 
26An early version of this case study was published as journal article on the media and information 
warfare.   Cited as: Shehabat, A., & Mitew, T. (2017). Distributed Swarming and Stigmergic Effects on 








caliphate. Recruitment and radicalisation is one part of the process to achieve this objective. 
Regarding the process of radicalisation and recruitment, ISIS’ IO objectives were designed to 
achieve short-term and long-term strategies to recruit and radicalise individuals. These 
strategies can be achieved by disseminating both grievances and utopian messages.  
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to highlight new perspectives on the types of digital media 
logistics used by ISIS in its IO. To that effect, this thesis examines the weaponisation of 
digital media platforms and the use of sophisticated media production (see section 4.3). This 
thesis also examines the effectiveness of the counter-ISIS degrading operation from an 
information warfare perspective. These perspectives have not yet been used in the literature 
to examine and understand the first three years of media information warfare against ISIS. 
Therefore, this thesis makes an important contribution to the literature. 
 
The scope of this research, however, is focused on ISIS’ online IO part of the information 
warfare it waged to maintain its networking structure in the period between 2014 and 2016. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between real-world networks and their online manifestation is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I have added a timeline of ISIS’ on ground 
operations that highlighted main ups and downs of ISIS during real-world operations (see 
pages xvii-xviii).  
      
To this end, the time frame studied is concerned with the rise of ISIS as a caliphate. Before 
the year 2013, journalists and scholars speculated about the existence of a digital caliphate 
(Atwan, 2015). Ironically, after the Iraqi and Syrian governments declared victory against 








   The research objective of this thesis is to understand, through an information warfare 
perspective, how the emergence of anonymous digital platforms and other digital logistics 
contributed to ISIS’ networks. It seeks to interrogate how ISIS networks engaged these media 
logistics to support its resistance of the attempts to degrade its IO objectives and operations 
between 2014 and 2016. 
 
The study of terrorism and the internet is a multidisciplinary topic, which incorporates media, 
terrorism, military, internet, and political science studies. To better understand the 
relationship between terrorism and the internet, several methodological approaches are 
required, including big data analysis, social network analysis, digital ethnography 
approaches, and text and visual analysis. However, to investigate the complexity of the use of 
digital media logistics that helped in the formation of ISIS’ IO strategy, strategic narrative, 
and propaganda, I have employed a mixed digital methods approach that involves the ANT 
directed, small-scale visual and textual analysis coupled with platform analysis. 
 
With regard to the visual analysis, it is important to acknowledge three facts regarding ISIS’ 
material, which are coherent elements of its digital media logistics and resistance of attempts 
to degrade its IO objectives. First, ISIS has created a sophisticated, new jihad social media 
ecology compared to other terror organisations in the region. Second, ISIS has produced a 
huge amount of HD media—both videos and images. Third, ISIS has rapidly responded to 
degradation operations by creating information signs and traces for its affiliates to follow. In 
other words, ISIS managed to maintain its networking structure and flows of information by 





encrypted communication channels, sophistication of message assemblages and processes, 
and speed of dissemination. The visual analysis in this thesis (see section 4.14) includes the 
most circulated propaganda videos, which were intended to be most effective in representing 
ISIS’ ideology. 
 
As this research aims to understand how ISIS’ digital media logistics IO were used to achieve 
a political end, it is essential to trace the digital activity of ISIS over multiple information 
environments to comprehensively understand ISIS’ propaganda strategies and IO. 
 
Chapter 4 examines ISIS’ Romeyah English magazine to capture the trends and themes of 
ISIS’ IO strategy, in which non-Arabic speakers were targeted. To do this, I selected seven 
editions of Romeyah English magazines, downloaded from two primary sources: archive.org 
and Nashir Political Services ISIS Telegram channel. I used the NVivo software analytic tool 
to capture the trends and themes of ISIS’ strategic narrative. My findings are presented as a 
screenshot. 
 
Tracing the network associations and online activity of ISIS, via the work of Latour and 
ANT, requires a mixed digital methods approach. As Marres (as cited in Kanngieser, Neilson 
& Rossiter, 2014) argued, “This approach develops ‘natively digital’ research tools that take 
advantage of the analytic and empirical capacities that are embedded in online media”. 
Within the framework of ANT, this research traced the online activity of ISIS on popular and 
anonymous digital platforms. By tracing ISIS’ activity, particularly on anonymous digital 
networks (e.g., dump.to, Sendvid and JustPaste.it), their logistical associations with other 
digital networks (such as Twitter) can be discerned. Ultimately, this will provide insights into 





digital method will also unveil the associations and interactions with these networks through 
the lenses of number of views, shares, and comments. This is helpful in capturing the trends 
and trajectory of ISIS’ terror narrative. As this research involves tracing the online activity of 
ISIS, mixed digital research methods will be used, including platform analysis, data 
visualisation, and screenshots. 
 
Platform Analysis 
   Joss Hands (2013) defined ‘platforms’ as: 
 
A software framework running on the World Wide Web or Internet, in the form of 
social media interfaces, apps, or most commonly ‘Web 2.0’ portals that gather users 
in interfaces with each other and with the Web and the Internet itself. (p. 3) 
 
The structure of platforms27—operated by systems, devices, and objects (human or non-
human)—and the operation of platforms is a result of convergence between its elements of 
structure. As digital platforms are designed to generate and aggregate content, information 
dissemination and communication, platform analysis will identify associations between 
content generators and the platform itself. This thesis highlights the importance of the 
platform analysis approach in charting the qualitative information on anonymous digital 
platforms (e.g., JustPaste.it, Sendvid and dump.to), encrypted communication channels (e.g., 
Telegram) and Twitter. Platform analysis provides insight into the socio-political change 
                                                          
27 Platforms are part of digital media environments discussed in this thesis. However, platforms are 
different from portals in a way that platforms offer users tools that enable them to build their groups and 
networks within the setting of the platform. Therefore, in this thesis, Facebook and Twitter were treated as 





created by the multiple uses of different digital environments to disseminate a pervasive 
terror narrative. With the concentration of attention on these elements, the aim is to learn how 
digital media networks contribute to the discourse of terror networks. 
Screenshots 
I am using screenshots to illustrate my key points within the thesis. I have provided 
screenshots that are evidence to ISIS’ IO on the information domains. In this thesis, the 
screenshot methodology approach is twofold. First, I have captured screenshots that were 
widely celebrated and circulated by ISIS members and sympathisers through Telegram, and 
other microblogging sites used by ISIS, to capture the evidence of propaganda and media 
narrative of ISIS networks used as part of network communication. Moore (2014) suggested 
that “As media objects they can be dynamically traced across the networks of their 
dissemination and require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural production that considers 
texts independently of experience”. Second, screenshots obtained from Twitter and video 
productions are used to interpret the thematic analysis of media narrative of ISIS networks. 
Siegler (2015) considered screenshots as a powerful way to manoeuvre around Twitter’s 140-
character limit. He suggested that, “people figured out that you could take a screenshot of any 
text on the web and share that as the image payload of a tweet”. These shared screenshots can 
be gathered, mapped and interpreted which help to understand the communication pattern of 
ISIS networks.   
  
According to Moore (2014), screenshots “play important and unacknowledged roles in the 
method of mapping, graphing and visualising as well as the general communication of 
research” (p. 142). In my research, this analysis sought to answer some important ontological 





from them? Moore (2014) highlighted the importance of screenshots in making sense of data 
visualisation. Moore (2014) noted: 
 
Screenshots are an excellent example: as digital tools, they diminish permanence in exchange 
for malleability and performativity. As media objects they can be dynamically traced across 
the networks of their dissemination and require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural 
production that considers texts independently of experience. (p. 142) 
 
Screenshots played a critical role in ISIS’ IO and is considered an important element of ISIS’ 
logistics.  For instance, it is used as a recruitment tool of foreign fighters, catalyst of lone-
wolfs, and carryout media propaganda operations. Within this context, screenshots are 
together with videos and other media, considered as important actants in the ISIS actor-
network, which ANT allows me to follow, trace, capture, and analyse.   
Capturing of circulated screenshots was an important element of media propaganda used by 
ISIS to leverage its networks. Also, capturing screenshots from ISIS propaganda videos is 












1 Chapter 1: Terror Organisations and Web Technology in the Arab 
World in the 21st Century 
 
1.1 Introduction 
    The objective of this chapter is to understand the influence of digital media logistics such 
as ICTs and SMNs and how it became an integral part of influence warfare28 during wartime 
in some parts of the Arab world. In this chapter, I examine how the evolution of internet 
technologies and independent satellite channels have shaped a new wave of terrorism that has 
erupted across the MENA region and extended beyond the borders of the Arab world.  
 
This chapter aims to expand on and explain the paradigm shift in terror communication 
established before the emergence of ISIS. It also pictured how digital media logistics are used 
as weapons by guerrillas as instruments of information warfare. Therefore, this chapter 
explores two main ideas.  
 
First, this chapter outlines how previous terror organisations, such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah 
and Hamas, operated in the Middle East—and were dependent on mass media channels and 
web technologies for communication purposes—prior to the emergence of ISIS. Second, this 
study explores how information environments enabled terror organisations to flourish; these 
environments were useful information sources, which informed warfare and military 
confrontations. This chapter will examine three case studies on the most notorious terror 
organisations (i.e., Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas) in the Middle East, prior to ISIS. This 
                                                          
28 Influence warfare is part of information operation that includes the dissemination of propaganda in 
pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. The use of this term in this thesis was suggested by 
James Forest during an early review version of this thesis who suggested that influence warfare may 





chapter argues that ICTs and SMNs have played a key role in the existence, maintenance of 
flows of information, and leverage of terror networks. This chapter is divided into three parts. 
First, I discuss the historical roots of terror networks in the Middle East and Iraq. Second, I 
examine how the exploitation of ICTs aided Al-Qaeda’s operations and affected world 
security. Third, I explore how Hezbollah and Hamas weaponised SMNs and websites for C2 
operations. 
 
1.2 The Emergence of Jihadi Movements—A Historical Perspective 
    The Arab world suffered a severe setback after the establishment of the State of Israel in 
1948. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan lost a six-day war against Israel in 1967 that resulted in Israel 
occupying the West Bank of Jordan, the Golan Heights of Syria, and Sinai of Egypt. To 
retaliate and seize their occupied territories, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in 1973, but 
could not achieve military victory as US troops intervened and protected Israel. In 1978, the 
US offered Egypt a peace agreement with Israel in Camp David (i.e., the Camp David 
Accords). Part of the agreement stated that Sinai and other occupied Egyptian lands would be 
returned to Egypt. 
 
However, the Camp David Accords had consequences for the relationship between Arab 
nations and Palestinians. Palestine felt betrayed by Arab nations who favoured peace with 
Israel, over achieving a successful military operation to liberate Palestine. Since then, jihadi 
and secular Palestinian movements emerged to take up arms against Israel. The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Hamas have 
attacked Israel with suicide bombings, abductions and shootings. The outcome of the Camp 
David peace treaty with Israel created an internal conflict in Egyptian society and the broader 





government interests, target foreign tourists, and assassinate police and military personnel. 
Zanini (1999) argued that “the Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya [wa]s the most active Islamic 
extremist group in Egypt. In November 1997 Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya carried out an attack on 
Hatshepsut’s Temple in Luxor, killing 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians” (p. 249). This jihadi 
movement caused significant economic and political damages; Egyptian Salafists paralysed 
Egypt’s tourism industry and then succeeded in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 
1980. 
1.3 The Rise of Hamas 
    In 1982, Israel attacked Lebanon to secure its northern border from daily skirmishes with 
PLO guerrillas, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. A few years later Hezbollah (The Party 
of God)29, under the leadership of Sheikh Sobhi Toufaily, was stationed in southern Lebanon 
after the Lebanese government managed to send Yasser Arafat and his PLO leaders to 
Tunisia. Hezbollah officially formed in 1985 after the Amal Movement became secular. As 
Schleifer (2006, p. 4) noted, Hezbollah found in Lebanon fertile ground for their activities, 
particularly after Israel started to attack the PLO. Since its emergence in 1985, Hezbollah has 
fought the Israeli army over its occupation. Hezbollah’s operations against Israel resulted in 
withdrawal of the Israeli army from southern Lebanon in 2000. With daily border skirmishes, 
Israel launched two massive military operations in 1996 and 2006 against Hezbollah; 
however, Israel failed to end Hezbollah’s hostility. On the Palestinian front, the conflict 
between PLO (rebranded as Fateh) and Hamas eased the attacks on Israel; the internal armed 
conflict divided the Palestinians into two groups: Islamists and secular individuals. 
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In 2006, Hamas won the national Palestinian elections, but the US and Israel criticised this 
victory as Hamas explicitly denied the existence of Israel. According to Wilson (2006), “The 
election results stunned U.S. and Israeli officials, who have repeatedly stated that they would 
not work with a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas, which both countries and the 
European Union have designated as a terrorist organisation”. Hamas argue that Israel is a 
land occupier. As such, Hamas “favours the creation of a Palestinian nation on land that now 
includes Israel rather than the road map’s two-state solution” (Wilson, 2006). However, the 
US, European Union, Palestinian National Authority and Israel refuse to acknowledge Hamas 
as an equal partner in the negotiations with Israel, as Hamas is understood to be “a terrorist 
organisation that refuses to recognise Israel or renounce violence” (Tran, 2007). The rejection 
of the 2006 democratic elections led to Hamas’s decision to seize control of the Gaza Strip. 
Hamas managed to disarm the Fateh movement in Gaza Strip and declare Gaza as 
independent from Palestinian Authority. As Zeitzoff (2011) asserted, “Hamas, and hence 
Gaza, was isolated internationally as it refused to recognize Israel as a state, renounce 
violence, and follow previous Palestinian Authority agreements reached with Israel” (p. 941). 
 
While Hamas was in control of Gaza under Islamist rule, Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza 
from land and sea and continued to assassinate Hamas’s top leaders. Consequently, Hamas 
continued its rocket attacks against Israeli targets. Three major confrontations in 2008, 2012 
and 2014 occurred between Hamas and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Significantly, in this 
war between 2012 and 2014, Hamas and IDF harnessed media tactics to rally international 
support, and disseminate information, propaganda and disinformation. 
 





    The emergence of Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, can be traced to the 
Soviet–Afghan War of 1979. Tarabay (2013) from Al Jazeera News argued, “The expansion 
of Arab Afghan Mujahedin movements during Russian attempts to occupy Afghanistan in 
1979 was a tipping point for the rise of ‘Al-Qaeda’”. Thousands of young Arab nationals, 
mainly from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen travelled to Afghanistan in response to 
the Afghan mujahedin’s call for jihad. The Soviet Union’s involvement in Afghanistan 
sought to support the communist Afghani government, led by Najeeb Allah, against the 
rebelling mujahedin, who claimed the government to be anti-Islamic (Hilali, 2005). The US 
government backed the mujahedin by supplying weapons and other military logistics to 
defeat the Soviet Union forces, as the US was concerned about the expansion of communism 
(Wittmeyer, 2013). During the Soviet–Afghan war, which lasted for 10 years, the US 
installed the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Afghanistan to monitor the 
performance of the mujahedin and to establish a database (translating to ‘Al-Qaeda’ in 
Arabic) of the mujahedin for intelligence and military purposes (Chossudovsky, 2008). In 
1989, the Soviet Union leader—Mikhail Gorbachev—ended the war, due to its significant 
military and economic costs. Steven Randolph (n.d.) from the US Office of the Historian 
described the aftermath of Russian departure from Afghanistan as “the Soviets left a shattered 
country in which the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group, seized control, later providing 
Osama bin Laden with a training base from which to launch terrorist operations worldwide”. 
 
The return of the Afghan Arab mujahedin to their countries of origin concerned Arab 
governments and the US, as the mujahedin’s leader—Osama bin Laden—shifted his jihad 
strategy to the US after establishing military bases in Saudi Arabia in 199130. The US 
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stationed its troops in Saudi Arabia as part of a coalition working against Saddam Hussein, 
who occupied Kuwait in 1990. According to Zanini (1999, p. 249), bin Laden was accused of 
targeting US troops in Yemen, Somalia (in 1992), Riyadh, and Khobar (as the blasts in Saudi 
Arabia resulted in the deaths of 24 Americans between 1995 and 1996). 
 
1.5 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
    In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on US soil, the US declared a Global War on 
Terrorism to seek revenge for the attacks, for which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. In 
2002, the US managed to occupy Afghanistan and prepared to attack Iraq. In April 2003, the 
US troops occupied Iraq, but confronted resistance from Sunni militants in the Anbar 
Province, after the ousting of Saddam Hussein. Since the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates started to emerge as subgroups (almost as if the terror organisation 
was franchising itself), attacking US interests around the world. For example, in Iraq, Al-
Qaeda affiliated with a jihadist group, under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who 
established a resistant group—Al-Jihad wa Al-Tawhid—to fight US troops (Atwan, 2015; 
Stern & Berger, 2015). Al-Zarqawi appointed Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as his deputy, who 
eventually became Caliph after the emergence of ISIS in 2013. 
 
 Despite the centralised structure of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, the use of ICTs—
especially the internet—has changed the form of these organisations to be decentralised, 
distributed, and leaderless (Sageman, 2011). Thus, this chapter explores the role of ICTs and 
the internet in changing the shape and ways that terror organisations form IOs and maintain 
their networking structure. As Zanini (1999) argued,  





Terrorist groups are taking advantage of information technology to coordinate the activities of 
dispersed members. Such technology may be employed by terrorists not only to wage 
information warfare, but also to support their own networked organisations (p. 247). 
 
1.6 Terror Communication Before the Emergence of ISIS 
    SMNs and other ICTs have been noted for their role in galvanising social movements and 
mediating terrorist communications over the last decade (Cox, 2006; Garrett, 2006; Jefferson, 
2007). The network design of terror organisations or groups is dependent on connections 
between individuals, which requires communication tools to create these networks. Thus, 
communication tools are essential as terror organisations acquire C2 operations. McLuhan (as 
cited in Soriano, 2008)—one of the most distinguished researchers on the social impact of 
mass media—indicated that “without communication, terrorism would not exist” (p. 2). 
To understand the role of media in shaping the organisational form of Middle Eastern terror 
organisations, Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini (1999) in their book, Networks and Netwars, 
claimed: 
 
             Middle East Arab terrorists are on the cutting edge of organisational networking and 
stand to gain significantly from the information revolution. They can harness 
information technology to enable less hierarchical, more network design—enhancing 
their flexibility responsiveness and resilience. (p. 29) 
 
This chapter examines three case studies of terror networks, and how these terror 
organisations deepened their roots in ICTs and SMNs to maintain their networking structure 
and sustain flows of information. The case studies include Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. 





    This case study will discuss how Al-Qaeda harnessed the internet and digital information 
environments for C2 operations, the spread of ideology, the coordination of attacks, the 
dissemination of propaganda, and the call for global jihad (Conway, 2012; Conway & 
McInerney, 2008; Hoffman, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Weimann, 2010). Al-Qaeda jihadists 
were aware that they were fighting a battle, in which the main setting was the news media 
itself. This view was expressed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a personal letter to Al-Zarqawi (as 
cited in Soriano, 2008): 
 
            However, despite all of this, I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race 
for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will 
never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan. (p. 9) 
      
Al-Qaeda has strategically adapted internet technologies to recruit potential followers and to 
win the hearts and minds of Muslims around the globe. Al-Qaeda have also used online 
media to present itself as a social online movement. As Gerdes (2011, p. 172) suggested, by 
presenting itself as a social movement, Al-Qaeda allowed potential followers easy access to 
participate. This impacted on its web activity, as more participants were driven to the 
organisation. Therefore, Al-Qaeda expanded its reach by adapting and creating more web 
pages and harnessing multiple information environments. 
 
The literature on Al-Qaeda’s utilisation of digital technologies is overwhelming. Thus, in this 
case study, I will highlight Al-Qaeda’s digital terrorism in correlation with ISIS terrorism. 
That is, ISIS inherited the media legacy of Al-Qaeda, as ISIS operated under Al-Qaeda prior 
to declaring the Islamic caliphate in July 2014. The argument put forward in this case study is 






              By 2020, an entirely new generation of ‘jihadists’ will have gone through Al Qaeda’s training 
camps, who will have returned to their home countries and re-created the kind of global 
network that emerged in the 1990s. In addition to being trained in terrorist tactics, this 
‘second generation’ of Al Qaeda will harness the full power of the Internet to coordinate 
attacks as well as communicate and propagate their views. (pp. 10–11) 
 
This case study is twofold. The first aspect is concerned with how Al-Qaeda harnessed 
internet technologies prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. The second aspect of this study 
is concerned with the rise of AQI in 2003 until the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010. 
 
1.8 Al-Qaeda Prior to September 11, 2001 
    Prior to the September 11 terror attacks on the US in 2001, Al-Qaeda harnessed the 
internet to communicate via email and World Wide Web (WWW) with sympathisers of the 
global jihadist movement around the world (Behnke & Hellmich, 2012; Hoffman, 2003; 
Levin, 2011; Rudner, 2016; Schmid, 2014; Weimann, 2010). The use of ICTs was essential 
for operational and organisational purposes. At an operational level, Al-Qaeda’s 
communication during this period relied on the WWW to act as an information environment, 
to disseminate propaganda, spread the culture of jihad, coordinate attacks, recruit and 
radicalise new members, and raise funds (Adhami, 2007; Arquilla et al., 1999; Jefferson, 
2007; Lesser, Arquilla, Hoffman, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999). As a further example of Al-
Qaeda’s ability to make intelligent use of the WWW, Al-Zawahiri (in 2007) participated in 
an online interview, including a chat session with questions from individuals and news 






Al-Qaeda invested in websites, such as Neda’a Al-Islam and Shumukh Al-Islam, to become 
the main hubs for Al-Qaeda’s ideology and propaganda distribution. Al-Qaeda also 
established the Inspire magazine, as well as As-Sahab media31 and Al-Forqan32 media 
wings33 to produce propaganda videos. Zanini (1999) observed that in the network structure 
of Al-Qaeda: 
 
             The most decentralized groups—appear to have embraced information technology to 
coordinate activities and disseminate propaganda and ideology. This is consistent with the rise 
in the Middle East of what has been termed techno-terrorism, or the use by terrorists of 
satellite communications, e-mail, and the World Wide Web. (p. 251) 
 
Other communication technologies, such as Paltalk and Bulletin Boards, were used for 
organisational and internal communication purposes. Zanini (1999) reported: 
 
             According to reporters who visited bin Laden’s headquarters in a remote mountainous area of 
Afghanistan, the terrorist financier has computers, communications equipment, and a large 
number of disks for data storage. Egyptian ‘Afghan’ computer experts are said to have helped 
devise a communication network that relies on the World Wide Web, e-mail, and electronic 
bulletin boards so that the extremists can exchange information without running a major risk 
of being intercepted by counterterrorism officials. (p. 251) 
      
                                                          
31 The official media wing of Al-Qaeda. 
32 This media wing has served ISIS as a propaganda machine. 
33 Media wings and media arms are metaphors used to express the important role played by these media 





However, most of Al-Qaeda’s digital activity focused on depleting US resources and 
spreading fear among the Western world through PSYOP. Some of these operations included 
threats to attack the US using biological and chemical weapons, direct messages sent by bin 
Laden on regular bases, threats of imminent attacks, and the claiming of responsibility for 
small attacks by individuals in the West. Simultaneously, Al-Qaeda directed its call to jihad 
towards Muslims around the world. As Theohary (2011) noted, “Most Al Qaeda-produced 
ideological material reflects Al Qaeda supporters’ shared view of jihad as an individual duty 
to fight on behalf of Islam and Muslims” (p. 1). 
 
As Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks and the US declared its 
Global War on Terrorism, a new chapter of terror communication emerged. Retrospectively, 
this era is marked by the establishment of global terror networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda. 
 
1.9 The Occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the Emergence of ISIS 
    In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the US government decided to destroy Al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. However, while the US managed to occupy Afghanistan by 2002, Al-Qaeda 
operatives fled to Pakistan, Iraq, North Africa and Yemen. The attack on Iraq and the ousting 
of the former president, Saddam Hussein, resulted in the creation of a political vacuum and 
fertile sphere for insurgency networks to emerge. One of these networks was Al-Qaeda. 
However, this subsection will focus on Al-Zarqawi’s use of internet technologies to carry out 
PSYOP to establish AQI and resist US forces after the demise of Saddam Hussein. As 
Conway and McInerney (2008) explained, “By going online, however, Zarqawi was able to 
both control the interpretation of his violent message and achieve greater impact with smaller 
operations” (p. 23). Part of this discussion will highlight the Al-Nusra terror organisation’s 






After the September 11 attacks until the rise of ISIS, Al-Qaeda harnessed websites as the 
main hub for information dissemination. Additionally, the emergence of web 2.0 technologies 
made a significant contribution to Al-Qaeda’s IO purposes. Adhami (2007) observed, “The 
jihadi websites are a phenomenon that has developed considerably in the post-9/11 era” 
(p. 864). According to Weimann (2010), in 1998, the US Department of State counted no 
more than 15 websites maintained by terrorist groups; however, in 2005, there were more 
than 4,000 websites supporting terrorist activities. In the post–March 2003 era, Iraq had 
become the main subject of discussion on these websites (Weimann, 2010). The material 
posted on these websites included, video clips of bin Laden in training camps in Afghanistan, 
electronic journals that contained analyses of the conflict in Iraq and Al-Qaeda operations, 
technical information about bomb-making, instructions on how to conduct simple operations, 
and speeches by clerics who emphasised the importance of jihad (Adhami, 2007; Conway, 
2012). 
 
The literature on Al-Qaeda’s use of communication technologies is immense and for the 
purpose of this thesis, I have highlighted some aspects of information production and 
dissemination tactics—which have been rarely documented and researched in academia—as a 
first step in understanding the IO strategy of ISIS networks. However, ISIS invested more in 
the production of ‘terror HD’ propaganda videos than PSYOP. Therefore, in Section 1.7 I 
have only highlighted the most important elements of the logistics of PSYOP exercised by 
Al-Qaeda. 
1.10 The Logistics of Psychological Warfare 
    In this section, the thesis discusses the logistics of PSYOP carried out by Al-Zarqawi’s 





propaganda videos. AQI (Al-Zarqawi’s group) realised the potential for video technology to 
be used during operations, in which US troops could be targeted with the intention of causing 
psychological and morale effects. In May 2004, Al-Zarqawi himself beheaded an American 
hostage live on video. This was the first propaganda video produced by Al-Zarqawi that was 
posted on the internet. Conway (2012) argued that: 
 
              The entire purpose of the beheading was to video it, to create images that would grip the 
imaginations of friends and enemies alike. It worked. Zarqawi risked almost nothing in this 
operation; but he started a withdrawal of foreign contractors which has paralysed 
reconstruction in Iraq and done as much if not more to undermine US plans as a bomb that 
killed 100 people in Najaf. And he made himself a hero to jihadis across the world. (p. 23) 
      
The relationship between the camera and the gun proved a more powerful weapon than the 
gun and bullet. While a bullet may kill an active combatant, a video camera has the power to 
cause psychological damage to troop morale. For example, Al-Qaeda’s Sniper 1 (Juba 
Baghdad Sniper) video production generated great effect on the morale of US troops in Iraq. 
Every single bullet that was directed at the head of a US marine was documented with a 
video camera that was attached to the sniper’s gun. As described by Rory (2005), the “sniper 
saps the morale of US marines in Iraq”. The 30-minute video included over 50 Al-Qaeda 
operations, which invited other jihadi to join the fight against US troops in Iraq. Rory (2005) 
recounted some of the harrowing dialogue, ‘The video starts with a man saying, “I have nine 
bullets in this gun and I have a present for George Bush. I am going to kill nine soldiers. I am 
doing this for the viewers to watch”. According to counterterrorism expert, Abdul Hameed 
Bakier (as cited in Adhami, 2007), “The most effective jihadi propaganda videos are 






The psychological success of the documentary, Sniper 1—measured by its contribution to 
demoralising the US marines—encouraged Al-Qaeda to produce Sniper 2 and Sniper 3 in 
2007, and Sniper 4 in 2008. In these videos, Al-Qaeda have used more sophisticated video 
cameras and post-production techniques. The video discusses the alleged fear generated 
within the coalition forces by insurgency snipers and shows ‘Juba’ returning from a sniping 
mission, marking a tally of dead US troops on a wall. To generate maximum psychological 
effect on US marines, the spokesperson in the videos shows sniper footage of dozens of US 
marines targets, along with jihadi Nasheeds (i.e., songs). These videos end with footage of 
dozens of Iraqi snipers operating on the ground. Significantly, to spread more fear among US 
marines and its coalition operating in Iraq, Al-Qaeda has Sniper 4’s subtitles translated into 
many languages. 
      
It is important to mention that before the Sniper 1 and Sniper 2 productions, Al-Qaeda’s 
information production in Iraq was less sophisticated. That is, their propaganda went 
unnoticed as most of their earlier productions were simple, low-quality videos that 
documented attacks of military vehicles with no images of US casualties. These examples of 
failed propaganda productions led to ISIS’ adoption of sophisticated media strategies as part 
of its IO strategy. 
 
Consequently, as Al-Qaeda noticed the change of dynamic and participation with its videos 
after using sophisticated production strategies, it moved to produce more propaganda videos 
that were dependent on web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to 
expand its audience and reach. Marks (2005) observed an advertisement on Al-Qaeda’s 
website that said, “Wanted: Video editors, writers, and webmasters to help Al Qaeda spread 





“prior to 9/11, only a handful of extremist websites existed. Now there are thousands of 
increasingly sophisticated sites offering everything from chat rooms, to videos of beheadings, 
as well as in-depth instructions on kidnapping, bomb-making, and recruiting”. 
 
To this end, AQI under the leadership of Al-Zarqawi have built a strong network in Iraq. 
After his death in 2007, Al-Qaeda became an integral part of the Sunni community in Anbar 
Province, and consequently, played a significant political role during the Iraqi uprisings in 
2012. The internet helped Al-Zarqawi build his brand very quickly. Arguably, his use of 
production strategies assisted in breeding the most sophisticated terror organisation in the 
Middle East, ISIS. However, in Syria, Al-Qaeda was operating under the Al-Nusra terror 
organisation. Al-Nusra had a critical role during the Syrian Civil War, which started in March 
2011, and is recognised as part of the Arab Spring uprisings. 
 
The Al-Nusra leader, Abu Mohammad Al-Julani, was Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s aid before 
Al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself as Caliph. During the years between 2012 and 2013, AQI 
(now under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi) sent logistical aid (e.g., weapons, ammunition and 
cars) to Al-Julani to fight the Syrian army. However, the rejection of Al-Julani’s pledge of 
allegiance to the Caliph, and his insistence to maintain his position in Al-Qaeda, forced Al-
Baghdadi to declare war against him. Al-Nusra has been designated as a terrorist organisation 
by both the US and Russian governments. Unlike ISIS, Al-Nusra does not receive a great 
deal of coverage in mainstream media. This is partially due to the way that Al-Nusra manages 
to fly under the radar on Twitter. However, Al-Nusra has been described as the harshest anti-







1.11 Hezbollah’s Media Strategy 
     Hezbollah is one of the most sophisticated terror organisations that has emerged from the 
Middle East. That is, it is structured as a hierarchical, centralised organisation, while its C2 
operation is decentralised, based on auftragstaktik operations. As Zanini (1999) described it, 
“The pro-Iranian Hezbollah acts as an umbrella organisation of radical Shi’ite groups, and in 
many respects, is a hybrid of hierarchical and network arrangements” (p. 250). 
 
In this case study, I explore Hezbollah’s IO strategy and the role played by web technologies 
and satellite channel (e.g., Al-Manar) in PSYOP during the 1996 to 2006 military 
confrontations with the Israeli forces. The emergence of WWW and satellite channels helped 
Hezbollah to end of 18 years of Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, which ultimately led to 
Hezbollah’s victory in the 2006 asymmetrical war. As Schleifer (2006) stated, “The visual 
media proved one of Hezbollah’s most effective weapons” (p. 6). It is important to highlight 
the role of SMNs as weapons for C2 operation utilised by Hezbollah guerrillas. As Nissen 
(2015) argued: 
 
             Hezbollah also used social network media for command and control and to defend their main 
information distribution channel (Al-Manar TV) from IDF cyber-attacks. Information 
(propaganda products) was, besides being aired over Al-Manar TV, re-distributed regionally 
and globally through PowerPoint presentations, video-clips and photos with an attached story 
in e-mails, video up-load sites, social media and blogs. (p. 77) 
      
Along with its main websites (hizbollah.org and www.almanar.com.lb), the Al-Manar 
satellite channel was instrumental in galvanising Arab opinion, by carrying out public 
relation campaigns against Israel and promoting Hezbollah’s ideology. Therefore, it is 






Since its emergence in the 1990s, Al-Manar was critical to the information production and 
dissemination of Hezbollah’s propaganda for local and international audiences. Al-Manar 
worked hard to promote the ideology and narrative of Hezbollah being the ‘moqawama’ (i.e., 
the resistance) “to almost 200 million regional viewers” (Caldwell, William, Murphy & 
Menning, 2009, p. 5). As El Houri and Saber (2010) argued, “Throughout this decade the 
Hezbollah would focus on promoting a narrative of ‘resistance’ and developing their media 
capacities by introducing the ‘Channel of the Resistance’” (p. 72). Further, Conway (2007) 
highlighted the strategic role played by Al-Manar in shaping Hezbollah’s politics, suggesting 
that: 
 
             Al Manar has, since its foundation, been a television station devoted to the goals of 
Hezbollah, and although these have been subject to change over time, the overarching theme 
of resistance has persisted throughout. From its establishment in 1991 to the Israeli 
withdrawal from the south in 2000, the bulk of the station’s programming was aimed at 
sustaining and, if possible, strengthening the Lebanese public’s support for Hezbollah’s 
campaign of resistance again the IDF in south Lebanon, while at the same time pressuring 
Israeli viewers to push their government for a unilateral withdrawal. (p. 8) 
 
The newly established Shiite political party borrowed from the revolutionary thinking of 
Khomeini of Iran but required the media strategy to establish legitimacy in the Arab world. 
This legitimacy was important as Lebanon had suffered under civil war and the Israeli 
occupation of southern Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Hezbollah gained 
notoriety in the Arab world at a grassroots level, by intensifying daily attacks on Israeli 
targets in southern Lebanon. Therefore, it called itself ‘Mumanah’ and ‘Moqawamah’ (i.e., 





against Israel were documented by using video and broadcast on the Al-Manar satellite 
channel showing its victories against the Israelis. El Houri and Saber (2010) described this 
strategy as an “efficient strategy of representation by videotaping their military operations 
and exposing these images to the public. Hezbollah exploited the power of these videos to 
reshape the prevailing political, cultural, and military realities” (p. 71). 
 
Since its emergence in 1985, Hezbollah’s warfare strategy was based on documenting its 
operations using video. As Schleifer (2006) observed, “The organisation’s motto could be 
summed up in the words: If you haven’t captured it on film you haven’t fought” (p. 6). 
Through the use of the video camera “Hezbollah demonstrated how it was possible, with only 
a few simple pieces of equipment and some creative thinking, to net huge military and 
psychological dividends” (Schleifer, 2006, p. 6). Most of the captured videos were posted to 
Hezbollah’s main websites (www.moqawamah.org and www.hezbollah.org) and broadcasted 
via Al-Manar satellite television. In section 1.9, I discuss the importance of internet 
technologies in the asymmetrical military confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel, 
between 1996 and 2006. 
 
1.12 Information Dissemination During the 1996 and 2006 Lebanon Wars with Israel 
    Trying to end the daily rocket attacks on its northern border, Israel launched a 
comprehensive attack against Hezbollah guerrillas who had been fighting the Israelis in south 
Lebanon since 1985. IDF operations, ‘Grapes of Wrath’ (Gambill, 1998) or ‘Clusters of 
Anger’, included a series of coordinated Israeli raids against Hezbollah in the south of 






At its first face-to-face confrontation with the IDF, Hezbollah succeeded in newscasting 
atrocities committed by the IDF and celebrating its own victories through videos posted to its 
two main websites and its satellite channel. As Zanini (1999) observed, 
 
The internet [was] used as a propaganda tool by Hezbollah, which manages three World Wide 
Web sites—one for the central press office (at www.hizbollah.org), another to describe its 
attacks on Israeli targets (at www.moqawama.org), and the last for news and information (at 
www.almanar.com.lb) (p. 252). 
 
Before the emergence of SMNs, terror organisations depended on their own media outlets; 
Al-Qaeda depended on Al Jazeera and Hamas depended on the Al-Quds satellite channels for 
information dissemination. 
 
However, Hezbollah’s media platforms were vulnerable to hacking activity, which meant that 
their information flows could be disrupted. Technically speaking, Hezbollah’s adversaries 
could intercept its satellite channel, which meant the feed stream could be diverted or hacked, 
causing a downlink or feed stream jamming effect. As a result, satellite feed streams became 
a dysfunctional tool for information flows. This could also happen to web pages. Information 
flows can be easily hacked, defaced, and disrupted by adversaries.  
 
The author experienced such events during the 1996 war in Lebanon, while working for the 
Worldwide Television News (WTN)34. During the ‘Clusters of Anger’ operation against 
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 1996, the WTN Amman’s bureau office received a 15-
minute video taken by our correspondent in Lebanon, Assad Fighaly. The video depicted the 
                                                          





destruction of an entire primary school caused by IDF. The scenes showed the bodies of 
many school children, because the air strikes had targeted a refugee primary school in Qana. 
After we received the unedited material from a driver, who came to Jordan via the Syrian 
border35, we contacted Eurosat36 to share the video as an exclusive story for WTN37. We 
received a disturbing reply from Eurosat, who claimed to have received enough material 
about the Israel operation in southern Lebanon. If the material had been accepted by Eurosat, 
millions of viewers around the world would have been reached, generating a significant 
global effect. As Saad et al. (2011) noted, 
 
The psychological impact was as significant as physical destruction. Information and 
reputation were very strong weapons, and both parts needed to exercise moral influence on 
populations, and model public opinion, if they wanted to win the conflict durably (p. 4). 
      
The gatekeeping strategy of Eurosat had a great impact on information reach and effect. As 
Caldwell et al. (2009) argued: 
 
              Proliferation and accessibility have played havoc with old rules of the media game in at least 
two important areas, gatekeeping and agenda-setting. Before the widespread advent of the 
                                                          
35 Such videos could not be broadcast via Syria TV as the process was controlled by Syrian intelligence, 
requiring long approval times and carrying the risk of rejection by the censors.  
36 Stationed in London, which is the main hub that receive satellite feed across the world. Eurosat has 
allocated five times a day to be informed to receive information from other satellite tv stations. Our contact 
point was via the Jordanian TV station.  





new media, traditional editors and producers served as ‘gatekeepers’, determining what 
stories and features to publish in accordance with varied criteria. (p. 3) 
 
The rejected material was filed and archived to preserve WTN’s material policy. 
Nevertheless, Hezbollah managed to create many videos of the Qana massacres and post 
them to its websites and Al-Manar, which had been under heavy cyber-attacks at that time. 
This is how information sharing happened before the emergence of SMNs. However, 10 
years later, a dramatic shift occurred in information dissemination tactics during the second 
major confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2006. The rise of social media 
platforms in 2004 had “abolished traditional gatekeeper and agenda setting roles” (Caldwell 
et al., 2009, p. 3). 
 
Overall, the media logistics of Hezbollah during 1996 had been tested, forcing them to 
identify avenues for communication and dissemination that could not be easily hacked or 
intercepted. The jamming of its satellite feed and the hacking of its main hubs for information 
dissemination pressured Hezbollah to use the Lebanese government television station and 
other Arab independent satellite channels, such as Al Jazeera. Lesson on war logistics (e.g., 
military supplies) and some aspects of C2 were also learned (Kulick, 2006). Kulick (2006) 
argued that “the clashes of 1996 ended with relative success at the operational level, as the 
organisation was successful in launching Katyusha rockets into Israel up until the ceasefire”. 
 
1.13 Social Media Networks During the 2006 Lebanon War 
     This era was marked with the emergence of three of the most influential SMNs—
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—which provided Hezbollah with a platform for 





Israel showed early on how social network media was successfully used in a contemporary 
conflict by a non-state actor to mitigate a conventional military disadvantage” (p. 77). 
This war was initiated when Hezbollah launched a surprise attack against Israel, killing eight 
and abducting two IDF members (Caldwell et al., 2009; Kalb & Saivetz, 2007, p. 7) in 
retaliation to the killing of a Lebanese boy by IDF (as Hezbollah claimed) in southern 
Lebanon. However, for Hezbollah, this war was not mainly ignited for the killing of a child, it 
was “more than a battle against a mortal enemy; it was a crucial battle in a broader, ongoing 
war, linking religious fundamentalism to Arab nationalism” (Kalb & Saivetz, 2007, p. 5). 
In this war, Hezbollah exploited social media platforms to achieve its IO objectives. As 
Nissen (2015) argued,  
 
Hezbollah was militarily outclassed by the IDF in all areas, yet they managed to exploit 
tactical engagements between the IDF and Hezbollah fighters on the ground through an 
information-led strategy creating strategic effects through primarily social network media 
(p. 77).  
 
Their information strategy was manipulated and carefully designed to serve propaganda 
agendas. As Caldwell et al. (2009) noted, “Hezbollah manipulated and controlled information 
within the operational environment to its advantage, using (at times staged and altered) 
photographs and videos to garner regional and worldwide support” (p. 5). 
 
Israel’s strategic objective of this war aimed to totally paralyse Hezbollah’s C2 operations, 
cause damage to its military components, and end Hezbollah’s hostility against Israel. 
However, these objectives were not achieved because Hezbollah succeeded to win the ‘battle 
of hearts and minds’ by directing its propaganda machine to atrocities committed by IDF. As 





information environment and thereby denied Israel the achievement of its strategic 
objectives” (p. 77). To do this, Hezbollah launched a successful IO strategy by harnessing 
many information environments and satellite channels to target international, Israeli, and 
local audiences with its message. As Nissen (2015) describes it: 
 
              From the physical battle to the information environment, Hezbollah succeeded in creating and 
sustaining regional and international pressure that eventually forced Israel to cease its 
operations before achieving its stated strategic objectives. Hezbollah heavily leveraged social 
network media to influence the political will of key global strategic audiences, including the 
Israeli population. Hezbollah ‘packaged’ (recorded/filmed, narrated and disseminated) tactical 
events to include both own successes and Israeli mistakes and major kinetic destruction of 
sites in Lebanon in a well-coordinated multi-channel cyber-strategy (p. 77). 
      
During the 34 days of the 2006 war between Hezbollah and IDF, live broadcast and SMNs 
reported events closely. Propaganda was carefully crafted to demoralise the IDF and the 
Israeli public by showing images and videos of killed IDF members and Lebanese civilians, 
including women and children. Shakarian, Shakarian and Ruef (2013) noted that Hezbollah:  
 
             quickly and accurately reported the tactical situation and created professional media products 
that were disseminated through a variety of means—their respective Web sites and YouTube. 
Further, these products were created in a variety of languages, including Hebrew—which 
again illustrates the strategy’s main goal of influencing the opponent’s perception. (p. 35). 
 
IDF tried hard to disable Hezbollah’s IO using DoS attacks against its websites and jamming 
its satellite streams. This operation created comprehensive information cyberwarfare between 





were accompanied by various cyber war techniques on both sides. Notably, the Israelis 
conducted a denial-of-service attack on the Web site of Hezbollah’s television station, “Al 
Manar” (pp. 34–35). 
 
1.14 Information Warfare—Hezbollah Versus Israel 
    It is important to consider the asymmetrical war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 
from an information warfare perspective. As Shakarian et al. (2013) noted, “Hezbollah’s 
integrated approach to information warfare was central to their strategy. One of the main 
components was ‘cyber psychological operations’” (p. 35). These cyber operations aimed to 
win the ‘battle of hearts and minds’ of local and international audiences and demoralise 
soldiers, while part of Israel’s IO was to focus on making Hezbollah appear as a terror 
organisation. Saad et al. (2011) reported: 
 
             Hezbollah used all available means to make sure that every piece of image and testimony was 
carefully controlled and edited for Web dissemination. For instance, it showed in the way the 
Lebanese party used the images of the Qana incident, where scores of civilians were killed 
after an Israeli bombing. (p. 4) 
      
As stated previously, fighting an unequal war with one of the most advanced militaries in the 
world required IO strategies that were reliant on media propaganda campaigns to generate a 
desired effect on local and international audiences. For instance, broadcasting images of 
killed IDF members, burned IDF military vehicles, improvised explosive device (more 
commonly known as ‘IED’) explosions, and live-tweeting sniper operations was part of 
Hezbollah’s strategy to achieve victory. Hezbollah fought PSYOP to demoralise IDF 





ultimately pressure their government to stop the war. Therefore, the maintenance of 
information flows from non-state actors can be essential in asymmetrical wars. As Saad et al. 
(2011) argued, “Psychological war took place on the Web through shocking pictures—dead 
children, destroyed buildings, bombings […] The enemy is demonized, and “martyrs” are 
revered, in order to create hatred” (p. 4). 
 
However, the Israeli C2 operations were aware of Hezbollah’s PSYOP. Thus, they managed 
to attack its information infrastructure. Shakarian et al. (2013) reported that “the Israeli 
response of shutting down their opponent’s Web sites can be viewed similar to the supposed 
Russian intent of their 2008 Georgia campaign” (p. 38). 
 
To maintain their flows of information, Hezbollah hijacked non-combatant internet protocol 
(IP) addresses (Shakarian et al., 2013, p. 38). The hijacking of IP addresses and broadcasting 
streams was essential for Hezbollah to maintain its flows of information and execute its IO 
strategy. Thus, to operate inside the information loop of Israelis and sustain their IO with 
dissemination tools, Hezbollah managed to hijack a South Texas cable operator (Hylton, 
2006). As Hylton (2006) from Time Magazine reported, “The Texas cable company has an 
agreement with a New York–based satellite communications aggregator, which moves feeds 
to a variety of customers from throughout the world, including Lebanon”. She further 
explains: 
 
              Al-Manar was linked to the small cable company’s IP address through a telephone number. 
Hezbollah essentially added an extension on that telephone line allowing their traffic to flow. 
Hezbollah then gets the word out through e-mail and blogs that it can be found at that IP 






Hijacked IP addresses enabled Hezbollah to establish websites to replace hacked ones. 
Hylton (2006) observed:  
 
            The IP address can be linked to a new domain name and that opens up the site to anyone who 
might search online for Al-Manar content. Hezbollah uses these Web sites to run recruitment 
videos and post bank account numbers where supporters can donate funds. 
 
Having intercepted Hezbollah’s activity via the South Texas cable company’s 
communications, the US closed the portal (Hylton, 2006). Closing Hezbollah’s portals was 
part of a whack-a-mole38 strategy to hinder Hezbollah’s IO objectives. Hylton (2006) 
reported: 
 
             Hezbollah was just as quick to play the whack-a-mole game and a new site sprang up from an 
Indian Web-hosting company within hours. As long as the war drags on, these 
communication portals will be critical as Hezbollah tries to get its global message out across 
the world.  
 
Shakarian et al. (2013) described the process of IP hijacking as “once detected [Hezbollah] 
was able to quickly hijack new IP addresses, which caused them to refer to their efforts as 
“whack-a-mole”—soon after one hijacked IP address was shut down, another one was 
corrupted” (p. 38). 
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The quick response by Hezbollah’s hackers has been a game changer in cyber information 
warfare. That is, the speed with which they can hijack IP addresses allowed the organisation 
to maintain its information flows, despite hacking activity against its main information 
environments. Shakarian et al. (2013) described this tactic as ironically supporting 
“Hezbollah’s information operations (IO). It is feasible that one of the key enablers of 
Hezbollah’s “victory” was their ability to communicate their story faster and more effectively 
than the Israelis” (p. 35). Hezbollah’s websites played a critical role in reaching an Israeli 
audience and affecting their opinions. Schleifer (2006) observed, Hezbollah was able to 
surmount the in-built suspicions of Israel’s news reporters. Consequently, the IDF could only 
look on helplessly as material posted on the organisation’s websites would routinely appear 
the following day in the Israel media (p. 14). 
 
That is, the speed and agility with which Hezbollah adapted to new information environments 
was a deliberate strategic and tactical operation to sustain their flows of information and 
outmanoeuvre their adversaries. The creation of a dynamic loop of information dissemination 
was part of their information-centric warfare. From a manoeuvre warfare perspective, this is 
what John Boyd called the ‘OODA loop’.39 
 
To this end, Hezbollah’s cyber operations were successful. Israel opened investigation into 
how Hezbollah’s propaganda had affected Israel society, which pressured the IDF to halt its 
military operation and call for ceasefire before it achieved its military objectives. Although, 
during the 2006 war, the internet penetration rate and number of social media account holders 
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was very low, Al-Manar satellite channel and internet websites were pivotal in maintaining a 
dynamic loop of information dissemination. This was a significant component of Hezbollah’s 
IO strategy: inform the world of what was happening from Hezbollah’s perspective. 
 
1.15 Hamas and Online Media 
    The Arabic word ‘Hamas’ means ‘zeal’; however, the movement has also been known as 
the Islamic Resistance Movement. The Council on Foreign Relations (as cited in Buke, 
2008), in a posting entitled ‘Hamas’, described the organisation as “the largest and most 
influential Palestinian militant movement”. Hamas boosted its popularity among the 
Palestinian society through charity and social work, by helping poor families, caring for 
orphans, and assisting unemployed youth by creating job opportunities. As Zanini (1999) 
identified, “Hamas is loosely structured, with some elements working openly through 
mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise funds, organize activities, 
and distribute propaganda” (p. 249). Long before Hamas shifted its strategy against Israel by 
joining the first Palestinian intifada in 1978, it maintained a good relationship with the Israeli 
army. The Israeli government helped Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of Hamas, to 
establish a charity organisation and preach for social good in Gaza. Israel’s supporting of 
Yassin’s movement had a purpose: Israel believed that Hamas was an emergent power that 
could counter PLO’s hostility against Israel. This strategy worked for Israel for many years 
and succeeded to split the Palestinian power structures into Islamists versus secular groups 
(Tahhan, 2017). 
 
According to the British Broadcasting Association (BBC, 2017), after Hamas had taken arms 
against Israel during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, the US government identified it as 





carried out over 50 attacks that would cause the killing of over 280 Israelis, while in the same 
period almost 5,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israel’ (as cited in Buke, 2008). 
Weimann (2011) pointed out that Hamas “uses a wide assortment of media tactics and 
strategies, as do many other modern terror organisations”. Zanini (1999) highlighted Hamas’ 
online communication activity and claimed that “Hamas activists in the United States use 
chat rooms to plan operations and activities. Operatives use email to coordinate activities 
across Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon” (p. 251). The organisational structure of the 
Hamas network depended on its defected leaders and operatives to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and the US. Hamas strategically utilised the internet to facilitate leadership communication 
with other allies in Iran and Syria, and within Hezbollah. Zanini (1999) noted, “Hamas 
[comprised] splinter groups and factions with no centralized operational leadership” (p. 250). 
Thus, the internet was a safe haven for Hamas’ communication with its regional allies, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood political party in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and the Iranian 
government. As Zanini (1999) noted: 
 
Hamas has realized that information can be passed securely over the Internet because it is 
next to impossible for counterterrorism intelligence to monitor accurately the flow and 
content of Internet traffic. Israeli security officials have difficulty in tracing Hamas messages 
and decoding their content. (p. 251) 
 
The accessibility of SMNs in Gaza and the West Bank was a crucial tool that served the 
cause of Hamas during its confrontation with the IDF. That is, the Israeli military managed to 
blackout media in Gaza by banning the entry of global media television stations to cover 






             With foreign press shut out, scarce electricity, and little internet infrastructure, the media 
dynamics in Gaza centred on a handful of Palestinian journalists who worked across a range 
of media formats to provide footage and primary reporting necessary for traditional and new 
media alike. (p. 2) 
 
Israel employed social media sites to build networks of recruited agents, who were operating 
in Gaza and the West Bank. As Ward (2009) identified: 
 
             Social media [networks] have advanced to the fore in this round of fighting because of Israel’s 
decision to impose a media blackout on Gaza. Days before the beginning of operation ‘Cast 
Lead,’ foreign correspondents were barred from entering the territory. The Israeli government 
even prohibited Israeli soldiers from bringing in mobile phones—by now the medium of 
choice for leaks of embarrassing information the world over. (p. 2) 
      
During this time, Hamas seized Gaza and dishonoured its peace treaty with Israel (which had 
been signed by the Fateh movement). Thus, SMNs acted as a double-edged sword. While 
Hamas used the platforms to share grievances and atrocities committed by Israel, Israel 
utilised the platforms to spy on and recruit agents in Gaza. The recruited individuals played a 
critical role as a source of intelligence during military confrontations and in the assassination 
of Hamas’ leaders.  
 
Leyden (2010) indicated that “Hamas has also accused Israel of using Facebook to recruit 
Palestinian spies from among the Gaza strip community”. One of the disadvantages of social 
media was that Israel was able to closely monitor the online activity of Palestinians, using 






             Israel has always maintained agents in the West Bank and Gaza, but Hamas thinks that fans of 
Facebook and similar services are revealing too much personal information on social 
networking which leaves them open to attempts to coerce them into becoming spies. It is 
suggested that Israel may be monitoring social networking sites to identify networks on 
contacts with links to either Hamas or local criminal networks. 
 
1.16 Social Media During Wartime in Gaza 
    Military confrontations occurred between Israel and Hamas in 2008, 2012, and 2014. 
These confrontations were characterised by an extensive use of web 2.0 platforms from both 
sides. As Zeitzoff (2011) explained, “The Gaza Conflict saw the emergence of social 
networking and new media sources that vastly increased the speed and dissemination of 
information from the battlefield” (p. 942). 
 
Both Hamas and the IDF established Facebook pages and created hashtags on Twitter to 
establish real-time information cyberwar. That is, as Zeitzoff (2013) noted, “The use of 
Twitter by Israel and Hamas during the 2012 Gaza Conflict marked the first time that conflict 
belligerents extensively used social media during an active conflict” (p. 12). An IDF 
spokesperson declared its intention on attacking Hamas via the microblogging platform, 
Twitter: ‘The IDF has embarked on Operation Pillar of Defence—@IDFSpokesPerson, 
November 14, 2012’. The confrontation over Twitter started when the IDF (as cited in 
Zeitzoff, 2013) tweeted, “We recommend that no Hamas operatives, whether low level or 
senior leaders, show their faces above ground in the days ahead—@IDFSpokesPerson, 
November 14, 2012” (p. 2). Al-Qassam Brigade40 (as cited in Zeitzoff, 2013) replied to the 
                                                          





previous tweets saying, “@idfspokesperson Our blessed hands will reach your leaders and 
soldiers wherever they are (You Opened Hell Gates on Yourselves)—@AlQassamBrigade, 
November 14, 2012” (p. 2). 
 
The extensive use of social media—specifically, Twitter— by both sides in the 2012 Gaza–
Israel conflict was unprecedented. Twitter is a social media platform for rapid, public, concise 
messages to be shared among networked followers (Zeitzoff, 2013, p. 3). Zeitzoff (2013) 
identified some purposes behind the use of Twitter by the IDF. He suggested: 
 
            (1) It was in English, so the communication was likely directed at an elite, international 
audience. The subject of the IDF’s communication emphasized the Hamas rocket attacks and 
Israeli victimisation and were further used to justify to an international audience Israel’s 
military campaign. (2) Another strategic goal of the @IDFSpokesperson Twitter feed was to 
combat what it perceived as Hamas misinformation. (p. 7) 
      
The use of social media by Israel was not limited to Twitter or Facebook; the IDF also 
utilised Flickr, Pinterest, and Tumblr to engage with international audiences in support for 
Israel. For instance, according to, the New Yorker columnist, Emily Greenhouse (2012), “The 
I.D.F. Flickr account parades Hamas’ rocket-launch sites alongside well-produced 
infographics announcing how many millions of Israelis are under fire, or within range”. The 
military’s newly created Tumblr shows leaflets in Arabic dispersed around the Gaza Strip, 
warning residents to “take responsibility for yourselves and avoid being present in the 
vicinity of Hamas operatives and facilities and those of other terror organisations that pose a 
risk to your safety”. The IDF also utilised Pinterest for propaganda purposes as Greenhouse 
(2012) observed, ‘Their Pinterest is all glory photos of I.D.F. soldiers who’ve “waited and 





humanitarian aid’. IDF’s Facebook page established a counting meter for rockets fired from 
Gaza targeting Israeli settlements. Greenhouse (2012) noticed, “The I.D.F. Facebook page 
posted, “400 Rockets from Gaza hit Israel in the last 3 days”. Meanwhile, Hamas used SMNs 
to report of “civilian casualties on Web pages, Twitter and Facebook pages in English, Arabic 
and Hebrew” (Hirschauge, 2014). The strategic use of hashtags by both sides of the conflict 
during 2008 and 2012 had catalysed a massive propaganda war. As Plede (2012) noted: 
 
Twitter became a battleground for tens of thousands of regular people who had an 
opinion, challenged someone else’s opinion, or wished to share updates. Under the 
hashtags #GazaUnderAttack, #PillarOfDefence and #IsraelUnderFire, hundreds of 
thousands of tweets exchanged reports, opinions, and challenges to mainstream news 
reports and to each other. 
 
To counter the narrative of Hamas’ influence on Twitter using #GazaUnderAttack, the IDF 
created #IsraelUnderFire to seek international support against Hamas’ rockets fired on Israel. 
The two hashtags attracted hundreds of thousands of supporters from Palestinian and Israeli 
people. Iftikhar noted (2014), “The conflict in Gaza has quickly become a “war of the 
hashtags.” Whereas Israel’s side of the story had dominated global media coverage for nearly 
half a century”. Media outlets reported that the hashtag #GazaUnderAttack had been used 
over four million times, compared to only 200,000 instances of #IsraelUnderFire. Other 
estimates indicated that there were over 11 million tweets of pro-Palestinian hashtags, such as 
#SupportGaza and #PrayForGaza, throughout the duration of the conflict (Iftikhar, 2014). 
Since the 2012 confrontation, Israel and Hamas realised the importance of SMNs to win the 
battle of people’s hearts and minds. As Iftikhar (2014) stated, “In this most recent Israel/Gaza 
crisis, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have played a far more prominent role in shaping 





is more desperate than Israel in harnessing SMNs, as it believes the mainstream media is 
biased and controlled by Zionists (Mason, 2014). As Ward (2009) identified, “Israel is using 
its military might to control media on the battlefield, while partisans of both sides strive to 
influence public opinion using social media” (p. 1). Hamas’ use of Twitter was not limited to 
#GazaUnderAttack; it disseminated information and reported casualties and destruction 
caused by IDF on trending hashtags such as #worldcup and #MalaysianAirline17. According 
to statistics from Twtrland, 
 
An Israel-based start-up, there were 319,757 mentions of ‘Gaza’ on Twitter on Thursday, the 
day Israel started its ground war. That was more than the 270,292 tweets with a #worldcup 
hashtag during the World Cup final. There were 456,000 tweets about Malaysia Airlines 
Flight 17 over the last 24 hours as of about midday Tuesday (as cited in Hirschauge, 2014).  
 
The use of trending hashtags is a strategy used by Hamas to expand the reach of its message 
to a wider audience.41 
 
Moreover, the military confrontations were reportable via YouTube. Since 2008, during ‘Cast 
Lead’ operation against Gaza, Hamas’ media arms and citizen journalists in Gaza widely 
posted videos on YouTube as international media outlets were banned entry to Gaza. Hamas 
had been honing its own message on Twitter—increasingly taking responsibility for the 
sharing of ideas to come from in-house, instead of relying on outside activist groups 
(Hirschauge, 2014). Graphic videos and images of murdered Palestinians (many of whom 
were women and children) and destruction caused by the IDF air force were instantly 
uploaded to YouTube and Twitter by regular citizens of Gaza. These images were quickly 
                                                          





distributed by Al Jazeera, CNN, and the New York Times. For instance, Paul Mason (2014) 
from the Israel Channel 4 News described the bombing of Shwjaea,42 where tens of 
Palestinian civilians were killed, demonstrating that Hamas was dominating the social media 
war over Gaza. He noted that, “It is evidence of a massive change in the balance of power 
between social media and the old, hierarchical media channels we used to rely on to 
understand wars” (Mason, 2014). 
 
Hamas used YouTube to spread propaganda and fear among Israel people by uploading 
videos depicting the launches of missile attacks on Israel. The BBC (2012) reported, “It 
[Hamas] posted a YouTube video purportedly showing the launch of a Fajr 5 missile towards 
Tel Aviv for the first time”. Within this chaotic sphere of online and on-ground conflicts 
between Israel and Hamas, there were winners and losers in this bloody war. 
1.17 Winners and Losers—Information Warfare During Wartime in Gaza 
    During military operations, information played a decisive factor in winning the war. As the 
Israeli army depended on centralised C2 operations, information was coordinated by the 
Ministry of Defence central command. These operations required sophisticated military 
communication tools between commanders on the ground and in the operation centre. This is 
in contrast to guerrilla warfare, wherein guerrillas advanced their operation based on 
decentralised C2 warfare. Communication between guerrillas were pre-planned beforehand 
and to some extent they used ham radio (for re-planning or aborting missions), but mostly 
they depended on the current progress of the war, described as auftragstaktik. However, this 
perception changed with the emergence of ISIS, as they depended on information 
environments as C2 warfare. This was due to their large number of operations and the size of 
                                                          





territory they controlled. However, winning a war cannot be determined by on the number of 
casualties or the scale of destruction caused alone. It can be decided through a total paralysis 
of the enemy’s C2 operations, forcing the enemy to concede defeat. Thus, the loser submits to 
terms of ending the war that are decided by the winners. 
 
Information became the domain of the third-generation warfare; the use of information for 
propaganda and public relations were decisive factors in the winning and losing of the war. 
Iftikhar (2014) reported: 
 
             For the first time ever, it appears that Israel is losing the public relations war in their 
most-recent military escapade into Palestinian territories. The social media counter-
narrative has been so overwhelming that the clearly threatened Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu had the audacity to claim that people in Gaza are using 
“Telegenically dead Palestinians” in order to bolster international support for 
Palestinians on social media. 
 
Mason (2014) also observed that:  
 
             Its media is traditionally heavily skewed towards the pro-Israeli view. But now, for 
the first time in a major Arab-Israeli conflict, the American public has other sources 
of reality. All research says that young people everywhere regard Twitter as 
essentially a news service, and via your social network you can easily get served up 
words and pictures more impactful than anything on TV. By the time many 






Despite the crucial role played by SMNs during the Gaza–Israel conflict in raising 
international awareness of civilian casualties, there have been some setbacks for Hamas. For 
example, Twitter suspended several Hamas-affiliated accounts based on the reason that ‘the 
U.S. government brands Hamas as a terrorist organisation’ (Hirschauge, 2014). Some graphic 
content posted by both the IDF and Hamas has also been targeted and removed by YouTube. 
Greenhouse (2012) reported: 
 
             Both Twitter and YouTube temporarily removed content right after the attacks 
began—the @IDFSpokesperson account, the I.D.F. video showing the strike that 
slayed Jabari—but they’re back up, and Flickr has said that it will not be removing 
content from the I.D.F. photo stream. 
 
While YouTube’s Terms of Service (TOS) state that “if your video shows someone being 
physically hurt, attacked, or humiliated, don’t post it”, guidelines are not rigidly enforced 
conditions of usage. Google, which now owns YouTube, has previously expressed “a bias in 
favour of people’s right to free expression in everything we do”. However, Twitter’s TOS 
explicitly ban “direct specific threats of violence against others”, including the 
recommendation from the IDF spokesperson’s account “that no Hamas operatives, whether 
low level or senior leaders, show their faces above ground” (Greenhouse, 2012). 
Further, the online war was not limited to hashtags. Hamas and Israel mobilised hackers to 
engage with the online battlefield. Nissen (2015) stated: 
 
              Both Hamas and the Israelis also mobilised ‘patriotic hackers’ and online activists to 
engage in a cyber-battle for control over the social network media sphere. This was 





communities and networks as well as through direct computer network attacks on, or 
hacking of, the opposition’s social network media accounts and platforms. (p. 78) 
 
The Israel–Hamas war of 2008, 2012, and 2014 shows the importance of SMNs as tools to 
carry out IOs during conflict. For Hamas’ fight in an asymmetrical war, social media became 
tools of psychological, C2 operations. The instant upload of information during wartime to 
Hamas guerrillas was crucial, as this information helped them understand the location of their 
next target. During its military operations, Hamas recorded its surprise attacks against the 
IDF, which had a great impact on the morale of IDF soldiers. For example, in operation ‘Auz 
Nahal’ during the 2014 war, Hamas attacked an Israeli military base, killing all IDF in that 
military base, which generated a significant impact on IDF morale. This propaganda video 
was immediately uploaded to social media to achieve maximum effect. 
 
To this end, both sides of the conflict have weaponised Twitter and YouTube as part of their 
propaganda and information warfare strategy to win ‘hearts and minds’ of the international 
community. Due to the pervasiveness of mobile phone and internet technologies, Hamas won 
the propaganda war. As Iftikhar (2014) concluded: 
 
             Because we are on the ground, and we are multitudes, and we have camera phones 
and social media. More terrifying to Israel than how Palestinians look on television 
should be how many of their supporters are plugged into social media. The truth is, 








    This chapter has discussed three terror organisations that have operated in the Middle East 
and Iraq and considered how they have used information as weapons to fight asymmetrical 
wars. It has also examined how these organisations emerged, leveraged, and flourished using 
digital media platforms and satellite channels. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah have 
strategically weaponised social media platforms and internet technology as the logistics of 
their IO to pursue their political ends. These platforms were critical in the pervasiveness and 
leverage of these terror networks. These platforms allowed these organisations to maintain 
and control information flows in real-time. This chapter established how future terror 
organisation, such as Al-Nusra and ISIS, have used information as a weapon and engaged in 







2 Chapter2   Post–Arab Spring Networking Dynamics—Information-
Centric Warfare and Social Media Networks 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in chapter I, ICT and social media platforms played a critical role as 
instruments of information warfare, utilised by terror organisations operated in the Middle 
East in the period between 2004-2009. In addition, this chapter outlines the first appearance 
of decentralised and distributed media operations in the MENA theatre – this is crucial in 
order to gain the necessary context for ISIS’ operations in that same theatre. 
 
In this chapter, I examine how social media platforms orchestrated the new wave of social 
movements that erupted in the Arab world in the period between 2010-2013, with a focus on 
the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi uprisings. This chapter argues that digital media logistics 
played a pivotal role in establishing a form of communication that lead to the emergence of 
ISIS during the Syrian and Iraqi uprisings. That is, the transformation and dynamics of social 
network emerged during the Arab spring uprisings led to the establishment of an organised 
form of terror networks.  
 
 The objective of this chapter is to examine the significance of the emergence of web 2.0 on 
the Arab Spring uprisings in regard to both state and non-state actors. The aim of this chapter 
is to highlight how the social media revolution began to display a darker side, as SMNs 
became tools for information-centric warfare. My argument is that SMNs aided in the 
establishment of political and ideological polarisation, which penetrated society and inspired 
political mobilisation. The rapid changes in the media environments during the Arab Spring 
uprisings divided Arab society at both the macro and micro levels. SMNs in general, and 





between liberals and conservatives, within homophilic groups, between ethnic and religious 
minorities and Islamists, and between family members (Shehabat, 2015). The effect of 
political polarisation has led to a divided society, comprising clashing of ideologies, and has 
incited information-centric warfare between anti- and pro-government actors (Krieger & 
Belliger, 2014, p. 61). In this chapter, I discuss the role of web 2.0 in some of the events from 
the Egyptian uprisings. Additionally, I explain how the emergence of new networking 
tendencies destabilised and challenged established social structures. I include analysis of how 
the utilisation of SMNs has shifted from ‘networks of outrage and hope’ to ‘networks of 
antagonism and hate’ into ‘networks of terror’. Finally, I examine the role of SMNs during 
the Syrian and Anbar (Iraq) uprisings, prior to the rise of ISIS. 
 
2.2 Web 2.0 and the Arab Spring Uprisings 
    There have been many discussions about the role of social media in the evolution of the 
Arab Spring uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011 (Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013; 
Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2018; Howard et al., 2011). In the wake of the 
upheavals that became known as the Arab Spring, social media platforms (such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube) were heralded as the catalyst that sparked, mobilised and coordinated 
the uprisings. Media outlets coined the terms ‘Facebook revolution’, ‘Twitter revolution’ and 
‘YouTube uprisings’ to describe the prominent role of social media in these events. The use 
of internet and other ICTs by ordinary citizens for the purpose of organising social uprisings, 
achieving political goals (such as promoting democracy) have been examined extensively by 
scholars and political commentators (Campbell, 2011; Castells, 2013; Howard & Hussein, 
2013; Khamis et al., 2012). Historically, SMNs and other ICTs have been noted for their role 
as medium of communication in facilitating the social movements in the last decade. For 





Moldova in 2009, widely known as ‘the first Facebook revolution’ (Zuckerman, 2009). The 
unrest in Iran in 2009 was also called ‘the first Twitter revolution’ (Sullivan, 2009). Further, 
in the last century, SMS (i.e., Short Messaging Service) was credited with playing a crucial 
role in toppling the Philippine’s former president, Joseph Estrada, in 1995 (Shirky, 2008). 
Similarly, cassette tapes were considered to have played an important role in the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 (Shirky, 2008). 
 
The role of SMNs during the first wave of social unrest in Egypt in 2011 has been the focus 
of empirical studies conducted by researchers and scholars (Campbell, 2011; DSG, 2011; 
Howard & Hussein, 2011; Lotan et al., 2011). Qualitative and quantitative evidence was 
captured during the events of the Egyptian uprisings that clearly demonstrates how pervasive 
of SMNs have empowered civilian activists while disempowering authoritarian governments. 
For example, Lotan et al. (2011) focused on Twitter feeds posted by digital activists during 
the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Lotan et al.’s (2011) analysis involved comparing 
information diffusion by the state’s mainstream media with Twitter data that reached global 
audiences through individual activists and journalists. The study concluded that the 
revolutions were, indeed, ‘tweeted’. This study made clear, for the first time, how media 
could be produced and disseminated worldwide and compete with mainstream, state-
controlled media. This study documented the power shift that occurred in favour of the 
Egyptian people as they generated global public support for their cause. In another study, 
Khamis et al. (2012) described how political activists have used new forms of 
communication—especially digital and online social media, such as Twitter, Facebook and 
the video-sharing portal, YouTube—as tools for highlighting the regime abuses of citizens, 





to combat repression. They conclude that, “the balance of both political power and media 
power has shifted unpredictably and will continue to do so” (Khamis et al., 2012). 
 
Seo and Ebrahim (2016, p. 231) studied how both sides of the conflict utilised SMNs to 
exchange political messages and concluded that dictators understood the role of social media 
in information warfare. For example, the Syrian government used social media to locate 
activists and the source of dissemination of misinformation. Similarly, in Egypt, political 
messages were exchanged between the military government and dissenting groups as part of 
C2 operations, which were aimed to intimidate and persuade. Comunello and Anzera (as 
cited in Nissen, 2015, p. 455) noted that governments generated social control through their 
direct management of media and application of surveillance technologies to intimidate 
protesters and decrease political engagement of grassroots movements. 
 
The environment of conflict between dissenting groups and the government have made it 
difficult for anti-government movements to emerge. For instance, in Syria, Yemen and Libya 
where governments control the media, military, police and other security agencies, organising 
social protests was a difficult task. In many cases, most organised movements or protests 
were crushed by the military, which lead to the emergence of political violence. However, the 
Egyptian case was different, as the channels of communication between the government and 
dissenting groups were reinstated, military forces were not directly involved in public 
protests and the organisation of protests were organised via social media. This situation did 
not continue for long as the Muslim Brotherhood conceded power in 2013 after a democratic 






2.3 Networking Tendencies and Political Polarisation During the Arab Spring 
Uprisings 
    The primary data collected by Shehabat (2015) during political turmoil in Egypt revealed 
that SMNs have evolved through four distinct phases: outrage and hope, instability and 
distrust, disinformation and criticism, and antagonism and hate (p. 17). As these phases have 
coincided with three waves of social unrest in Egypt, the power dynamics between civilian 
activists and the Egyptian government have changed. Castells (2013) proposed that social 
networks can be sites of ‘outrage and hope’. Nevertheless, Shehabat (2015) argued that social 
media has developed into ‘networks of antagonism and hate’. This argument is made after an 
empirical analysis of the Facebook datasets of Egyptian liberals and Islamists, which shows 
SMNs have become platforms of clashing ideologies. This clash of ideologies on social 
media platforms has resulted in the emergence of political polarisation. Guerra et al. (as cited 
in Brooking & Singer, 2016) defined polarisation as “the social process whereby a social or 
political group is divided into two opposing sub-groups having conflicting and contrasting 
positions, goals and viewpoints, with few individuals remaining neutral or holding an 
intermediate position” (p. 1). 
 
For example, in Egypt, the rise of social media platforms enabled marginalised individuals, 
homophily groups,43 and religious and political ideologies to evolve. Therefore, the function 
of SMNs is to strengthen dispersed societies, groups of common interest and religious 
minorities within networks. Socialists, Islamists, communists, liberals and other religious 
minorities (e.g., Copts) have established their own networks through digital media 
technologies. These groups bonded together and challenged existing political structures 
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during first social movements in 2011 and then turned against one another during the second 
and third waves of social movement between 2012 and 2013. The occurrence of this social 
rupture was a result of media polarisation, orchestrated by military and other religious and 
political minorities to gain political status in the country. The mechanisms of social media 
platforms enable the quick and effective enrolment processes of more active nodes to the 
network. These new nodes rejected and challenged the existing structure of political 
movements within the networks. For example, during the first wave of social unrest in Egypt 
in 2011, nearly all aforementioned groups were bonded together, as they shared common 
grievances against the military government. However, these groups were divided in the 
aftermath of the first democratic elections that led to ultimate triumph of the Muslim 
Brotherhood political party. This bifurcation also appeared and was expressed in SMNs—
groups started to attract followers by establishing Facebook pages that reflected their 
objection and thus, these groups initiated a new social campaign against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. That is, new networked social subgroups emerged on digital platforms first, and 
then infiltrated society. 
 
To this end, as new networked political polarisation occurred during the second and third 
waves of the uprisings between 2012 and 2013 (Shehabat, 2015), the status quo that has 
previously united all Egyptian people (e.g., radicals, moderates, Copts, liberals and socialists) 
through ‘networks of outrage and hope’ (Castells, 2013) was challenged and transformed by 
the emergence of ‘networks of antagonism and hate’ (Shehabat, 2015, p. 7). These latter 
networks presented their own ideologies, resulting in the social and political chaos that 






In Section 2.4, I discuss how social networking platforms shaped the political polarisation, 
bifurcation and mobilisation that led to information-centric warfare between subgroups from 
social networks and between subgroups and pro-government actors. 
 
2.4 Political Polarisation and Mobilisation Logistics 
    In this subsection, I highlight the logistical role of SMNs, Facebook and Twitter, in the 
political and terror mobilisation and polarisation of social movements that changed the Arab 
world. To examine how polarisation and mobilisation function in a networked context, I 
analysed datasets of Facebook networks of both anti-government and pro-government 
Facebook pages (Shehabat, 2015). My analyses revealed that polarisation in Egypt occurred 
during the period of government control over mainstream media and the utilisation of social 
media platforms (mainly Facebook). While mainstream media acted as the gatekeeper of 
news production, the Egyptian Government aimed to control society through the 
dissemination of pro-government propaganda and messages of fear and intimidation. With 
that in mind, the digital divide, computer illiteracy, accessibility and affordability of the 
internet have made mainstream media a critical tool in shaping government sympathisers, 
especially lower-class populations, in which access to the internet is limited. My analyses 
revealed that mainstream media always has a great impact on the older demographic, who 
consider television to be the most credible source of news (Shehabat, 2015). 
 
Another decisive factor that generated polarisation during the Egyptian uprisings was the 
framing of social networks as distributed systems. That is, the dynamics of Facebook 
networks translated and enrolled actors to the network. The process of adding additional 
actors to the networks generated affect. Affect enhanced social participation, by encouraging 





p. 130) argued that visual media can generate affective responses. For example, images of the 
Egyptian government’s brutality against peaceful protesters in Tahrir Square generated a 
sense of solidarity, brotherhood and sympathy for the protesters. 
 
As a result, marginalised groups, homophilous groups and individuals established 
connections through the use of social media platforms has created networked environments. 
In other words, spontaneous responses to disseminated content over networked environments 
leveraged these networks. For example, the largest network responsible for sharing common 
grievances, which worked as a catalyst for the 25th uprising was the ‘We Are All Khaled 
Said `` Facebook page (see Figure 1). This Facebook page has 3.8 million members. 
 
Figure 1. ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook page. Source: facebook.com. 
 
The interaction of networked people through this Facebook page led to a speedy response to 
calls for public protests. The new networked environment created by the ‘We Are All Khaled 
Said’ Facebook page formed a space for subgroups, individuals and homophilous groups to 
network with other like-minded groups by exploiting tenuous commonalities. Facebook 





which serve to strengthen weak connections of groups and individuals by presenting the 
responses and engagement of the wider audience concerning the political and religious 
ideologies represented. Therefore, Facebook created a unique environment for advancing 
political mobilisation and participation. McPherson, et al., argued that “information flows 
over social networks have localised the behaviour of homophily groups”. In other words, the 
dynamics of information, shared across social platforms enabled individuals to connect and 
interact with other social entities in an ecology of social forms (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & 
Cook, 2001). Thus, the mechanisms of digital networks enhance collective participation. 
Studies on existing large-scale web systems have revealed power laws in content creation 
(Capocci et al., 2008; Panciera et al., 2009). Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
rhythms of networked gatekeeping during uprisings and protests would also reflect the 
dominant influence of a select group of users (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p. 143).  
 
Twitter also played a significant role as a logistical aid in supporting and enhancing political 
polarisation and inspiring collective action against Arab governments. Homophilous groups, 
ideological minorities, liberals and anti-Islamic brotherhood were motivated by Twitter. The 
use of hashtags such as #Jan25 and #Egypt were the main hubs for millions of tweets and 
created narratives, which were shared across other platforms and news channels. Meraz and 
Papacharissi (2013, p. 157) observed that, journalists, activists and actors can exclude 
mainstream media and engage directly with the public through the sociotechnical architecture 
of Twitter. A networked flow of information and activity through crowdsourcing stimulates 
fragmented and pluralised storytelling to actor nodes, who then sent, received and remixed 
information (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p. 157). Personal conversations are characterised 





Therefore, Twitter was an enabler for networked framing and gatekeeping (Meraz & 
Papacharissi, 2013, p. 158). That is, through socio technical processes of hashtagging, 
retweeting, liking and replying enabled by Twitter, the SMN facilitated individual and group 
participation in information flows, which then became part of framing and gatekeeping 
processes (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p. 158). According to Meraz and Papacharissi (2013, 
p. 158), it was through these reciprocal processes that individual’s contribution and 
engagement in information flows lead to polarisation. Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) defined 
networked gatekeeping as a ‘process through which actors are crowdsourced to prominence 
through the use of conversational, social practices that symbiotically connect elite and crowd 
in the determination of information relevancy’ (p. 158). Twitter functions (e.g., retweet, 
reply, like) and hashtags shape the conversationality and flow of news streams on Twitter, 
giving voice to marginalised issues and people, especially in situations in which access to 
media is restricted, controlled or otherwise not accessible (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, 
p. 140). 
 
Thus, Twitter afforded an ambient news environment through engendering and fostering 
network processes (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p. 158). Within this context, Meraz and 
Papacharissi (2013, p. 158) proposed that the gatekeeping of the networked environment 
enabled ordinary users to create a measurable impact through practices that blend 
broadcasting with social conventions. 
 
To this end, these networked forms of communication have an asynchronous and 
synchronous effect on shaping ideological and personal polarisation, which defined new 
phases of the social struggle for power. The use social media platforms created polarised 





authoritarian Arab governments. Digital networking mechanisms enables homogeneous 
personal networks to network, dissolve and establish ties with other similar networks, which 
enabled the emergence of new patterns of relationships within heterogeneous societies. An 
examination of hashtag frequencies and usage across the arc of a public event like the 
Egyptian uprisings can provide an insight into how hashtags function to negotiate the framing 
and counter-framing of an event, both substantively and affectively, over time. It is worth 
noting that social media platforms do not just enable communities to network, rather they 
determine networks. Social media platforms facilitate individual’s connection to networks 
and make the network structure of society more noticeable (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). 
Further, the utilisation of SMNs in Egypt engaged the Egyptian population in local politics. 
The democratic nature of social networks created a space for public participation by 
removing divisions based on social class, ethnicity, gender and religion. This has included the 
engagement of marginalised members of society in public discussions that have directed the 
political agenda towards the promotion of democracy in the Arab world. However, 
networking mechanisms of Twitter and Facebook during political uprisings have changed the 
dynamics of networking tendencies and incited information-centric warfare between pro- and 
anti-government groups and between religious and ideological groups by redefining former 
networks of outrage and hope as networks of antagonism and hate, which facilitated the 
emergence of networks of terror. 
 
2.5 Networks of Outrage and Hope44 
    During the political uprisings in Egypt, Facebook played a central role in political triumphs 
against the government. Prior to the waves of unrest in Egypt, the Egyptian regime had held 
                                                          





power through fear, brutality and torture. Facebook was significant in dismantling the fear 
barrier and subsequently, became a medium for the expression of outrage. As Castells (2013) 
wrote, “People overcome fear by being together, and they were [together] in the internet 
social networks and in the urban networks formed in the squares. But to come together in 
throngs they needed a strong motivation, a mobilizing force” (p. 81). According to Castells 
(2013), “[O]utrage induces fearless risk-taking and there was extreme outrage against police 
abuse, against hunger rising in the country and against the desperation that led people to 
immolate themselves” (p. 81). As such, hope “c[a]me from Tunisia, it showed that it was 
possible to topple an entrenched regime if everybody would come together and fight 
uncompromisingly, to the end, regardless of risks” (Castells, 2013, p. 81). The world came to 
know Mohamed Bouazizi45because his act of desperation was broadcast globally using SMNs 
and this sparked hope in people who shared common grievances and encouraged them to act 
against their oppressors. Therefore, in the first wave of social unrest in Egypt people 
depended on social networks to express their outrage. 
 
From this example it is evident that Facebook activism during the first wave of social unrest 
in Egypt resulted in political change and shifted power to benefit the users of SMNs 
(Shehabat, 2015, p. 23). However, this success and happiness did not last, because counter-
revolutionaries harnessed Facebook and other social media platforms to dismantle the social 
unity that had been created. According to Mark Lynch (2014): 
 
            Just those ‘18 days’ created a bond of shared sacrifice and struggle which washed 
away differences of class, ideology and generation. This bond, though, couldn’t 
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survive the return to normal politics and unfortunately revolutionary actions just 
became part of the currency of the politics of power. (p. 2124)46 
      
Despite the events that have occurred since, it cannot be denied that for a period the dominant 
networks were those of hope and outrage, which triumphed and challenged the long-held 
power of the regime in the favour of the civilian activists. 
 
Narratives relaying the role of SMNs in the Egyptian revolution have upset state–society 
relations and revealed an imbalance at the social level, which has split society at large. While 
SMNs have empowered individuals by creating a space for political debate and helped to 
organise political action—or what Castells (2012) called ‘networks of outrage and hope’—, 
these networks have created a struggle for power between social actors who have established 
new forms of networks to challenge existing networks, appealing to multitudes to challenge 
other multitudes, which has ultimately led to the emergence of ‘networks of antagonism and 
hate’. Thus, these power structures have created a chaotic public sphere; this is reflected in 
the structure of the SMNs that had a central role in restoring the power of authoritarianism, 
such as in the case of Egypt in 2013. Castells (2013) argued that “it began on the internet 
social networks, as these are spaces of autonomy, largely beyond the control of governments 
and corporations that had monopolized the channels of communication as the foundation of 
their power, throughout the history” (p. 2). 
 
Just as social media has been used to promote democracy and justice, it was employed to 
engender disinformation, propaganda and persecution. This counter use of social media has 
resulted in the emergence of two opposing groups: Islamists and liberals. The virtual 
                                                          





interactions between these two groups has transformed the networks of outrage and hope into 
networks of antagonism and hate. 
 
2.6 Networks of Antagonism and Hate47 
    Antagonism and hate are common emotional responses expressed during social conflict 
and they serve the function of establishing and maintaining group identities. According to 
Simmel (as cited in Gilbert & Parent, 2004), conflict sets boundaries between groups by 
strengthening group consciousness and awareness of each group’s separateness from other 
groups. Simmel (as cited in Gilbert & Parent, 2004,) argued: 
 
            [R]eciprocal antagonisms between groups preserve social divisions and systems of 
stratification. The distinction between one’s own group and outsiders is established in 
and through conflict. This includes conflicts between classes, nations, ethnic groups, 
and political parties. (p. 164) 
 
The second wave of social unrest in Egypt (in 2012) has been marked with the emergence of 
a new tendency towards a fascism and extremism in opinion that Shehabat (2015) called 
‘networks of antagonism and hate’ (p. 26). The transformation of networks of ‘outrage and 
hope’ into ‘networks of antagonism and hate’ divided the power between social actors and 
led to a second military coup on 3 July 2013. That is, ‘networks of antagonism and hate’ have 
emerged and replaced the ‘networks of outrage and hope’ as the Facebook landscape shifted 
to engage Egyptian community in the political struggle between seculars and Islamists. 
                                                          





The difference between antagonism and hate is that antagonism is ‘active’ and thus, it often 
involves killing, while hate is expressed in people’s hearts. Since January 2011 protest, these 
social behaviours have been expressed in the Facebook pages of the revolutionaries and the 
counter-revolutionaries through the expression of social, class, ethnic and religious beliefs. 
Fahmy El-Howaydi, an Egyptian political analyst and columnist, called the year 2013 ‘the 
year of hate’ (Al Jazeera, 2013). In his weekly column for Al Jazeera Arabic, on 24 
December 2013, El-Howaydi (as cited in Shehabat, 2015) wrote that “in the modern Egyptian 
history I didn’t find a paradigm to describe the current social and political divisions that split 
the society aiming to eradicate and destroy the other as I see today” (p. 26). 
 
In deeming 2013 a year of hate, el-Howaydi (as cited in Shehabat, 2015) explained that this 
claim specifically referred to the degree of media polarisation that had arisen and was 
poisoning the minds of the Egyptian public. This hatred eroded the social ties that once 
existed between Egyptian civilian activists. In his column, el-Howaydi continued to outline 
the motives and the characteristics of this hate. He indicated that media platforms have 
supported campaigns of hatred against politically different groups (el-Howaydi, as cited in 
Shehabat, 2015). For example, he highlighted how opposition and disapproval had been 
expressed through the abuse of Copts and Shiites. The events of the third wave of social 
unrest are yet to end. As such, antagonism and hate continue to dominate the Egyptian media 
landscape. However, in Iraq and Syria political violence changed the dynamics of digital 
activism into a bloody struggle. The new struggle was reflected by parties of conflict through 
their digital activism. Images of beheadings, burnings, burying, drownings and shootings 
were disseminated on social media platforms. Since 2013, a paradigm shift has occurred in 
utilising social media platforms. That is, more Facebook pages, Twitter feeds and YouTube 






2.7 Networks of Terror 
    As noted in sections 2.4 and 2.3, during waves of political turmoil in Egypt, SMNs were 
utilised by secular groups, homophilous groups, liberals, religious minorities and Islamists. 
However, the role of SMNs during the Syrian and Iraqi revolutions have entered a new phase 
of development. A new paradigm of political communication has emerged as political 
violence erupted in both countries. This new paradigm was formed by two factors: 
● The social media cyberwar during the Syrian revolution. 
● The emergence of terror networks during the Anbar uprisings, until the emergence of 
ISIS. 
For each of these factors, I outline the transformation of SMNs, as instigated by 
revolutionaries to share grievances and facilitate political mobilisation, prior to the 
emergence of ISIS networks that promoted terror and spread fear through the world at large. 
To do this, I examine the role of SMNs during the political unrest in Syria and Iraq. The 
significance of this study is that ISIS terror networks were born from these uprisings. 
 
2.8 Syrian Case Study48 
    This subsection is focused on presenting a deep understanding of the pervasiveness of 
SMNs during the Syrian revolution. This section explores how Syrian rebels and pro-
government individuals and organisations used information-centric warfare in the period 
prior to the eruption of political violence and the rise of ISIS’ terror organisation. In this case 
                                                          






study, I discuss digital activism and digital conflict between the Syrian Free Army (SFA) and 
the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). I analyse the events of the Syrian uprising by focusing on 
the communication tools used by the rebels. In this case study, I examine closely at social 
media cyber-attacks, disinformation, propaganda and surveillance, as used by both the SEA 
and SFA to win the online front—an operation that is having a significant impact in battles on 
the ground. 
 
2.8.1 Social Media Warfare—Syrian Free Army versus Syrian Electronic Army 
    The Syrian political uprisings—first instigated on 15 March 2011—facilitated a demand 
for freedom and political reforms. In early 2011, social media platforms had already been 
used to accelerate the downfall of both the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia and 
Egypt, respectively. The Syrian Sunnies had been inspired by the ultimate triumph of the 
Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, which had resulted in political change and the promotion of 
democracy. This uprising was uniquely characterised by the information-centric warfare that 
emerged as both the Syrian government (led by the SEA)49 and the Syrian rebels (led by the 
SFA) utilised digital media networks to represent acts of political violence. The involvement 
of hackers, misinformation, propaganda and digital surveillance on both sides of the conflict 
resulted in the first social media cyberwar, during the Arab Spring uprisings (Shehabat, 
2012). My reflections are based on a close monitoring of SEA and SFA Facebook pages, 
                                                          
49 SEA described itself in its Twitter account, “We are not an official side and do not belong to a political 
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YouTube channels, Twitter feeds and other resources, such as news articles and satellite 
channels. 
 
In this case study, I explore how Syrian activists have harnessed multiple communication 
technologies as the logistical means for war, including social media platforms (such as 
Facebook, YouTube, Skype and Twitter) and mobile phones (SMS, recorded video and live 
streaming) to achieve their aims. Namely, Syrian activists desired to expose the Syrian 
government’s brutality to the world, communicate with other rebels, create digital 
communities across the country, spread propaganda, coordinate military attacks, and 
disseminating news and information about the uprising. 
 
2.8.2 Digital Logistics of the Syrian Uprising 
    The snowball effect of uprisings occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 has shaped   
protests in Syria. Protesters’ used SMN’s and other communication tools such as Skype and 
Mobile phones to document and promote their uprising. The high level of mobile phone use 
in Syria also played a pivotal role in publicising the government’s brutality (Shehabat, 2012). 
The incidents in Daraa and Homs were recorded and uploaded onto YouTube and broadcast 
worldwide. This was in stark contrast to the events of February 1982, when Hafez Al-Assad 
(the father of President Bashar Al-Assad) ordered a massacre in Hama following the rise of 
the Islamic Brotherhood in the province. 
 
In Hama in 1982, local and international media were banned from documenting events. 
However, in Daraa in 2011, the killing of the 13-year-old boy, Hamzeh Al-Khateeb, 
provoked international outrage after his battered and tortured body was shown on a YouTube 





decades. Syrian activists turned to Facebook, Twitter, and other internet tools (such as Skype 
and Yahoo Messenger live stream) to broadcast news and information about the uprisings. 
The first Facebook group page established to spread the word of the revolution was ‘We are 
all Hamzeh Al-Khateeb’. This page mimicked the famous Egyptian Facebook page ‘We Are 
All Khaled Said’, which had sparked the call for political mobilisation on 25 January 2011—
an important turning point in Egyptian history. 
 
In response to this social media activism, the Syrian government hindered the rebels’ 
information loop by disabling of mobile phone and internet connections in Daraa and Homs. 
As such, the communication tools of social media remained critical for the rebels. To restore 
communication technologies between rebels in Syria, proxy modems, satellite phones and 
international mobile phones SIM cards were smuggled in from neighbouring countries. 
Shehabat (2012) recounted that in southern Daraa, which is only few kilometres away from 
the Jordanian border of Ramtha, Jordanian mobile phone SIM cards were used by rebels to 
reconnect; in northern Idlib, Turkish mobile phone SIM cards were used (Shehabat, 2012, 
p. 3). Smartphones and the 3G wireless internet have also been a significant tool for the 
rebels; these technologies were so valuable that the Syrian government banned the use and 
import of iPhones into the country (BBC, 2011). Al-Thuraya Saudi satellite phones, powered 
by the Saudi Telecom Company, were used to report news to international satellite channels, 
such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Technologically savvy Syrians resumed their internet 
activism by using dial-up connections and proxy internet modems (Shehabat, 2012, p. 4). 
Freedom House (2015) reported: 
 
            Authorities prevented foreign media from accessing the situation on the ground, 
prompting many ordinary Syrians to take up mobile phones and small cameras to 





journalists have become vital in the quest to document flagrant human rights abuses 
by all parties to the conflict. (p. 2) 
 
Social media had an influential role in the early stages of the uprisings. Notably it has shaped 
and brought Cyber communities into existence. Build solid alliances between communities 
and sustain flows of information. An example of cyber communities existed during the Syrian 
conflict was the Local Coordination Committee (LCC)50. Johnston indicated that over 70 
(LCCs) initially existed to document the Syrian revolution, which then became coordinating 
protests and information disseminators (Johnston, 2017, p. 79). LCC’s mission also included 
keeping a count of the number of killings, diffusing propaganda and reporting to international 
agencies. The LCC was productive in spreading fear among Assad’s military and in 
facilitating defections. 
 
The use of SMN’s in documenting the Syrian government brutal actions used against the 
rebels resulted in the divisions between communities that formed the Syrian Arab Army 
(SAA). Knowing that the majority that SAA consists of is the Sunni and other religious 
minorities such as Alawitie, Druze, Christian and Ismaili sects. In other words, the SAA is a 
heterogeneous network of different actors.  The defection of some Sunni soldiers in the 
Syrian Arab Army (SAA) led to the establishment of the SFA. Dryan Lee indicated that “The 
SFA was formed as a decentralized armed force that incorporated a diverse range of actors 
including local self defence units, defectors from the military, Islamists, and foreign fighters” 
(Lee, 2016). 
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Therefore, SMN’s have been influential in mobilising public opposition amid a militarised 
uprising. Daily street protests in most of the country’s streets have been orchestrated and 
synchronised via Facebook pages and Twitter feeds. The use of hashtagging—particularly 
#Syria—has contributed to the coordination of protests and engaged the world press in 
events. It has been reported on Al Jazeera’s (2012) satellite News-hour program that over 600 
street demonstrations, which were organised by social media platforms, broke out in one day.     
The vulnerability of use of SMN’s as weapons which enabled rebels to carry out   
information operations, information warfare and built its strategic narrative have forced 
the Syrian government to tighten its grip on internet usage by applying filtering and censoring 
technologies to closely monitor internet content that could potentially destabilise the 
government. 
 
Ironically, in June 2011 in the middle of the uprisings, the Syrian government restored 
Facebook and YouTube. The government aimed to track activists, capture them and steal 
their usernames and passwords to spread propaganda, dismantle communication networks 
and to gain information about the social movements’ plans for pre-emptive strikes. This move 
by the government reflected Morozov’s (2012) theory of net delusion, wherein he argues that 
information technologies are in the hands of authoritarian regimes, not activists. As Morozov 
(2012) stated, “The internet may favour dictatorships rather than democracies” (p. xiii). To 
hamper the efforts of social media activists during the 2011 uprisings, the technologically 
savvy employees of the Syrian government have applied many strategies to paralyse 
information diffusion, hunt activists and destroy communication channels. These have 
included setting up a fake YouTube, Facebook interference, Skype encryption and others acts 






2.9 The Fake YouTube 
    YouTube has been cited as an important platform in the Arab Spring uprisings, particularly 
in Syria. It has aided revolutionaries in many ways. First, it highlighted the governments 
brutality by documenting events via mobile phone technology, which led to the expansion of 
the geographical proximity of the uprisings by raising awareness among the Sunni sect. 
Second, it worked as the alternative press: an informative platform that disseminated 
information to most of the world news outlets. Finally, it captured tangible evidence of 
Assad’s crimes against his people. According to Alex Fitzpatrick (2012), “The world is 
watching the Syrian uprisings on YouTube”. The battered body of the 13-year-old Hamzeh 
Al-Khateeb was the first video uploaded on YouTube that showed the government’s 
ruthlessness. Those trying to view the video found a message saying, “This video has been 
removed as a violation of YouTube’s policy on shocking and disgusting content” (Melber, 
2011). YouTube has posed a major threat to the government’s propaganda and stability. In 
revenge, the SEA cloned the YouTube website to trap Syrian digital activists (see Figure 2). 
However, the fake YouTube page attacks users in two ways. First, it requires you to enter 
your YouTube login credentials to leave comments. Second, it installs malware disguised as 








Figure 2. Fake YouTube site used by Syrian Electronic Army to trap activists. Source: 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/fake-youtube-sites-target-syrian-activists-with-malware/. 
      
2.10 The Facebook Interface 
    Facebook was considered the second most important social media site that the 
revolutionaries relied on to expose the Syrian government. The government has allowed 
Facebook to remain available for trapping Syrian activists. Syrian activists have harnessed 
the potency of Facebook pages in recruiting, coordinating and diffusing information to local 
and worldwide audiences. The most compelling Facebook pages have been ‘We are all 
Hamzeh Al-Khateeb’, the ‘The Syrian Revolution 2011’ and ‘Euphrates Revolution 
Network’. The ‘We are all Hamzeh Al-Khateeb’ Facebook page was shut down by Facebook 
administration on 30 August 2012, but restored on 2 September 2012 after a message was 
sent by the page administrators outlining the page’s purpose: 
 
             Dears Messrs [,] We demand that the respectful Facebook management return the page of the 
child martyr Hamza Al-Khatib (more than 500,000 fans) that have [sic] been deleted today, 
despite of being a great reference in publishing what really happens in Syria for the public 





name of the revolutionary Syrian youths against the criminal regime of Bashar Al-Assad. (We 
are all Hamzeh Al-Khateeb’ Facebook page, 2012). 
 
Facebook pages that were established by dissenters and revolutionaries were directly targeted 
by the SEA to be reported as spam. The Facebook login page within Syria is ‘www.leged-
rein.org’; a similar link was visible on revolutionaries Facebook pages, with prompts asking 
users to post and share ‘good news’ (see Figure 3). However, using this link would cause 
huge damage. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF, 2011), this attack steals 
usernames and passwords and could potentially give an attacker access to all private 
information in your Facebook account. 
 
The SEA may not be the only pro-government faction meddling with Facebook’s operations 
in Syria. In early May, mysterious forces staged a man-in-the-middle attack, wherein 
Facebook users who attempted to log in to their accounts were redirected to a fake Facebook 
login page. This allowed the attackers to harvest logins and passwords, giving them the 
ability to monitor and control those accounts. The attack targeted Facebook’s encrypted 
HTTPS version, and made use of forged security certificates. 
 
 





2.11 Skype Encryption Tools 
    Skype has been an important tool for Syrian revolutionaries as it enables live reporting, 
especially to Al Jazeera satellite channel. Skype has also been important in facilitating 
communication between the coordination revolutionary divisions. As a result of this, the EFF 
(2012) reported that Skype has been directly targeted by the regime with a Trojan called 
DarkComet (RAT). The Trojan allows an attacker to capture webcam activity, disable 
notification settings for certain antivirus software, record keystrokes and steal passwords. It 
sends the collected sensitive information to the same Syrian IP address used in the attacks 
(Galbren et al., 2012).  
 
Villeneuve (2012), senior threat researcher at Trend Micro, discovered a web page that 
advertises a software that purports to provide encryption for Skype. According to Villeneuve 
(2012), this page is hosted in Syria on [BLOCKED]encription.sytes.net and includes an 
embedded YouTube video that claims to be from an IT security laboratory to encrypt voice 
communications (see Figures 4 and 5). 
 
 







Figure 5. Links to Skype encryption, generated by Syrian Electronic Army51. Source: Villeneuve 
(2012).  
 
2.12 Social Media Networks: Information-Centric Warfare 
    In their book, Cyber War, US government security experts Clarke and Knake (2010) 
defined cyberwar as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or 
networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption”. In the Syrian case, there are 
three levels of information cyberwar waged. The first is the cyberwar between state and 
foreign organisations, such as the Al Jazeera satellite channel and Harvard University. The 
second form of cyberwar is the state versus individual actors, at both local and international 
levels. On 15 March 2011—the day the Syrian Sunnis demonstrated in Daraa demanding 
reforms and liberty— resulted in a truly sectarian war. Additionally, the army, which has 
been called Humat el Dyar (i.e., the protectors of the land) has also divided into sub-groups 
engaged in political and military conflicts. Finally, the third form of cyberwar was between 
foreign organisations and the state. Hacktivist groups, such as Anonymous and Telcomix, 
have themselves attacked the Syrian government, but they have also supplied information 
technologies to enable the revolutionaries to attack the Syrian government information 
resources. Thus, a massive social media virtual war is being carried out between the SEA and 
SFA to win the media war.  
 
                                                          





SMNs have played a vital role in the protest movements that have taken place since March 
2011. The revolutionaries’ coordination groups have established Facebook pages, Twitter 
accounts and YouTube channels so that they can communicate, coordinate and disseminate 
news and videos. The most powerful networks are ‘The Syrian Revolution 2011’ Facebook 
page (over 504,000 likes) and @revolutionsyria on Twitter (approximately 49,500 followers). 
As the battle on-ground escalated, so did the online frontier. The SEA launched an aggressive 
attack on the SFA Facebook pages, posting pro-Assad comments and reporting it for spam to 
Facebook administration. The SEA initially succeeded in shutting down ‘The Syrian 
Revolution 2011’ Facebook page, but it was later restored after contacts with Facebook 
administration. As such, #Syria has been targeted by TH3 Pro, the SEA special operations 
department who post pro-Assad tweets, but Twitter administration intervened and removed 
all comments posted by TH3 Pro (Shehabat, 2012). 
 
In retaliation, the SEA Facebook page was reported for spam by the SFA. In a plea posted by 
the SEA, in which they asked for support to evade a shutdown by Facebook administration, 
the SEA urged sympathisers to join and post supportive comments. The SEA managed to 
retrieve the page under a different name, ‘Al-Nidal Al-Sory’ (i.e., struggle for Syria).  
 
Shehabat (2012) has monitored the attempts of the SEA to establish new Facebook pages. 
The SEA moved their Facebook hacktivism in a different direction by targeting some of the 
world’s most prominent figures, media outlets and educational organisations who have been 
publicly supporting the freedom fighters. The SEA has since launched coordinated attacks on 
Facebook and Twitter directed at the Facebook pages of Harvard University (see Figure 6), 
The Independent newspaper (see Figure 8) and the US former president Barack Obama (see 





Kamal Ibrahim, ‘please stay away from us […] we love Syria’, are typical of the many 
hundreds of comments directed to Obama, Winfrey, Sarkozy and others.  
 
 
Figure 6. Screenshot of the hacking of Harvard University website by Syrian Electronic Army. 
Source: Threatpost.com 27/11/2011.
 





https://cdn.theatlantic.com August 2011. 
 
 
Figure 8. Screenshot of hacked The Independent by Syrian Electronic Army. Source: 
www.theregister.co.uk 27/11/2014. 
 
Overall, SMN’s played a critical role in shaping of information warfare occurred between the 
Syrian government and rebels. This allows non-state actors to vigorously participate and have 
a meaningful impact in cyber warfare. Part of information operation carried out by some 
rebel groups such as Khalid bin Al-Waleed group and Al-Nusrah front52that sheds light on 
Sunni-Shitte- Alawite divisions to recruit more Sunnies. Such groups highlighted Shitte and 
Alawite atrocities against Sunnies which frustrated Sunnies. This has changed the uprisings 
from a Syrian uprising to a Sunni insurgency. As Johnston (2017) puts it, “The violence of 
the Syrian uprising transformed Islamist speech from an uprising of the Syrian people to an 
uprising of Sunnis to fight the Syrian “Alawite” regime” (p.86). This tendency explains how 
ISIS became a game player in Syria after declaring Caliphate in 2014. 
 
2.13 Iraq Case Study—Anbar Uprisings 
                                                          





    Nearly two years after the spark of the Tunisian revolution, the Anbar uprising began in 
July 2012. It was known as Anbar uprisings, not Iraq uprisings, as the protests only took 
place in the Anbar Province (northern Iraq). Anbar Province is a Sunni stronghold, which is 
also inhabited with other ethnic and religious Iraqi minorities, such as Kurds, Turkomans, 
Yazidi and Christians. Muslim Sunnies started to protest marginalisation, corruption and 
political exclusion by the Shiite government, ruled by Nouri Al-Maliki. The government’s 
arrest of the bodyguards of the moderate Sunni finance minister, Rafi Al-Issawi, in December 
2012 led to widespread peaceful protests in Sunni provinces in northern and central 
Iraq(Katzman, 2013; Wicken, 2013). At first, the demonstrations were well-attended, with 
protesters demanding an end to political, civil and economic discrimination against the Sunni 
community (Sullivan, 2013). 
 
However, the Anbar uprisings cannot be disconnected from the Syrian uprising. As such, 
political violence erupted in Syria as Sunni tribes of Iraq and Syria were geographically 
connected. As Al-Amin (2014) puts it: 
 
There is a solid relationship between the uprising in Syria and uprising in Anbar even 
if the pragmatic aspect of this relation is limited to the citizens of Anbar receiving 
their cousins as refugees from Syria and sending their fighters to join the forces of the 
Syrian opposition. 
      
To understand the connections between the Sunni insurgency in both Syria and Iraq and how 
IS fighters involved in the political violence erupted in Syria in the period between 2011-
2014 a study of the influence of Al-Qaeda is to be addressed.  In 2013, Al-Baghdadi 





Assad forces in Syria. Before the emergence of Al-Nusra, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (who 
became Caliph Ibrahim) called his jihadist group ‘ISIS’. Hazem Al-Amin (2014) observed: 
 
             As clans in Anbar send their fighters to stand by their beloved ones against the regime 
forces in Syria, the ‘Anbar rebels’ adapt in their protests with the rebels of Syrian 
cities at a time when modern communication means, such as Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube, helps clans along both sides of the border communicate, cancels what 
modern countries’ borders have severed regarding ties and restores wefts to the clan, 
its sheikh and its values. 
 
According to Internet World Stats,53 in 2012, nearly 2.2 million Iraqis had internet 
connection, which equates to a penetration rate of approximately seven per cent of the Iraqi 
population. Despite the low internet penetration and participation in Iraq, Facebook was the 
most popular website in Iraq; however, its users were few in number (Al-Rawi, 2014; Berger 
& Perez, 2016, p. 10). According to Al-Rawi (2014), “Iraqi Facebook pages received much 
less attention. A survey of the most popular Facebook pages during the Arab Spring in Iraq 
revealed that most pages were established in early February 2011 and carried an obvious 
secular orientation”. The most popular Facebook page was ‘Support the Iraqi Youth 
Revolution’ (http://www.facebook.com/Supportiraq); it had more than 130,350 followers and 
was established on 9 February 2011. Its profile stated: “The Iraqi Revolution is a revolution 
to support the right in the face of injustice, corruption, and tyranny. The aim of the Iraqi 
Revolution is to eradicate Iraq from the corrupt people, occupation and its agents” (Al-Rawi, 
2014). 
 
                                                          





However, Facebook activism was not used by grassroots movements alone. Iraqi insurgents 
were among the first active internet users because they needed to spread propaganda on their 
activities, gather popular support and seek funding. Several pan-Arab television channels, 
such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, made use of the videos and announcements posted online 
by Iraqi insurgent groups to cover the events in Iraq (Berger & Perez, 2016, p. 6). Maliki’s 
government used several mainstream media outlets to discredit the cause of the protesters, by 
calling them ‘Al-Qaeda followers’ and ‘Saddam Hussein sympathisers’ (Berger & Perez, 
2016, p. 21). 
 
Maliki suspended the licenses of 10 television channels that criticised his crackdown on 
protesters who allegedly incited violence (BBC News, 2013). Once more, activists bypassed 
the government’s news blackout by posting updated information regarding the protests on 
Facebook and YouTube. Due to its widespread availability and use of SMN’s, the Iraqi 
government can no longer suppress public anger by means of controlling traditional media 
outlets (Berger & Perez, 2016, p. 21). 
 
However, the rise of ISIS as a game player in Iraqi politics occurred after they took control of 
Mosul city on the 10th of June 2014.  Under the leadership of Abo-Baker Al-Baghdadi, ISIS 
has become very organised as it managed to form its political structure by creating Islamic 
institutions (known as Dywan) such as, Dywan of education, Dywan of Hesbah (markets) and 
Dywan Al-Zakah (charity). It also, invested in creating of media outlets and information 
centres to carry out its information operation and to inform residents. Patrick Cockburn 
(2016) observed that “Its propaganda films frequently show non-Sunni Muslims being 
executed and its reputation for savagery may have helped demoralise the Iraqi security forces 





such as Diyala, Tikrit, Salahuddin and Anbar. However, after the fall of Mosul ISIS 
spokesperson abo-Mohammad Al-Adnani calls on ISIS fighters to be humbler. In his words 
“Do not let your egos fall prey to your recent military gains such as the Humvees, helicopters, 
rifles and military equipment”. Cockburn (2016) suggested that the speech is “interesting and 
significant because Adnani gives the first insight into how ISIS views its stunning territorial 
gains as well as its intentions in the immediate future”.  
 
However, during the year 2014, ISIS strategy depended on spread of fear to gain territorial 
control. Adnani speeches were aimed at conquering of Baghdad. To spread fear among 
Muslim Shia, ISIS documented its biggest massacre of Shia army recruits in Speicher54. 
On12th of June 2014 ISIS released a video depicting the execution of 1700 Iraq recruits from 
Shia sect captured on camp Speicher55.  To maintain the morale of people in Baghdad, and to 
supress ISIS’ information operation the Iraqi government has shut down the internet and 
closed Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter (Cockburn2016). The shutdown of the internet 
however, created a sphere of panic and confusion in Baghdad. As Cockburn (2016) who 
claimed that   
 
 the internet shutdown is creating a vacuum of information filled by frightening 
rumours that are difficult to check. The result is an atmosphere of growing panic in 
Baghdad with volunteers from the Shia militias being trucked to Samarra, north of the 
capital, to stop the ISIS advance. 
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 To this end, the military advances of ISIS and its brutality against other minorities depicted 
in its video releases resulted in the emergence and mobilisation of networked militants form 
different ideological sects. Although the year 2014 was marked with the proliferation of ISIS’ 
IO strategy, after the declaration of caliphate, ISIS has pushed the boundaries of its IO 
strategy to become more sophisticated.     
 
2.14 Conclusion 
    In this chapter, I described the usage of social networks during the Arab Spring uprisings. I 
have argued that utilisation of SMNs by Arab revolutionaries have been subject to three 
major transformations in years between 2010 and 2013. That is, these networks were praised 
for their key role in challenging the political structures of some Arab governments and thus, 
were hailed as networks of outrage and hope. 
 
However, this dynamic changed as subgroups opposed the outcome of democratic elections 
that led to the success of Islamic political parties (such as Ikhwan). These subgroups 
bifurcated social fabric (especially Egyptian society) and as a result this era was marked with 
the emergence of networks of antagonism and hate. In Syria and Iraq, sectarian war erupted 
between Sunni, Shiite and Alawite sects. As a result, a new wave of terror networks emerged. 
Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra front and ISIS actively harnessed SMNs and other media environments 






3 Chapter 3: ISIS’ Information Operations—A Strategic Narrative 
Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
    The purpose of this chapter is to understand the complexity of ISIS’ IO56 and its objectives. 
This includes their tools of influence warfare,57the use of multiple digital environments, the 
techniques of HD production, strategic narrative themes, propaganda and information 
warfare. The aim of this chapter is to create a conceptual framework to understand ISIS’ 
strategic narrative. Additionally, it is important to understand the role of ISIS affiliates and 
members in information aggregation, dissemination and generation. To do that, I applied 
thematic analysis to media produced by media wings and individual affiliates of ISIS 
networks. These themes were depicted mostly in HD video productions and digital 
magazines, such as Al-Naba,58Dabiq and Rumeyah.59 To understand the conditions that 
surrounded and affected their information processes, it is essential to highlight the diversity 
of ISIS individuals (Ba’athists, jihadi from around the globe and local residents of Iraq and 
                                                          
56  The definition is provided in the introduction chapter on p.3.  
57 As suggested by professor James Forest. 
 
58 An Arabic version of the magazine produced by ISIS’ Al-Hayat media centre. It is widely shared on 
Justpase.it and Telegram channels as PDF files. 
59 Dabiq was the first ISIS produced magazine to communicate to non-Arabic speakers, with high-quality 
images, professional layout, and writing. It first appeared in 2014 and changed to Romyah in 2016. There 
is a political significance behind the change of its name. That is, Dabiq, according to Hadith of Prophet 
Mohammad, that great battle will occur between Kuffar (infidels) and Muslims in place called Dabiq (near 
Aleppo north of Syria). While Romyah which means Rome where also prophet Mohammad foretold his 
companions that it will be conquered by Muslims. The political message here is that ISIS planned to carry 





Syria). ISIS’ information strategy was amplified by their alliance with other global terror 
organisations such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram (Nigeria), Abu Sayyaf (Philippines) and Al-
Shabaab (Somalia). Media wings had a critical role in shaping the information strategy, as 
every media outlet specialised in aspects of media production. 
 
This chapter aims to explain the role of narratives in the IO strategy of ISIS networks within 
globally interconnected media environments. In this chapter, I briefly outline the political and 
religious aims of ISIS. Second, I explain the objectives of ISIS’ IO strategy. Third, I highlight 
the roots of ISIS’ IO and its strategic narrative to achieve its political and religious agendas. I 
analyse many elements of the ISIS narrative and how it served its political agendas. Finally, I 
examine the effects of the ISIS narrative on recruitment and radicalisation. 
 
3.2 ISIS’ Organisational Structure, Politics and Religious Aims 
   As explained in the Background chapter of this thesis, ISIS was born from AQI, which 
responded to the US’s war on terror and occupation of Iraq in 2003This subsection will 
highlight the political structure of ISIS, its origins and religious aims. ISIS’ religious aims 
must be considered because they are inherently connected with their political aims, as 
exemplified in the establishment of a caliphate. Declaring a caliphate required huge 
resources, such as logistics, new recruits, political structure and agenda. To execute its IO 
strategy, ISIS has adapted sophisticated narrative themes to garner support from Muslims 
around the world. To gain support from zealous Muslim youth, ISIS utilised and adapted Al-
Qaeda’s pre-existing political structure, media wing and IO strategy by adapting Al-Qaeda’s 
political and religious ambitions, which has been inspired by Osama bin Laden’s vision to re-
establishing an Islamic caliphate, ISIS swiftly achieved their objective and declared an 





of Islamic caliphate created confusion among Al-Qaeda loyalists and other jihadi who 
questioned the legitimacy of new Islamic caliphate. The establishment of the Islamic 
caliphate bestowed ISIS a superiority over its original roots, Al-Qaeda. Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi, as the instigator of Islamic caliphate, asked Al-Qaeda loyalists to pledge allegiance 
to Islamic caliphate and to offer him bay’ah as Caliph. The split between the Al-Nusra front 
and ISIS was as a result of Al-Qaeda’s leader, Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, denouncing the 
legitimacy of Al-Baghdadi. The decision of Al-Nusra to keep its loyalty to Al-Qaeda led to a 
military confrontation between ISIS and the Al-Nusra front in 2013. 
 
Despite their conflict, it is important to mention that the common vision between Al-Qaeda 
and its new rival ISIS—despite the religious and political divide—was the establishment of 
an Islamic caliphate. This state must be ruled by a true Muslim leader (a caliph), who would 
appoint a Shura council60 to govern the Muslim world based on teachings of Qur’an and 
Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed. According to Osama bin Laden, this vision can be 
achieved through declaring of global jihad against Western invaders. To recruit jihadi and 
inspire Muslims around the world, bin Laden invested in three main narratives: grievances, 
utopian society and jihad. Schmid (2014) noted that a basic grievance bin Laden stressed 
upon in his speeches was that “the Muslim world is in chaos because of a Zionist–Christian 
alliance. This alliance is responsible for most, if not all, that is wrong in Muslim countries 
and the way Muslims are humiliated, discriminated and mistreated in the world” (Schmid, 
2014, p. 6). To restore the dignity of Muslims, ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad Al-
Adnani (as cited in Ingram, 2015) asserted: 
 
                                                          





            So rush O Muslims and gather around your khalifah [caliphate], so that you may 
return as you once were for ages, kings of the earth and knights of war. Comes o that 
you may be honoured and esteemed, living as masters with dignity. (p. 743) 
 
For Al-Qaeda, the only way to restore dignity and achieve victory against the Zionist–
Christian alliance was by declaring global jihad. As Schmid (2014) stated, “Every true 
Muslim has to engage in a holy jihad against the invading Crusaders to defend the faith and 
the Muslim lands from enemies near and far in order to achieve victory and humiliate the 
oppressors” (p. 6). Additionally, Al-Qaeda created a vision of the good society (Schmid, 
2014, p. 6). In this vision for society, political structure depended on “a single political 
entity—the caliphate—that replaces corrupt, apostate rulers under Western influence, by rule 
under sharia (Islamic Law) wherever there are Muslims so that Allah’s will be done and order 
is restored” (Schmid, 2014, p. 6). 
 
Since their establishment, ISIS has borrowed this same strategy, but invested more in creating 
a similar media narrative to achieve its political agendas. The first step to establish its 







Figure 9. The political structure of ISIS. Source: CNN (2014). 
 
This political system was based on the sovereign authority of its caliph, who has the power to 
enforce sharia law for the purposes of controlling society. This vision was depicted in a 
propaganda publication entitled This is the Promise of Allah by the Al-Hayat Media Centre. 
The publication provided information about the future plans of the organisation and gave an 
indication of goals of the Daesh [ISIS] information strategy’ (Strategic Communication 
Centre of Excellence [StratCom], 2015, p. 4). To this end, ISIS adapted a sophisticated IO 
strategy that utilised HD video production techniques to execute well-constructed narratives 
to achieve its political agendas. 
 
3.3 The Strategic Deployment of High Definition Productions 
    As argued in Chapter 2, since the rise of the Arab Spring uprisings, the utilisation of SMNs 
by Arab revolutionaries has changed dramatically. The dynamic usage of social networks has 
highlighted governments’ cruelty against civilians and has catalysed for political mobilisation 
but has also evolved into a tool for promoting fear and terror. The events of the Iraqi and 





and ISI, who both pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. These terror organisations strategically 
harnessed SMNs and other dissemination tools reliant on internet technologies. Ultimately, 
ISIS and its supporters utilised many means of ICTs and SMNs to spread its message, 
promote its ideology and maintain its network structure and connectivity. For this purpose, 
ISIS realised the significance of establishing a ministry of information to control and direct 
messages to serve its ambition: establishing an Islamic caliphate under the motto of 
‘remaining and expanding’. Schmid and Janny de Graaf (1982, as cited in Architte, 2012) 
famously argued that “terrorism is communication: for the terrorist the message matters, not 
the victim” (p. 29). This appears clearly in type on messages produced by ISIS. The versatile 
of producing messages depicting violence and brutal scenes, ISIS aims to get attention to 
enlarge its audience base. That also explains how their message was mediated so quickly as 
mainstream media collaborated in disseminating of some videos that depicted brutality. For 
example, in January 2015 FOXNEWS broadcasted 2minutes of the burning of the Jordanian 
pilot. It also kept the ISIS video on its website for a few months.  
 
However, ISIS attracted unprecedented media attention on 19 August 2014 after it produced 
its first beheading video titled Message to America. The 4.40-minute video captured the 
speech of both the US photojournalist James Foley and the United Kingdom (UK) ISIS 
jihadist, Mohammed Emwazi.61 In this video, ISIS utilised what are arguably professional 
tools of media production, including high-quality cameras, multiple angle screenshots, 
professional montage and use of sound devices. Overall, this marked the first time a terror 
organisation had produced high-quality video through its own media outlet (Rose, 2014), 
giving an indication of ISIS’ production sophistication and ability to harness new tools of 
                                                          





dissemination. Before this, media reported two accounts of beheading videos produced by Al-
Qaeda in 2002 and 2004. Daniel Pearl and Nick Berg appeared in Al-Qaeda’s unsophisticated 
video productions; Al-Qaeda operatives used single analogue (i.e., VHS) camera in uncut 
scenes of the beheadings. The videotape was sent by mail to Al Jazeera satellite channel. 
 
Unlike the unedited Al-Qaeda videos that preceded it, for the first time, a terror organisation 
produced sophisticated HD, vivid images. The significance of this production aimed to show 
the power of ISIS’ network and to send its radical message to potential recruits to encourage 
their migration to their utopian state. As Giroux (2005) noted: 
 
The culture of fear and the spectacle of terrorism become indistinguishable, everyday life 
under goes a structural and political transformation, fusing sophisticated, electronic 
technologies with a ubiquitous screen culture while simultaneously expanding the range of 
cultural producers and recipients of information and images. (p. 2) 
      
However, according to Ewan (2014) from the Chicago Sun-Times, these videos have been 
“growing in sophistication, using animated graphics and editing techniques apparently aimed 
at embellishing the audio to make a victim’s final moments seem more disturbing”. Ewan 
(2014) observed that these videos were uploaded online and disseminated by traditional 
media and other web-based platforms, such as blogs and shock sites. 
 
Overall, ISIS’ communication strategy can be interpreted as rapid processes of HD 
propaganda video productions, created by its own media production arms, and distributed via 
its SMNs and other unpoliced platforms, such as JustPaste.it, archive.org and Sendvid, for 
information dissemination. ISIS has four aims for their HD production: spread a culture of 





and spread their radical ideology. ISIS’ priority is to spread a culture of fear among its 
enemies, especially Shiite militants and the Iraqi and Syrian armies. The aim is for ISIS to 
terrorise and demoralise its enemies, to earn some concessions concerning their political 
legitimacy and free their prisoners (Clarke, 2003). As Castells (2009) in his book 
Communication Power noted: 
 
Political violence is a form of communication by acting on the minds of people through 
images of death to instill fear and intimidation. This is the strategy of terrorism, which resorts 
to spectacular manifestations of random destruction to induce a permanent state of insecurity 
among targeted populations. Violence, broadcast over the communication networks, becomes 
the medium for the culture of fear. (p. 417) 
 
Horror has always been used as tool of propaganda. The use of political violence aims to send 
messages of fear throughout society to achieve political agendas. For example, in 1948, 
Israeli Haganah62 attacked some Palestinian villages, killing almost everyone there, which 
forced the Palestinians to flee from main cities (e.g., Yafa and Haifa). In 1968, during the 
Vietnam War, the US troops attacked My Lai, killing over 500 unarmed Vietnamese 
civilians. In 1988, the government of Saddam Hussein launched a chemical attack on the 
Kurdish city of Halabja in Iraq, killing thousands of people. These horrific acts served to send 
political messages of fear throughout their respective societies. 
 
ISIS’ second objective in their use of HD productions is to show the power of their networks. 
They desire the world’s attention regarding their message. Their message aims to encourage 
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other jihadi to join their cause, as it appears most recruited jihadi are foreign fighters. As 
Kelly (2014) identified: 
 
             ISIS’ online propaganda campaign effectively targets disenfranchised westerners. It 
lures them into a false sense of purpose by contrasting the West’s often intolerant 
perceptions of Islam with the idealisation of a caliphate, and then throws in 
Hollywood-style action in its execution. 
 
Similarly, Schmitt (2015) observed, “The online messaging has aimed to create a competing 
narrative that strikes an emotional chord with potential militants weighing whether to join a 
violent extremist group”. 
 
Third, HD productions assist ISIS in achieving its territorial ambitions to contain the Sunni 
provinces, as they claim in their video productions that they are the Sunni defenders. Finally, 
ISIS exploits HD productions to spread their radical ideology (i.e., a global networked radical 
ideology), in which ISIS can disturb the security of the coalition forces of what Atwan (2015) 
called an “ideological sleeper cell” (p. 127). This was evident in recent attacks in Saudi 
Arabia, Canada, Australia and the US as self-radicalised individuals committed acts of terror 
to disturb the security of these nations. As Giroux (2005) noted: 
 
            As a result of the emergence of new technologies of diffusion, culture becomes more 
globalised as it is newly hybrized and organised through technologies that redefine its 
meaning, the power of its reach and the influence it has in shaping diverse and 
loosely connected audiences […] it also has become a powerful force for the 
production of public spheres engaged in the production of global landscape of 






One of the technologies that played a key role in spreading radical ideology and encouraging 
acts of terror against Western targets was Telegram (see Section 6.3). Ultimately, it was the 
sophistication of HD videos that proved to have a greater effect, and be more convincing, 
than messages posted to Twitter and shared across other information environments. 
According to Architte (2012), “It is often argued that videos are more radicalizing than text”. 
Katz (as cited in Architte, 2012), the Director of the Search for International Terrorist Entities 
(SITE) Institute in a statement prepared for the US Congress in 2007 stated that “the 
propaganda in jihadi videos is compelling, convincing, and able to be accessed in a growing 
number of languages” (p. 18). 
 
Overall, the deployment of HD media productions is part of ISIS’ IO strategy. That is, HD 
videos helped to maintain network structure and flows of information by enrolling more 
actors to the network. HD videos helps to maintain internal cohesion and messaging. 
Externally, it aided in spreading fear and recruiting more actors (see Section 4.12). 
 
3.4 Understanding ISIS’ Information Operations 
    To understand processes of ISIS’ IO strategy it is important to identify organisation 
objectives, political and religious structure and its purpose of endurance. Since its emergence, 
ISIS was transparent about the nature of its existence as outlined by the famous Friday speech 
of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (as Caliph Ibrahim) in the Great Mosque of Al-Nuri, Mosul on 29 
June 2014. The speech highlighted many aspects of causes of destruction of the Ottoman 
Islamic caliphate. This speech was also significant because of Al-Baghdadi’s declaration of 
Islamic caliphate under his leadership. Al-Baghdadi’s declaration of Islamic caliphate 





location under the umbrella of Islamic caliphate. Second, it built a sovereign Islamic state that 
had an army, Welayats and constitutions. Third, it declared the intention to conquer and 
subdue the land of infidels. To achieve such objectives, ISIS ran a sophisticated IO strategy, 
dependent on their strategic propaganda narrative. Winter (2017) underlined the aim behind 
ISIS’ use of strategic propaganda. He argued: 
 
           The Islamic State [ISIS] has three information principles. First, present an alternative 
narrative, a comprehensive offer of existence; second, counter the ‘intellectual 
invasion’ being conducted by the mainstream news media; and, third, launch 
propaganda ‘projectiles’ against the enemy. Combined, these three facets form the 
foundations of the group’s propaganda strategy.  
 
However, before I explore the strategic narrative of ISIS networks, I will define the term IO. 
The US Department of Defence (DOD, 2017) defined IOs as “the integrated employment, 
during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and 
potential adversaries while protecting our own” (p. 113).  
 
ISIS’ IO involves the collection and dissemination of information to establish competitive 
advantage over its opponents. Specifically, ISIS managed to swarm information 
environments with propaganda utilising social network platforms’ dissemination dynamics 
(e.g., the hijacking of trending hashtags). The purpose of ISIS’ IO in swarming information 
environments was to influence Muslims—through ISIS’ processes of sophisticated 
production, new approaches to information dissemination techniques and employment of 
strategic narrative themes—to rally behind the new caliphate. To understand these processes, 





3.5 The Strategic Logic of ISIS’ Information Operations—A Strategic Narrative 
Perspective 
     To highlight the origins of ISIS’ IO strategy it is important to understand the events that 
characterised the trajectory of this strategy. These events include the Arab Spring uprisings 
and Al-Qaeda’s use of digital information environments and sophisticated propaganda 
strategies. From the Arab Spring uprisings, ISIS learned that the use of strategic narrative by 
Arab activists tipped the balance of power and diminished barriers of information control by 
the Arab governments (see Section 2.1). From Al-Qaeda, ISIS understood the need to have a 
compelling story to gain support and enlarge their audience; however, ISIS managed to use 
sophisticated media production techniques and targeted new information environments for 
dissemination purposes. 
 
To understand the logic of ISIS’ IO and the use of a strategic narrative, two infamous 
publications must be discussed: Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through 
Which The Umma Will Pass (herein, Management of Savagery) and Oh Media 
Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid Too.63 In these two publications, ISIS crafted and defined 
its media production policies, strategic narrative and propaganda to achieve its political and 
religious ambitions. To understand the roots of ISIS’ IO and strategic narrative an in-depth 
analysis of the latter media publications is presented. 
 
In Management of Savagery, Al-Qaeda’s thinker, Abu Bakr Naji (2006) expressed the 
necessity of adapting a powerful media strategy to compete with and defy the media of ISIS’ 
adversaries. According to Naji (2006), this media strategy had three aims. The first aim was 
                                                          





to recruit some military personnel from the “army of infidels”64 to convert them into 
mujahedin. Second, the media operations must justify all savage behaviour, such as killings 
and all other capital punishments. Third, the media operations must be transparent on all 
actions, including the recognition of their own error. With this Naji (2006) aimed to represent 
Al-Qaeda as an honest organisation to its followers; by revealing the lies and tricks of Al-
Qaeda’s enemies, Naji hoped to establish a strong impression of Al-Qaeda’s truthfulness. To 
achieve this media strategy, Naji (2006, p. 43) suggested that new media committees should 
be established from enthusiastic youth willing to serve the new state. 
The Management of Savagery booklet was adapted by ISIS as the ultimate strategy with 
which to establish their own state. As ISIS inherited a legacy of corruption, chaos and 
disorder in the territories they controlled (a result of the secular governments who abolished 
Islamic laws), it was deemed necessary to act mercilessly to control the society. The steps to 
establish a caliphate, as outlined in the Management of Savagery publication, is shown in 
Figure 10. 
                                                          






Figure 10. The stages to establish the caliphate. Source: Hume (2015). 
 
The second publication and media production is Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a 
Mujahid Too. This publication was produced by Al Himma bookshop;65 it is a 55-page 
pocket-sized book, so it could be kept and distributed easily among followers. This 
publication presented two main media strategies: defensive (reinforcing) aims to counter the 
propaganda strategy of adversaries and offensive (suppression) aims to show strength through 
disseminating messages of fear.66 
 
                                                          
65 Al Himma is the publishing agency for ISIS books. 





In Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid Too,67 ISIS aims to encourage every Muslim 
who cannot join physical jihad to be media jihadist. ISIS first identified (based on the Hadith 
and some verses of Qur’an) that media jihadi and actual jihadi in the battle field have the 
same divine reward. In this publication, the authors highlighted ways to use media for jihad. 
According to teachings about jihad (i.e., Fiqh Al-Jihad) in the Qur’an, jihad of infidels has 
three aspects. The first of these aspects is jihad of the tongue. That is, the use of words either 
written or spoken to fight enemies. This strategy of jihad had great psychological effect their 
enemies by the spreading of messages of fear. For example, Nashir Political Service posted 
on its Telegram channel: 
 
             Some people might think that what we say on the media is just words and not 
fighting. But our words if sometimes accompanied by wisdom they will be just like a 
bomb that can be heard in the heart beats of any unbeliever. Some words you write or 
the news you report might settled [sic] in the heart of Nice68[such as] Knight when he 
carried his operation which terrified not only France but also Europe. 
 
The second aspect of jihad, as it applies to media, is that media can be used as the catalyst for 
jihadi mobilisation. The use of media channels to call for jihad and show the atrocities 
committed at the hands of an organisation’s adversaries is also the duty of mujahedin. The 
third purpose of jihad is to infuriate the enemy. This can be done by disseminating counter 
narrative measures to defy the propaganda of their adversaries by showing the victories and 
strength of their state. However, to achieve the objectives of media-mujahedin, guidelines 
were established on how to use many means of media productions and channels of 
                                                          
67 ISIS also produced a video production under the same name. 





dissemination. That is, the enrolment of many network actors such as multiple digital media 
environments can facilitate jihadi’s mobilisation. 
 
In the Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid Too video production,69 ISIS drew 
attention to the war within SMNs after the degrading operation had taken place. In the video, 
the presenter said, “Let fight them in Twitter […] they spend millions of dollars to hinder the 
outreach of our message”. The video also claimed that every post or message sent in digital 
media influences on Muslim youth: “It may affect their decision and join us or at least this 
post will raise awareness about the ongoing war between the army of infidels and Islam”.  
According to Winter (2017), the producers of this video aimed to provide: 
 
             Advice as to how Islamic State [ISIS] media operations should actually be 
constructed. In so doing, they shed light on the very essence of its propaganda 
strategy, a tripartite approach to communication that has given the group an edge over 
its rivals and transformed its war against the rest of the world. 
 
Further, the notion of media-mujahedin was also highlighted in Al-Qaeda’s publication 
produced by the Al-Fajr media centre.70 In it, the author (as cited in Prucha, 2011) argued, 
“Internet is a battlefield for jihad, a place for missionary work, a field of confronting the 
enemies of God. It is upon any individual to consider himself as a media-mujahid, dedicating 
himself, his wealth and his time for God”(p. 46). 
 
                                                          
69 This video is available on: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3vmb3r. 





Clearly, the publications Management of Savagery and Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a 
Mujahid Too reflect ISIS propaganda strategy and media tactics. These publications informed 
their information warfare strategy, aimed to counter their adversaries’ propaganda and raise 
awareness about the important aspects of jihad. These publications have exclusively 
contained all media strategies of ISIS, particularly how to execute IO and mobilise media 
correspondents and digital logistics to achieve a counternarrative media strategy against their 
adversaries. The analysis in this chapter discusses what these publications present and the 
implication for ISIS’ IOs. Analysing the content of these publications leads to an 
understanding of the ISIS’ sophisticated media strategy, strategic narrative and propaganda 
themes, methods of production, influence of reach and objectives of messages. 
 
3.6 The Strategic Narrative of ISIS Networks 
    The study of the strategic narrative of ISIS aims to understand its message, the audience it 
targets and the medium it uses. As Roselle, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin (2014) argued, 
strategic narrative “directly addresses the formation, projection and diffusion, and reception 
of ideas in the international system” (pp. 9–10). Therefore, the purpose of creating a strategic 
narrative, as Nissen (2015) argued, is that “it offers a framework through which conflicts 
past, present and future can be structured in order to help establish and maintain power in the 
international system and to shape the context and the system itself” (p. 45). 
 
In this chapter, I use Roselle et al. (2014) definition of strategic narrative: A strategic 
narrative is “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of international 
politics and to shape the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviour of domestic and international 
actors” (Roselle et al., 2014). It is also important to point out that “a narrative is a system of 





how those elements can be assembled to satisfy a desire that is rooted on conflict” 
(Halverson, Corman & Goodall, 2011). 
 
To better understand the common themes, shared stories and participants and events of ISIS 
networks, I highlight key findings of scholars and policymakers who examined the strategic 
narrative of ISIS’ networks to establish a counterpropaganda strategy (e.g., Milton, 2016; 
Nissen, 2015; StratCom, 2015; Winter, 2015a, 2015b; Zelin, 2015; see Table 1). 
 
Author Zelin, 2015 Winter, 2015 Milton, 2016 StratCom, 2015 
Methodology Content analysis of 
visual propaganda 
posted on Twitter 
Content analysis of 
892 digital 
artefacts posted on 
Twitter 
Content analysis of 


























Table 1. Findings of scholarly research on ISIS’ strategic narrative. Illustrated by the author. 
 
This analysis aims to capture the communication effects and strategic propaganda of ISIS’ 
narrative themes by referring to the work of scholars who used different methodological 
approaches, different time frames and different media content. The findings of these studies 
will be compared to my own findings, in which I used different methodological and content 
analysis approaches. As Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle (2017) noted: 
 
             This approach to strategic narratives indicate that they are not just single stories, but 





taken as a part of a strategy are ‘storied’, thereby becoming part of a larger 
overarching strategic narrative, and that these actions have communicative effect. 
 
Communication effect can be radicalisation, recruitment processes and lone wolf attacks. For 
example, in Picture or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media 
Output, Zelin (2015) examined the totality of ISIS’ media productions during a sample week: 
from 18 April to 24 April 2015 (p. 85). His analysis was based on visual and textual content 
posted by prominent ISIS accounts on Twitter. Zelin (2015) categorised his key findings into 
four main themes—governance, daw’a (preaching), hisbah (moral policing) and military. His 
week-long data collection revealed that 88 per cent of ISIS content is visual (63 percent is 
pictures, 20 percent is video, 5 percent is graphic) “as opposed to text-based propaganda” 
(Zelin, 2015, p. 84). 
 
Using the tracking of hashtags methodology, Winter (2015a)—in Documenting the Virtual 
‘Caliphate’—examined 892 items of ISIS’ digital media content on Twitter. His analysis 
involved a 30-day survey of ISIS’ media outputs such as Al-Hayat, Al-Itisam and Ajnad 
media production arms. To understand ISIS’ IO and its media strategy with evidence-based 
analysis, Winter (2015a, p. 5) collected some videos, photo essays, news bulletins, audio 
statements, posters and theological essays from 17 July to 15 August 2015. His research 
revealed that six main media narratives were dominating ISIS productions. These are utopia, 
military, brutality, belonging and victimhood. 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO’s) StratCom (2015) report, DAESH 
Information Campaign and Its Influence, examined the information strategy of ISIS between 
2014 and 2015. To understand ISIS’ information and communication strategy, StratCom 





syndicates, eye tracking, social media analysis, and media and effect analysis. Their research 
shows that the visual propaganda of ISIS comprises three main narrative themes: political 
messages, which accounted for 48 per cent of the visual propaganda; religious messages, 
which accounted for 38 per cent of the visual propaganda; and social issues, which accounted 
for 14 per cent of the visual propaganda. 
 
In another report, Communication Breakdown: Unravelling the Islamic States Media Efforts, 
military analyst Daniel Milton (2016, p. 21) analysed over 9,000 videos, photographs and 
picture reports that had been embedded in Twitter, posted between August 2015 and August 
2016. Milton (2016) found that more than 50 per cent of the analysed data was focused on 
themes outside the battlefield, such as religious practices, justice, governance and life in the 
caliphate. Only nine per cent of the releases “show the commission or aftermath of 
executions or battlefield killings” (Milton, 2016, p. iv). Figure 12 and 13 shows the results of 
Milton’s findings. 
 
Figure 12. Milton’s findings about the media 
form used by ISIS in their Twitter posts’. 
Source: Milton (2016, p. 30).
 
Figure 13. ‘Milton’s findings about the content 
of ISIS’ Twitter posts. Source: Milton (2016, 






Overall, all media content produced by ISIS, including visual, audio, document, photo, 
meme, or Twitter and Facebook posts share a similar narrative. The difference is the 
percentage of shared themes through visual propaganda as they vary depending on political 
and religious circumstances surrounding the caliphate. The role of outside actors who 
digitally aided ISIS with media productions reflected on victories and setbacks of ISIS.  
I have included my reflections on the studies that highlighted ISIS’ IOs and narrative themes 
in line with al-Baghdadi’s speech, who first defined the objectives of ISIS’ IO based on the 
publications Management of Savagery and Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid 
Too. Additionally, I highlight my findings from my own textual analysis, using the NVivo 
analysis tool, of six examples of Dabiq and Rumiyah ISIS magazines (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Word cloud findings of the analysis of six of Dabiq and Rumiyah ISIS magazines.created 
by the Author. 
 
The publications of six Dabiq and Rumiyah ISIS magazines were downloaded from the 
archive.org platform. These publications were published by al-Hayat Media Centre and were 
written in English. The publication dates of these magazines were between August 2016 and 





non-Arabic speakers. As shown in Figure 14, the main media narratives highlighted Tawhid 
(i.e., the idea of no God, but Allah), praise for the IS, the need to establish a caliphate, other 
important aspects of jihad against their enemies (e.g., crusaders and rafida) and call for 
Hegira to the Islamic caliphate. However, these textual analysis findings will be explained in 
correlation with other scholarly findings examined in Section 3.6 (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15. Capturing information operation objectives of ISIS networks. Illustrated by the Author. 
 
Based on the process represented in Figure 15, the strategic logic of ISIS networks required 
in-depth analysis of ISIS’ IO objectives and principles. As stated in Figure 15, ISIS’ IO aims 
to achieve three objectives: re-establish a caliphate, unite all Muslim Sunnis under the newly 





3.7 Re-Establish the Caliphate 
    Since the demise of the Ottoman caliphate in 1923, and its substitution by a secular 
Turkish government, Al-Qaeda—under the leadership of Osama bin Laden—was the first 
organisation who proposed to reinstate a caliphate. Bin Laden withdrew his plan, as he 
worried that this would benefit the US, as the mujahedin could be easily targeted if they were 
stationed in one geographical space. However, ISIS disowned Al-Qaeda and declared the 
caliphate after the seizure of Mosul. Winter (2017) asserted that: 
 
             The restoration of a ‘caliphate’ is a religious duty—as are the draconian laws and 
vicious terrorism that the Islamic State [ISIS] practices. It presents a diagnosis for 
real and imagined Muslim woes and a prescription: to embrace its assault on Syria, 
Iraq and, eventually, all other Muslim states. 
 
To understand the principles guiding ISIS’ strategic narrative to re-establish a caliphate, I 
classified findings into two main categories: offensive and defensive operations. This 
classification was based on current empirical studies by scholars and experts in the field (e.g., 
Milton, 2016; StratCom, 2015; Winter, 2015a) and content analysis of ISIS’ media 
productions in primarily Arabic publications, such as Management of Savagery, Oh Media 
Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid Too and the content analysis of Dabiq magazines. As 
Winter (2017) explained: 
 
            The Islamic State [ISIS] uses offensive information warfare to attack not only military 
targets, but civilian ones, too. After all, in its eyes, there is no such thing as a civilian 
status beyond the caliphate’s boundaries. Thus, its media ‘missiles’—be they video 
executions or mass-mediated terrorist attacks—are calibrated to strike disengaged 






The main objective of the strategic narrative’s defensive operations was recruitment, 
including encouraging Muslims to migrate to the land controlled by ISIS; calling Muslims to 
pledge allegiance to the Caliph,71 recruiting individuals for jihad and establishing a global 
caliphate. 
 
To achieve the primary and ultimate objective, ISIS carried out sophisticated media 
propaganda campaigns to promote a new caliphate. As Afzal and Wallis (2016) noted, “ISIS’ 
content contains carefully-chosen informational cues aiming to present a romanticized view 
of the caliphate” (p. 76). To do that, ISIS employed experts in media production techniques, 
who selected narratives carefully. Using the data collected from social media platforms (e.g., 
Twitter), encrypted applications (e.g., Telegram) and anonymous sharing portals (e.g., 
JustPaste.it), I observed that the media narratives of ISIS’ promotion of the caliphate was 
underpinned by three themes: utopia, supremacy and the sharing of grievances 
(representations of victimhood). These themes were depicted in what Atwan (2015) identified 
as ‘propaganda HD’ (p. 8), as evidenced in the following videos produced by ISIS: Message 
to the US Government, Healing of Believers’ Chests and Clanging of Swords. The reason 
behind the HD production was suggested by Milton (2016): “The group placed on quality 
production as a means of appealing to the public. Indeed, while Islamic State [ISIS] media 
products today are known for their high-quality production value” (p. 4). 
 
                                                          
71 Based on a Hadith of the Prophet Mohammad, “Whoever removes his hand from obedience (to the ruler) 
will meet Allah with no proof for himself, and whoever dies without the pledge of allegiance (to the ruler) 







    In his monograph, Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’, Winter (2015a) argued, “The 
relative importance of the utopian strand of Islamic State’s [ISIS’] propaganda is inevitable 
and necessary” (p. 30). In 2014, ISIS showed its utopian society depicted in a series of 
propaganda videos, Mujatweets,72 produced by Al-Hayat Media Centre (see Figure 16). 
In Mujatweets, ISIS aims to recruit jihadists and encourage other Muslims to migrate to 
newly established Islamic caliphate. The main narrative in these videos was the 
representation of a beautiful life under the re-established caliphate. These videos were 
characterised by images of busy markets, children in playgrounds, clean hospitals and free 
health care, and peace in the streets of Raqqa and Mosul. These videos were widely 
celebrated and shared across SMNs, mainly YouTube.73 As Winter (2015b) observed, “The 
idea of the utopia “caliphate” runs strongly throughout all the organisation’s messaging. Its 
constant presence makes sense: Islamic State’s [ISIS’] establishment and implementation of 
the “caliphate” is the organisation’s unique selling point” (p. 28). 
                                                          
72 The term Mujatweets is a combination of ‘Mujahideen’ and ‘Tweets’. Mujatweets are short HD videos, 
ranging between 1.30–3.00 minutes, presented by foreign recruits in many languages, mainly English, 
French, and German. 
73 Mujatweets is series of episodes start episode #1 and ends episode #8. Some of these videos are still 






Figure 16. Screenshot of Mujatweet, episode 8. 
 
The utopian narrative was effective; it resulted in convincing thousands of Muslim youth to 
migrate from Western and Arab countries to join ISIS (see Figure 17). Ibish (2014) described 
this narrative as healthy because it was not challenged by ISIS’ adversaries. This vision of 
utopian Muslim society was described by Ibish (2014) as “universalism in an undifferentiated 
and gigantic caliphate across the Islamic world, without distinctions among individuals 
except their degree of zealotry”. 
 
 
Figure 17. Eid celebrations in Raqqa, Syria. Source: Nashir political service. 
 
Other propaganda productions, such as From the Land of Khalifah (see Figure 18) and 





the Islamic caliphate. The focus was on migrating to the land of the caliphate, as many 
migrant jihadi said, we “live in dignity and peace under the rule of sharia law”. One foreign 
fighter from the UK said, “We don’t need their democracy [,] we only need Sharia that’s why 
I am so happy to migrate here”.74 
 
 
Figure 18. Post by ‘Speak the Truth’ Twitter account by @6Haqq. Posted on 21 March 2015. 
 
Moreover, ISIS’ printed publications and digital magazines, such as Dabiq and other online 
publications, also focused on a utopian life under the Islamic caliphate. Media narratives in 
such publications visioned the societal impact of the Islamic caliphate constitution (known as 
Dywan) in building the state, paving the streets, observing markets, and caring for livestock 
and land. According to one media operative (as cited in Winter, 2017): 
 
            Propaganda must simultaneously address and water down the negative aspects of 
living under the Islamic State [ISIS], while also conveying a rose-tinted image of its 
                                                          





positive facets. In this way, the Islamic State can sell itself as a utopia to which 
Salafi-jihadists can go to live as heroes, rather than an insurgent group to which new 
adherents go to die as martyrs. 
 
The utopian theme in the ISIS narrative was presented during operation We Are Coming 
Nenawa, which was initiated in October 2016 to liberate Mosul. The power of the utopian 
messages is highlighted by Ibish (2014): “This simple message resonates because it is 
coherent, idealistic and fills a void. But most of all, it promises, and appears to be delivering, 
tangible and striking political and military successes”. 
 
The utopian narrative comprises 52.57 per cent of the media narratives of ISIS (see Figure 
19). Winter (2015a) stated, “Islamic State’s [ISIS’] emphasis on the utopia narrative is 
unambiguous: over half of the propaganda events in the Shawwal dataset (469 of 892) convey 
it above all else” (p. 30). Winter’s (2015a, p. 32) content analyses revealed that the utopian 
narrative can be refined into seven categories: economic activity, religion, social life, justice, 










Figure 20. Utopia narrative subcategories of ISIS networks between 2014 and 2015.  
Source: Winter (2015, p. 32). 
 






           The most prominent narrative, by far, is that of utopia. At once the most appealing 
promise of the group and the most difficult to convince observers of, there is a 
predictably disproportionate emphasis upon it. Islamic State’s [ISIS’] media 
strategists ensure that its utopia is sold as a comprehensive project, where the 
economy flourishes, ‘Islam’ is implemented, wildlife thrives, rule of law prevails, and 
the government governs. (p. 39) 
 
To attract women in joining and migrating to the Islamic caliphate, ISIS established ‘Umm 
Network’ on Twitter. According to Liang (2015), the content shared in Umm Network’ is: 
 
            Meant to make extremism a normal lifestyle decision. Pictures of kittens and design 
footwear are tweeted as well as extremist rhetoric and descriptions of the ‘good life’ 
in Syria. The network gives nursing and cooking advice for those wives who want to 
keep their jihadists happy, and it provides information on Shariah, weapons use, and 
social media tools so that they can contribute to the IS recruitment campaigns. (p. 6) 
 
3.7.2 Supremacy 
    There were three aspects to the supremacy narrative depicted in ISIS’ media productions: 
the primacy of Muslim identity, the application of sharia law and the functioning of the state. 
ISIS propaganda has shown many aspects of state authority, power and control in the 
territories they control (i.e., Welayats). The first sign of sovereignty was the declaration of 
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as Caliph. The legitimacy of the new Caliph, as stated in ISIS’ media 
productions, is derived from the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and the legacy of the 
Rashidun caliphate after the prophet’s death. The use of the black flag, stamped with Prophet 





returning to its original form, power and dominance. The significance of Al-Baghdadi’s 
declaration of caliphate resonates by dividing the Muslim world based on identity. This 
identity is derived from a Salafi perspective, which rejects non-Islamic behaviour and 
practices, such as Sufism, Tabligh and Ikhwan. As Ingram (2015) observed, “IS’s [ISIS’] 
central media units bombard its transnational audiences with messages that fuse narrative, 
imagery and symbolism to emphasise the primacy of one’s Muslim identity over all others” 
(p. 742). 
 
Moreover, the application of sharia law (e.g., hudud, see Figure 24) in its original form, based 
on the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunna (including the issue of passports and establishment 
of its own golden currency yet) are another sign of ISIS’ supremacy (see Figures 21–23). 
 
 
Figure 21. ISIS flag. Source: Nashir political 
services. 
 
Figure 22. Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. 
 






Figure 24. The application of sharia law in Raqqa, Syria. Source: Nashir political services (Telegram 
channel). 
 
As Ingram (2015) explained, “IS [ISIS] now devotes a significant portion of its IO activities 
to portraying its governance apparatus as multidimensional, sophisticated, bureaucratised and 
well resourced. This prioritisation is reflected in IS’ IO output” (p. 737).  
 
One of the most important elements of their IO to show supremacy through the integration of 
physical acts of violence within their IO. Denning (2005) argued, “They make audio and 
video recordings of the incidents for distribution over the [i]nternet and on television. Their 
violence becomes theatre, staged for its psychological impact, and replayed played over and 






3.7.3 Sharing Grievances and Representations of Victimhood 
   ISIS represented notions of victimhood as a key narrative to establish unity among Muslims 
under the newly established caliphate. In its media productions, End of Sykes-Picot (see 
Figure 25) and Smashing the Borders (see Figure 26), Al-Hayat media productions showed 
atrocities, economic setbacks and poverty after the dismantling of the Ottoman caliphate and 
subsequent appointment of Arab leaders who were allied to the West. These grievances 
occurred as a result of the US and European meddling in the Middle East. The Sykes-Picot 
Agreement was an agreement signed between England and France on 16 May 1916, which 
divided the regions of the Ottoman Empire between England and France. This agreement was 
responsible for establishing the current borders of the Middle East. The creation of artificial 
borders has dismantled the unity of the Muslim nation, which resulted in direct intervention 
from the UK, France, the US and Russia in Iraq and Syria. Ultimately, this intervention 
caused millions of casualties and led to the current refugee crisis. Miller (2016) contended: 
 
            In the propaganda video, IS was echoing and amplifying the sentiment that Sykes-
Picot is a symbol of foreign meddling, but the militant group was also modifying this 
message for their own purposes, and crucially accusing Muslim leaders of complicity 
in these crimes, a key theme of IS propaganda. 
 
Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi announced, “This blessed advance will not stop until we hit 







Figure 25. Screenshot of first release of The End of Sykes-Picot video. 
 
 
Figure 26. Screenshots from ‘The End of Sykes-Picot’ propaganda video by Al-Hayat Media Centre. 
 
3.8 United Sunnis 
    United Sunnis, under the banner of Islamic caliphate, is one of the objectives of ISIS’ IO 
strategies. As Winter (2017) noted, “If presented with the “right” information and the 
“correct” narrative, they contend, Muslims everywhere will inevitably end up rallying around 
the caliphate’s banner”. 
 
Three strategic narratives can be observed from this objective: share grievances, raise 
political awareness and recruitment. As clearly stated in Figure 27 these strategic narratives 





identity and raise political awareness. Ultimately, this objective can be achieved through the 
process of recruitment. Common grievances and raising of political awareness were tools 
used to recruit new jihadi and migrants to ISIS’ lands. 
Figure 27. The main narratives aimed to unite Sunnis. Illustrated by the Author. 
 
The main narrative theme that ISIS used to unite Sunnis was victimhood. Fernandez called 
this theme ‘urgency’. To present this theme, ISIS depicted atrocities committed by Shiites’ 
militancy, by showing images and videos of: 
 
            [Sunni Arab] Muslims … being slaughtered now. Syria’s children are being killed by 
the (Rafida75) apostates now. There is a plot now by the Shiites in Iraq, Syria, and 
elsewhere to utterly destroy the Sunni Muslims. The Shiites have already taken the 
Sunnis’ dignity and political power and are now on the march to take everything else. 
(Fernandez, 2015, p. 11). 
 
Ingram (2015) also observed that: 
                                                          
75 Rafida, according to Sunnis, are Majoos (fire worshippers) who embraced Islam under Shia sect to 












             ISIS’ narratives portray them as the champion of Sunni Muslims (in-group identity), 
its enemies as evil Others (Shias, Christians, non-conformist Sunnis) who are 
responsible for Sunni perceptions of crisis, and ISIS as the only source of solutions. 
The result is a competitive system of meaning that acts as a framework through which 
ISIS’ audiences perceive and evaluate the conflict and its actors, generate meaning 
and legitimise actions. (p. 736) 
 
In one of his speeches, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (as cited in Ingram, 2015) affirmed Muslim 
Sunni identity when he stated: 
 
            O soldiers of the Islamic State [ISIS], do not be awestruck by the great numbers of 
your enemy, for Allah is with you … I also remind you to attend to the Muslims and 
the tribes of Ahlus-Sunnah (the Sunnis) with goodness. Stay awake guarding them so 
they can be safe and at rest. Be their support … Know that today you are the 
defenders of the religion and the guards of the land of Islam. (p. 742) 
 
It is important to acknowledge that Islam is the identity of all Muslims. This identity is 
constructed on Islamic principles of wall’a (i.e., alliance to Allah and his messenger only) 
and Barra’a (i.e., abolish all alliances and associates with infidels). Therefore, as Arab 
countries are allied with the infidel West, ISIS encouraged all Muslim migrants to its land to 
declare Walla’a and Barra’a by burning their passports (see the propaganda films, Message 







Figure 28. Screenshot from One Nation video produced by Al-Furat Media. 
 
The third strategic narrative asserted the need for political awareness. It highlighted the 
corruption of Arab governments, including their alliances with ‘the enemies of Allah’ (e.g., 
the US and Israel), their application of non-Islamic laws and the true believers they held 
captive in their jails (e.g., Saudi Arabia). Therefore, ISIS called Sunnis to unite and execute 
jihad against their rulers. Moreover, ISIS drew attention to the role of Iran and its ambitions 
to control Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and the Arab world. Such political messages were 
depicted in video productions (see for example, Revenge of the Desert and The Fertile 
Nation) see Figures 29 and 30. 
 
 






Figure 30. Screenshot of ‘The Fertile Nation’ propaganda video. 
 
3.9 Stay and Expand 
    As part of its marketing strategy to recruit more people to the land of Islamic caliphate, 
ISIS adopted the motto baqiya wa tatmadad (i.e., stay and expand). To establish a legitimate 
Islamic caliphate, the expansion of territories is a religious duty and requirement. However, 
most of ISIS’ political and social messages depicted the term ‘baqiah’. To achieve stay and 
expand objectives, ISIS used psychological operations that included the dissemination of 
political and social messages aimed to radicalise, recruit and spread fear (see Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31. Diagram representing the relationship between fear, recruitment and radicalisation. 





Giroux (2005) noted: 
 
           The culture of fear and the spectacle of terrorism become indistinguishable, everyday 
life under goes a structural and political transformation, fusing sophisticated, 
electronic technologies with a ubiquitous screen culture while simultaneously 
expanding the range of cultural producers and recipients of information and images. 
(p. 2) 
 
Further, Giroux (2005) clarified: 
 
            As a result of the emergence of new technologies of diffusion, culture becomes more 
globalised as it is newly hybrized and organised through technologies that redefine its 
meaning, the power of its reach and the influence it has in shaping diverse and 
loosely connected audiences […] it also has become a powerful force for the 
production of public spheres engaged in the production of global landscape of 
violence, fear and insecurity. (p. 15) 
 
The violence, fear and insecurity, as suggested by Giroux (2005), were used as a strategic 
narrative by ISIS to justify its actions and acts of terror against Western people in their 
homeland. Being exposed rapidly to ISIS’ information was thought to speed the process of 







Figure 32. Screenshots of messages disseminated via Nashir Telegram channel. 
 
 







The NATO StratCom (2015) argued that the information strategy of ISIS intended to 
“become a global state that unites Muslims around the world, and lines of effort” (p. 29). This 
objective can be achieved through processes of radicalisation, recruitment and spreading fear. 
Williams argued: 
 
            Islamic State’s [ISIS’] media effort has several aims that target both sympathetic and 
hostile audiences. One goal is to recruit supporters (…) A second goal is to generate 
fear among its opponents, which has very specific advantages on the battlefield. A 
third goal is to assert its legitimacy and gain acceptance of its status as a state. 
 
In this context, it must be stressed that the bulk of Islamic State’s publications target Muslim 
societies around the world; however, they also attempt to influence disbelievers (Lakomy, 
2017, p. 41). The strategy of establishing Welayats (i.e., provinces) in every Arab country, 
including Afghanistan, Russia, Pakistan and the Philippines, and constitutions in every 
Welayah aims to control social and economic systems. However, the ambition of ISIS is not 
limited to only these countries but aims at conquering the West as shown in their map (see 
Figures 34 and 35). 
 






Figure 35. The land ISIS planned to control, as shown on their press releases. 
 
3.10 The Communication Effect of ISIS’ Strategic Narrative 
    As established at the beginning of this chapter, I have analysed the strategic narrative aims 
of ISIS. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the communication effects of ISIS’ IO. In 
this subsection, I aim to highlight the two main communication effects: radicalisation and 
recruitment. I aim to examine how these effects manifested in ISIS’ IO objectives. Most 
importantly, I discuss the role of internet technologies in the processes of radicalisation and 
recruitment. 
 
However, this subsection will not discuss how and why an individual is radicalised or 
recruited. Instead, I will highlight the role of SMNs and other information environments in 
spreading ISIS’ strategic narrative and how this has affected the influx of jihadists to the land 
of the Islamic caliphate. 
3.11 Recruitment and Radicalisation 
    Recruitment and radicalisation are an integral part of ISIS’ PSYOP to achieve its political 
and religious agendas. As Denning (2005) argued, “The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or 





Although terror organisations do not refer to it as PSYOP, they appear to understand and 
employ psychological operations76 (Denning, 2005, p. 3). 
 
Denning (2005) defined psychological operations as “planned operations that convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behaviour of foreign governments, 
organisations, groups, and individuals”. The first part of this definition is the most important 
when discussing the radicalisation and recruitment of foreigners. 
 
In this subsection, I am discussing the PSYOP that aimed to enhance and accelerate the 
process of radicalisation and recruitment. However, these operations can also be called 
propaganda (Taylor, 2002, p. 50). There is no doubt that ISIS used propaganda as an IO 
strategy to leverage its networks around the world. These operations targeted local and 
international supporters by disseminating emotive messages and grievances, wherein the 
atrocities of the West—especially those committed against Muslim women and children—
were depicted. James Comey (2015), Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
claimed that: 
 
ISIS has managed through its high-volume Internet recruiting, via videos, memes, Tweets, 
Facebook, WhatsApp and Telegram accounts to contact and penetrate across international 
boundaries to recruit Americans. According to the FBI, ISIS recruitment in the U.S. has 
resulted in the actual and attempted recruitment of over 200 individuals residing in the U.S. 
traveling to Syria to join them. 
 
                                                          





By examining the numbers of recruited foreign fighters who joined ISIS in 2014, it can be 
argued that ISIS’ IO was successful. As Gartenstein-Ross, Barr and Moreng (2016) noted: 
 
             ISIS has employed several common themes and narratives in its global propaganda 
efforts. One theme that is omnipresent in IS’ [ISIS’] global propaganda is a ‘winner’s 
message’, which portrays ISIS as an unstoppable military force capable of defeating 
all enemies. This narrative has been particularly effective in persuading jihadist 
organisations and prospective foreign fighters that IS has staying power in the region. 
(p. 4; see Figure 36) 
 
 
Figure 36. Country of origin for the foreign fighters who joined ISIS in 2015.  Source: Statista.com. 
 
To understand the phenomena and processes of recruitment, first we must understand 
radicalisation. In my view, based on my observations, I am arguing that in some cases, 
radicalisation leads to recruitment. In other words, an individual cannot be recruited unless he 
is retaining a radical view. These views can be obtained from many sources, such as radical 





Additionally, individuals can be exposed to information available on the internet and other 
social media platforms by radical preachers. Adopting radical views through the use of media 
sources is known as self-radicalisation. There are many factors that influence self-
radicalisation. This includes social, economic and religious factors. Further, regular exposure 
to radical messages that have been posted by charismatic Muslim clerics, who are primarily 
involved in global jihad business (such as Al-Awakili, bin Laden and Al-Zarqawi), can 
influence the processes of self-radicalisation. However, to completely understand the 
processes of radicalisation, an in-depth qualitative methodology approach, including semi-
structured interviews and social network analysis of participants, would be required. 
 
Based on Figure 36, the influx of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq after the 
establishment of the Islamic caliphate demonstrated that ISIS’ PSYOP was effective. That is, 
the strategic planning of IO, in terms of dissemination tactics and produced content, was 
successful. This success will be discussed using the OODA loop information warfare model 
(see Section 7.3). As represented in Figure 36, more than 7,000 recruits came from non-Arab 
countries, which is significant.77 By directing its IO strategy aims at establishing the Islamic 
caliphate as its ultimate goal, ISIS’ propaganda had a successful effect on young Muslim men 
and women, who became willing to join. This effect was attained by using a strategic 
narrative, in which ISIS suggested that migrating to the caliphate was obligatory for all 
Muslims. This notion was based on the Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed, who said that 
‘who dies without a pledge of allegiance, he dies the dead of ignorance’. In Figures 37, 38 
and 39 propaganda messages encourage the migration to the Islamic caliphate. 
 
                                                          
77 These numbers are probably lower than it is estimated. As these statistics are based on government and 






Figure 37. Screenshot of Inside video production. 
 







Figure 39. Screenshot of a message sent via Telegram to encourage migration to ISIS’ land. Source: 
Nashir News Agency. 
 
However, to understand what radicalisation is or who radicals are can be as difficult as 
defining ‘terrorism’. Warnes and Hannah (2008) defined radicalisation as “the process 
whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to 
consider to be normal, into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme” (p. 2). 
Nasser-Eddine et al (2011) suggested that “the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘radicalise’ are used 
to denote: revolutionary thought or actions; shifting from peaceful activity to violent 
‘extremism’; becoming sympathetic to militant action; recruitment; becoming hyper-
conscious of critical issues and willing to act violently” (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino 
& Caluya, 2011, p. 13).  
 
Further, Ingram (2015) has explained the role of ISIS’ narrative in recruitment process by 





narrative that effectively adapted by its political and military apparatus has designed a system 
to support rational- and identity-choice decision making in its audiences (p. 736). Ingram’s 
(2015) views were also reflected by Shaheen’s (2015) study, Network of Terror: 
One of the important aspects of ISIS propaganda efforts on SMNs is the ability to produce 
information Hollywood style materials that can attract the tech-savvy younger generation 
who are more likely to respond to such concepts. (p. 11) These propaganda efforts had 
successfully thrived in the minds some of the Muslim youth through rapid processes of 
information disseminations of grievances.  In other words, an influence warfare operation 
carried out by ISIS resulted in an increase in the number of recruits. It is important to 
emphasise that the notion of influence warfare not only captured the way information 
operations occurred in terms of its impact on recruitment, but also how it influenced the 
opinion of possible recruits to join ISIS.  
 
Moreover, McDowell-Smith, Speckhard and Yayla (2017) explained the mechanisms of the 
use of social media in the recruitment process, examining recruits in the US who joined ISIS 
suggesting that: The common method of recruiting in the U.S. is through the feedback 
mechanisms of SMN’s who is asking questions about ISIS, tweeting, liking or otherwise 
endorsing the group and then to swarm in on the person with a great deal of personal 
attention paid via the Internet (see Callimachi, 2015 and Driscoll, 2015). When an American 
is seduced into the group they are invited to go offline or into encrypted apps where they 
either are discussing a homegrown attack or seduced into traveling to Syria and Iraq for 
Jihad. (p. 58) 
 
Overall, to establish the Islamic caliphate, ISIS required a devoted population who offered 





their propaganda materials. ISIS’ propaganda aimed to encourage other jihadi to join their 
cause, as it appeared that most recruited jihadi were foreign fighters. As Kelly (2014) 
identified: 
 
             ISIS’ online propaganda campaign effectively targets disenfranchised westerners. It 
lures them into a false sense of purpose by contrasting the West’s often intolerant 
perceptions of Islam with the idealisation of a caliphate, and then throws in 
Hollywood-style action in its execution. 
      
Also, Schmitt (2015) observed that “the online messaging has aimed to create a competing 
narrative that strikes an emotional chord with potential militants weighing whether to join a 
violent extremist group”. The strategic narrative of recruitment and radicalisation is formed 
as a result of what Architti (2013, p. 10) called collective construction of narrative, which 
ISIS understand very well. 
 
3.12 Conclusion 
    In this chapter, I highlighted ISIS’ IO strategy, aims and objectives. The information 
presented in this chapter was derived from prominent ISIS publications and video 
productions, including Management of Savagery and Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a 
Mujahid Too. I explained the strategic narrative of ISIS’ networks aims, which led to the 
establishment of the Islamic caliphate. I discussed the role of digital media in amplifying 
their message. As Archetti (2013) stated, “The relational understanding of narrative which 
has been illustrated helps mak[e] sense of the social and political impact of communication in 





flows of information across digital information environments, it is important to further 





4 Chapter 4: Promoting a Terror Narrative—ISIS’ Information Logistics 
4.1 Introduction 
   Following the analysis of ISIS’ IO and its strategic narrative (see Chapter 3), the purpose of 
this chapter is to explore the construction processes of terror messages, including its 
assemblages and flows of information across digital networks. In this chapter, I analyse the 
dynamics and function of tools that helped the generation and dissemination of these 
messages. These tools are logistics. Often, the word ‘logistics’ is associated with military 
equipment or supply chains. However, in this chapter, logistics will be defined as the digital 
products, media tools and services that helped ISIS create and disseminate its messages. In 
other words, logistics are the materials used to form message assemblages, information flows 
and media of communication. Understanding the medium of communication is essential to 
understanding the message. In this chapter, I aim to answer the thesis’s primary question: 
Does the change in the means of access to new software and hardware logistical tools give 
ISIS superiority in information environments and prevent attempts of degrading its digital 
capacity? 
 
To answer this question, I will examine the role of information as logistics within terror 
organisations from two perspectives: the framing of information and the transmitted object. 
While the former refers to acts of representation, the latter refers to the physical logistics of 
assembling and disseminating information. To do that, I adapted Raber’s (2003) model of 
information as paradigm. 
 
The aim of this chapter is also to understand how ISIS deepened its roots in the information 





logistics of message assemblages and the channels of information flow within ISIS’ networks 
will lead to an understanding of the following: 
● Message assemblages and mechanisms of information flows (including 
information retrieval and reproduction). 
● The network logistics of the terror organisation (including digital and physical 
media logistics). 
● Digital manoeuvre warfare that has occurred in the information environments. 
● The marketing strategy of terror organisations (e.g., the production of HD horror 
propaganda videos as part of their PSYOP has become a marketing tool for 
promoting their terror narrative across networks). 
● IO objectives and how these served ISIS’ political agendas in establishing the 
Islamic caliphate. 
● The pervasiveness of the terror narrative across the digital spectrum. 
 
To identify message assemblages and flows of information, it is important to trace and map 
networks of actants as suggested by Latour. Thus, the argument of this chapter is derived 
from ANT as a theory and methodology that explains the association between human and 
non-human actors in the network through processes of translation and enrolment. However, 
examining all media logistics and traces of message assemblages is almost impossible, due to 
the large terrains of logistical tools (digital and physical) harnessed by ISIS. In this thesis, I 
will highlight the most important software and logistical tools that have had a significant role 
in sustaining information flows and maintaining ISIS’ networking structure. These include 
Twitter, Telegram and anonymous sharing portals (JustPaste.it, Sendvid and dump.to). 
Telegram and anonymous sharing portals will be closely analysed in Chapter 6. Twitter is 





In this chapter, I attempt to scale and comprehend the volume of information sent across 
digital media platforms. Second, I explain the paradigm shift78 in ISIS’ logistics of 
information through the three aspects of Raber’s (2003) problem with information. Third, I 
highlight the produced content and channels of dissemination, including an analysis of the 
most circulated propaganda videos across media networks. Fourth, I draw parallels between 
ISIS’ propaganda media outlets (such as Al-Hayat and Al-Itisam) and mainstream media 
(such as Fox News and Al Jazeera), which together promoted ISIS’ narrative. To understand 
these parallels, I propose the concept of the collaboration networks of adversaries. Finally, in 
this chapter, I examine the content of production and evaluate how it empowered the terror 
network and maintain its structure. In this chapter, I answer the following questions:  
● What media strategies have ISIS obtained to compete with its adversaries? 
● How does ISIS maintain flows of information in the rapid changing environment? 
● How has the ISIS gained control of the media narrative? 
● How has media production logistics deepened the collaboration of networks of 
adversaries and empowered the terrorist’s narrative? 
● How was the message of terror mediated so quickly? 
 
The analysis of information content and information logistics infrastructure leads me to 
conclude that ISIS continues to empower its network. 
 
4.2 Understanding ISIS’ Information Logistics 
                                                          
78 ISIS is distinguished from all other terror organisations in utilisation of digital media tools, information 
environments, producing HD media productions, swarm dissemination process of digital productions 





   ISIS has produced, and is still producing, significant amounts of data, including thousands 
of documents shared across anonymous sharing portals, millions of tweets, private and public 
messages across Twitter, thousands of sophisticated and simple video productions, blogs and 
messages via encrypted communication channels (e.g., Telegram and WhatsApp). Winter 
(2015b, p. 3) observed that ISIS produce an average of 38 propaganda materials (including 
videos, audio and texts) every day. 
 
Due to the sheer volume of data produced by this network, we are witnessing a paradigm 
shift in terror communication. Making sense of such information requires frameworks and 
methodological approaches that include social network analysis, digital ethnography 
approaches, big data analysis and content analysis. 
 
The processes and mechanisms of producing and disseminating such data are termed as 
logistics. Understanding the information and network logistics of ISIS would help its 
adversaries to counter its message. As argued earlier (see section 3.1), digital logistics 
assisted ISIS in crafting its message and maintaining its information flows and networking 
structure. The role of logistics is to produce, coordinate and transmit data and things (e.g., 
equipment and military services) from point to point. This includes tools of production and 
dissemination—hardware and software. Software tools include social media platforms, phone 
applications, sharing portals, photograph editing software, and video and editing programs. 
Hardware tools include cameras, computers, uniforms (such as the black and red uniforms in 
ISIS’ propaganda videos), symbols or icons (such as ISIS’ black flag), video editing 
machines, media points and centres, and filming devices. Overall, every digital and physical 





However, according to Rossiter (2015) logistics “is not only an adaptive technology able to 
accommodate contingency. It is also a technology of penetration, seeping into reserves of life 
that exist beyond the world of supply chains” (p. 142). Media had a critical role in the war—
and arguably, won the war—and as such, has become the new domain of warfare. This 
warfare includes the dissemination of propaganda, PSYOP, disinformation and distortion 
using internet technologies—particularly, social media platforms. ISIS has capitalised on the 
wide engagement with ‘participatory media’ (Jenkin, 2006), wherein digital media has 
become the new social operating system (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 9). This new social 
operating system engaged communities in sharing information and enabled social networks to 
emerge. However, some of these social networks are also terror networks. Terror networks 
have utilised digital media logistics as digital weapons to boost its strategic narrative and 
execute its IO. As Afzal and Wallis (2016) argued, “Social media can be weaponised to 
support influence warfare operations; in turn, the ways in which hostile actors undertake 
information operations can provide insights into their own strategic objectives and 
organisational structures” (p. 77). Nissen (2015) proposed that “in contemporary conflicts … 
web-pages, internet-based web-television, social network sites (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), 
blogs and upload services (e.g., LiveLeak and YouTube) are being used as sophisticated 
weapon systems” (p. 10). However, to understand the sophistication of message assemblages, 
objectives of IO and the planning of ISIS’ flows of information, it is important to explore the 
logistical operation of this organisation.  
 
Disregarding the sophistication and complexity of message assemblages, ISIS’ IO is based on 
a clear strategy (see Sections 3.4 and 3.5). The mapping of information logistics is required to 
understand the large quantity of information that has saturated digital media platforms. 





and distributed messages can be understood. The logistical tools helped ISIS to assemble 
messages and maintain the flow of information at an operational level. Within this chapter, I 
will discuss overt logistical tools (e.g., Twitter and YouTube) and covert logistical tools (e.g., 
JustPaste.it and Telegram). The interaction between the overt and the covert logistical tools 
generates a dynamic loop of information as a result of interconnectivity and convergence 
between information environments. For example, disseminated data over Twitter was 
generated by JustPaste.it software. The content generated using covert logistical tools can be 
transmitted, coded and reproduced by another overt logistical media tool. Peters (as cited in 
Neilson, 2012) described what he called ‘logistical media’, which “arrange[s] people and 
property into time and space’. These are ‘prior to and from the grid in which messages are 
sent […] Logistical media establish the zero points of orientation, the convergence of the x 
and y axis” (Peters, as cited in Nelson, 2012). Case (2013) argued, “Logistical media gesture 
to the roots of the transmission model of communication—the sender-message-channel-
receiver-feedback model—to the foundational work in military science, network theory, 
telecommunications, and cybernetics” (p. 380). 
 
That said, the feedback loop of information leaves traceable hyperlinks known as ‘signs’ for 
others to follow (see Figure 40). These signs are regarded as information signs (Raber & 
Budd, 2003). Information signs can also be physical, such as the black flag and red and black 
outfits used in ISIS propaganda videos. These signs are also known as a ‘pheromone trail’, 
which is intended to be followed by other network affiliates79 to coordinate the assemblage of 
messages, and optimise, retrieve and reproduce information through stigmergy.80 The 
                                                          
79 Part of a large extended network that operates outside the geographical space of the physical network. 
80 Stigmergy “is a term used in biology, from the work of French biologist Pierre-Paul Grasse, to describe 





stigmergy work helps in maintaining the loop of information that brings the network into 
existence.81 
 
Figure 40. Screenshot shows signs for Al-Naba, ISIS’ Arabic Magazine. Source: Dissemination 
Knights on Telegram Channel. 
 
On a tactical level, the covert media logistics (e.g., anonymous sharing portals, and Telegram, 
WhatsApp and Signal applications) maintained an information feedback loop of information 
flows in the aftermath of the degrading operation. Overall, the categorisation of information 
logistics as overt and covert helps to understand assemblages of messages and trace of 
network actants. The feedback loop of ISIS’ networks aims to swarm Twitter with 
unprecedented and rapid processes of information, which creates a global reach for ISIS by 
                                                          
term can be applied in the study of terror networks as ISIS runs a heterogeneous network of members, 
sympathisers, and affiliates around the world. 





generating a network effect. It also enables ISIS to accomplish its strategic ambitions. As 
Neilson (2012) argued: 
 
           This seems a truism in the light of the developments of twentieth-century warfare and 
the civilian logistics revolution. Today it seems common sense that strategic 
decisions are limited by the resources at hand and tactical manoeuvres unfold within a 
situation defined by lines of information and supply. 
 
These lines of information supply were enabled by access to the internet and via the use of 
communication templates, which makes information logistics visible. 
 
To explain the key role of information in the formation of terror messages, the maintenance 
of information flows, establishment of networks of affiliates and enhancement of the 
connectivity of terror movements, I will apply Raber’s (2003) approach to information. 
 
4.3 Understanding the Paradigm Shift in ISIS’ Logistics of Information 
    Raber’s (2003) three-paradigm approach to information explains the phenomenon of the 
paradigm shift in terror communication that occurred as a result of the rise of ISIS. Further, it 
explains how ISIS managed to leverage its networks by creating networks of affiliates around 
the world. The three paradigms are the physical paradigm, cognitive paradigm and social 
informatics. The importance of this approach was expressed by Skinner (2011), who argued 
that researchers must “examine these movements through the paradigms to better understand 
how participants seek and organize information, and how they leverage technologies to 





and individuals, and create networks of affiliates around the world, ISIS invested in its IO 
strategy by swarming digital information environments. 
 
This approach provided an understanding of how information was transmitted and retrieved 
across information environments; the volume of information disseminated; the dynamics of 
video productions; the processes of recruitment and radicalisation; the internal and external 
communication between ISIS members and affiliates; and how audiences perceived and 
interpreted information. 
 
4.4 Physical Paradigm 
    The physical paradigm focuses on transmission, storage and retrieval through the 
development of mechanised processes; these processes are largely separate from individual 
interpretation or social contexts (Raber, as cited in Skinner, 2011, p. 6). The physical 
paradigm regards information as a physical object, which is recorded in ‘texts’ and other 
forms of media (e.g., video and audio). These objects can be “stored, optimised, coded, 
transmitted and retrieved when needed” (Skinner, 2011, p. 6). Images, texts, audio and 
video—regardless of medium—are regarded as tangible forms of information (Raber & 
Budd, 2003). Information is a sign, which may contain and text and content (Raber & Budd, 
2003). 
 
Social media platforms and other digital sharing portals have the mechanisms to envision 
information as transmitted objects, which enables information movements across multiple 
digital media environments. That information can be stored and retrieved (Skinner, 2011, 
p. 7). The assemblages of ISIS’ messages and the capacity of their information flows depend 





explains the pervasiveness of ISIS messages. Twitter’s hashtags mechanism permits the 
grouping of instant updates, which helps users to locate specific information almost instantly. 
Additionally, a simple search for ISIS information on archive.org or through the Google 
search engine will lead to stored information and archives of ISIS content. 
 
Further, Cloudflare82 was accused of hosting ISIS content and thus, being a logistical tool in 
the proliferation of ISIS information. This service stores communication, texts, training 
materials and propaganda videos that can be retrieved any time (Appleweed, 2015). In May 
2017, I identified over 2,000 HD video productions of ISIS on Scribd’s online service. These 
videos can be downloaded instantly after an annual fee of US$25 is paid (see Figure 41). 
 
 
Figure 41. Screenshot shows ISIS videos on scribd.com. 
 
Developing on the idea of information as a physical object, Skinner (2011) raised important 
questions for the examination of social media platforms: 
 
             How do we define and classify ‘objective’ information when reading tweets or 
Facebook posts? Can we create a system to locate this information through 
summarizing vast numbers of tweets and pulling out only information about events 
                                                          





that is corroborated by multiple participants? What shortcomings are there to this 
approach? (Skinner, 2011, p. 7) 
 
Within the context of this study, additional questions have arisen. For example: 
● How do jihadi and ISIS affiliates retrieve, generate and disseminate content across the 
digital networks?  
● How do potential recruits and international audience interact with ISIS information 
flows? 
These questions, along with Skinner’s (2011) questions, are beyond the scope of the physical 
paradigm and require a new approach: the cognitive paradigm. 
 
4.5 Cognitive Paradigm 
    The questions identified in Section 4.4 cannot be answered through the physical paradigm, 
wherein information is understood as an object that is transmitted across a medium of 
communication (regardless of whether the medium is digital or non-digital). To answer these 
questions, the nature of the information itself must be determined, by focusing on how 
audiences’ value and engage with information. Therefore, the cognitive paradigm arose from 
criticism of the physical paradigm, which has been defined by Raber (2003) as “premised on 
the assumption that we can distinguish between tangible, formal objects, and expressions that 
possess the quality of being informative and intangible cognitive phenomena of knowing and 
being informed” (Raber, 2003, p. 91). 
 
Interpreting information can determine individual participation and engagement; this can be 
achieved by surveying individuals to assess how they appraised information (Skinner, 2011, 





analysed to assess how this information affected recruitment, radicalisation and lone actor 
operations. Skinner (2011) noted: 
 
             Using the cognitive framework, researchers can survey or observe users and collect 
data about where they look for media related to different aspects of the protests. Such 
an approach allows us to ask questions about how people choose and appraise news 
sources, or whether those who saw the original videos versus the edited video have 
different perceptions of what happened. (p. 10) 
 
This also explains the effect of producing HD videos, digital migration to Telegram, and 
other anonymous sharing portals to find news, and how Amaq and Dabiq media agencies 
became the most credible news source. 
 
According to Skinner (2011), the cognitive paradigm also allows us to examine how activists, 
journalists and other parties engaged with the issues. Such work could draw heavily from 
Jenkins et al.’s (as cited in Skinner, 2011) notion of participatory cultures, which have “low 
barriers to participation and engagement, strong support for sharing, and informal 
mentorship” (p. 10). The cognitive paradigm could also be useful for understanding the use of 
trending topics on Twitter, which increases presence and broadens message input and output. 
Therefore, the cognitive paradigm explains ISIS members hijacking of trending hashtags on 
Twitter.  
 
Further, the cognitive paradigm explains how the traffic on #IslamicState and #Khilafah 
reduced dramatically. That is, this theoretical approach explains the effect of the degrading 





reply and retweet functions) and consequently, the volume of information and traffic was 
reduced. 
 
4.6 Social Informatics 
    While the physical and cognitive paradigms engaged with information as an object that 
individuals interact with, these paradigms failed to acknowledge how we interact with each 
other (Skinner, 2011, p. 11). Sawyer and Jarrahi (2014) claimed social informatics is ‘part of 
socio-economic research that examines the ways in which technological artefact and human 
social context mutually constitute the information communications technology ensemble’. 
Moreover, Sawyer and Rosenbaum (2000) consider this approach to include three 
orientations for studying ICTs: the normative (recommending alternatives to current models 
used by developers, information professionals, and policymakers), the analytical (creating 
theories related to technologies by conducting empirical studies), and the critical (studying a 
variety of perspectives related to these technologies). These three orientations could be 
applied to the study of social media and terrorism. The normative approach would be useful 
for those hoping to develop or disseminate more effective social media tools; the analytical 
would be useful for discussing trends in social media use and building relevant theories; and 
the critical would allow researchers to examine how social media use is viewed by non-users 
and how revolutions are discussed within social media (as cited in Skinner, 2011, p. 12). 
 
As the social informatics approach explores the consequences of the use of ICTs on 
individuals, it is useful for understanding how media of communication (e.g., Twitter) have 
become tools to promote terror. Social informatic explains how loosely connected individuals 
become enmeshed in networks, how networks are established and how the public become 





enables researchers to understand how SMNs (e.g., Twitter) has been exploited for the 
purposes of radicalisation and recruitment and how individuals are inspired to conduct acts of 
terror on behalf of ISIS. 
 
Social informatics allows researchers to examine social media use and determine how 
individuals are connecting to each other and staying updated about the events around them 
(e.g., through the use of encrypted communication channels, such as Telegram and 
WhatsApp). It has also been suggested that the tenacity of these movements is due, in part, to 
the fact that people are recording everything, including footage of events that may not have 
been caught by mainstream news crews (Madrigal, 2011). Social informatics would help 
researchers understand how exposure to information—which has been disseminated through 
social media and other digital media technologies—shapes individuals’ perspective 
(especially in regard to the processes of radicalisation and recruitment). Therefore, 
understanding this element of logistics may lead to how radicalisation and recruitment 
occurs. This approach defines individual disseminators and creators of terror content as social 
informants and seeks to explain their influence on potential recruits (e.g., Turjoman Sawtry 
and Shami Witness). 
 
4.7 Social Media Platforms as Logistics 
    SMNs and other ICTs have been noted for their role in mediating terrorist communications 
and in galvanising social movements in the last decade (Aday et al., 2012; Castells, 2013; C. 
J. Cox, 2006; Garrett, 2006; Jefferson, 2007; Khamis et al., 2012). Prior to the September 11 
terror attack on the US, Al-Qaeda harnessed the internet to mediate its communication via 
email to a global jihadist movement and its sympathisers around the world (Levin, 2011). Al-





video chat and the WWW helped them to coordinate attacks, recruit jihadi, mediate 
communication, spread their ideology and raise funds (Sageman, 2004; Weimann, 2010). The 
proliferation of social media platforms, especially Twitter and Facebook: 
 
            With 284 million and 1.35 billion monthly active users worldwide (in the 3rd quarter 
2014), respectively, [has meant that] the terrorism communication landscape can be 
radically reshaped by the speed, reach, affordance, and ease of uploading voice, text 
and imagery data via mobile devices for immediate visualisation effects. (Chatfield, 
Reddick & Brajawidagda, 2015, p. 3) 
      
In Section 4.8, I will focus on Twitter as the most prominently used social media platform for 
ISIS’ communication. However, it is important to note that when examining the logistics of 
ISIS’ network, Twitter is only one node in a wider social media ecology (Conway et al., 
2017, p. 7). 
 
4.8 ISIS’ Information Operations on Twitter 
    Twitter has permitted a new means for terror communication. The information distribution 
mechanism of the microblogging social media platform has become ISIS’ hub to mediate 
communication and disseminate terror messages. ISIS has even claimed Twitter as their own 
platform (see Figure 42). 
 






As discussed in Section 3.6, part of ISIS’ IO strategy is to swarm Twitter to control the 
narrative in this platform. This would explain the increase of the traffic on Twitter in the 
period between 2013 and 2014. Berger and Morgan (2015) claimed that since the emergence 
of ISIS: 
 
             Twitter’s user base grew by approximately 30 percent in 2013, while ISIS’ user base 
nearly doubled. The Twitter user base grew 20 percent in 2014; the number of ISIS 
supporters on Twitter nearly tripled during the same period (within the limits of the 
sample). This [is] reflective of strong growth, but also reflects anecdotal observations 
of increased adoption of social media by jihadist extremists starting in 2013. (p. 17) 
 
In Sections 4.9–4.11, I aim to highlight the importance of the Twitter platform in enhancing 
ISIS’ IO and explain how ISIS utilised Twitter to form of its message across other platforms. 
The information presented in these sections is obtained from ISIS’ Telegram channels and 
other pro-ISIS accounts on Twitter. There are two motives underpinning ISIS’ utilisations of 
Twitter as their main domain, which I refer to as intuitive and technical. 
 
4.9 Intuitive and Technical 
    In the Sections 4.9.1–4.9.3, I outline the trends in the infrastructure and mechanisms of 
sharing information of Twitter. 
 
4.9.1 Dissemination Mechanisms—Retweet, Reply, Like and Hashtag 
    Twitter’s dissemination mechanisms have allowed ISIS to exploit the platform to enlarge 





holders. Using these mechanisms effectively has enabled ISIS to generate and diffuse an 
estimated 90,000 tweets every day. Daily tweeting was encouraged by ISIS’ commander and 
spokesperson, Abu Mohammad Al-Julani. He claimed that participating in Twitter and 
sending messages across other digital media environments is partaking in jihad. As stated in 
Figure 43, Al-Julani commands his supporters to “make your computer as a bomb, be present 
at Twitter, upload information to Twitter, write, upload and diffuse. Don’t corner yourself on 
Telegram”. 
 
Figure 43. ISIS encourage its followers to use Twitter to disseminate, tweet and upload. 
 
Winter (2015a) suggested that “hashtags—which Twitter neither suspends nor blocks—are 
now Islamic State’s [ISIS’] preferred vehicle for dissemination. By using an organically 
defined set of tags, Islamic State’s official disseminators can simultaneously be effective and 
low-key” (p. 11). ISIS uses what they call Twitter bombs, which redirect trending hashtags to 
Twitter websites and material related to ISIS. In the autumn of 2014, there were at least 
45,000 Twitter accounts used by ISIS supporters; 73 per cent had an average of 500 
followers, while others had up to 50,000 followers. The Al-Battar Media Group—with 
32,000 followers—seeks to mobilise Twitter members to support ISIS by translating ISIS’ 





4.9.2 Interconnectivity and Networking 
    The infrastructure of Twitter enables connectivity by default. This potential for 
connectivity was the reason ISIS established itself in this platform. Its basic function and 
purpose of use is based on sending a short, 140-character message. These messages are being 
communicated using dissemination mechanisms highlighted in section 4.9.1. To enhance 
connectivity, third-party bots have been established to tweet on behalf account subscribers. 
ISIS has harnessed this function—as part of its IO strategy—to encourage individuals to 
engage with real fighting through the systematic presentation of flows of information. 
Svetoka (2016) reported: 
 
              Daesh [ISIS] does not rely solely on their ‘media soldiers’ and volunteers to create 
and distribute content, but constantly look[s] for the ways to maximise their presence 
on social networks by using technological solutions. Automatically created content 
distributed by bots or apps provides a cheap and easy option for dramatically 
increasing Daesh reach. (p. 37) 
 
One of the most infamous bots used by ISIS is ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings’. 
 Prucha and Fisher (2013) claimed, 
 
Twitter functions as a beacon for sharing short-links to content dispersed across numerous 
digital platforms … Today’s social media zeitgeist facilitates emergent behaviour producing 
complex information-sharing networks in which influence lows through multiple hubs in 
multiple directions. 
 
Alexander Towbridge (2014) observed that “the use of automatically generated content, by 





identities (e.g., trolls, sock puppets, bots) … [seeks to] spread a message and minimize 
alternative voices”. 
 
The NATO StratCom (as cited in Svetoka, 2016) observed that to enhance their networking 
via Twitter: 
 
             Daesh [ISIS] is adding geo-locations to its hashtags (e.g., ‘State of Homs’ or ‘State of 
Raqqa’), which allows members to ‘disseminate target information to specific regions 
and any independent actor to share information within their region using a 
combination of Islamic State [ISIS] hashtags as well as geographic keyword tagging’. 
(p. 16) 
 
Another tactic used by ISIS members to stay connected is the use of event-specific hashtags 
(see Figure 45). For example, ISIS members encouraged followers to swarm Twitter using 
#CloseIncirlik. 
 
Figure 45. Message forwarded by Gazwa Telegram channel. 
 
Moreover, Twitter enabled the creation of groups—similar to Facebook, Telegram and 





(2015): ISIS members established a network called Baqiah83 Family. It is hard to say how 
large the Baqiya family is, but one estimate gave them 40,000 members, and growing. The 
vast majority are aged 20–28, but quite a few are 18 or younger, male and female. 
 
Figure 46. A message to join the ‘Baqiya Family’ group and a message from Usudul Islam to ‘Baqiya 
Family’. 
 
4.9.3 Convenience—Anonymity, Mobile Phone Applications and Ease-of-Use 
    One of the intuitive dynamics of Twitter is its convenience. This includes the availability 
of the mobile phone app, the one-to-one messaging service and text upload functions. 
Propaganda videos and text were mostly uploaded from anonymous sharing portals, such as 
JustPaste.it and Sendvid. As explained earlier, the convergence of digital media entities, 
through the use of information signs to direct audiences from platform to platform, has 
increased interactivity and maintained flows. As NATO StratCom (2015, p. 39) noticed, ISIS 
                                                          





uses Twitter as an umbrella platform that connects the various sources into one easily 
searchable, browsable information index. Berger and Morgan (2015) reported: 
 
              Smartphone usage among ISIS supporters, according to primary app used for tweeting 
… [suggests that] [a]mong users of the three most popular phone types, 69 percent 
had downloaded a Twitter client from the Google Play store or Google.com. Another 
30 percent used a client downloaded from the Apple iTunes store, and about 1 percent 
had downloaded a client from Blackberry.com. (p. 26; also, see Figure 47) 
 
 
Figure 47. Mobile phone usage among ISIS supporters. Source: Berger and Morgan (2015). 
 
Anonymity also makes Twitter a convenient platform to use for ISIS. ISIS members’ identity 
is always kept secret through the use of pseudonyms (such as Shami Witness, Asad Caliphah 
and ibn Dawlah), which allows them to evade capture and persecution. While this section has 
addressed the mechanisms, information loops and dynamics of the Twitter platform and how 
ISIS utilises it, it is also important to assess ISIS’ objectives in adopting Twitter as its 
primary network for its IO. 
 





    The mechanisms of message generation and distribution that are possible via Twitter have 
defined ISIS’ usage of this medium. Through their communication—and particularly, under 
the hashtag #elzamthagrak (i.e., stay in your domain)—two main organic reasons have 
emerged for ISIS’ adoption of Twitter as its main hub for communication: first, the partaking 
in media war and second, the spread of propaganda to enhance the processes of recruitment 
and radicalisation. 
 
4.10.1 Partaking in Media War 
    Figure 48 demonstrates how ISIS has used the media as their battlefield—media has had a 
critical role in the winning and losing of wars. According to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, half of the war is fought in the media. Twitter presented a unique battlefield, in 
which ISIS chose to fight. As stated in Figure 48, ISIS outlined the main purpose behind use 
of Twitter. When translated, it says that the more ISIS affiliates are active on Twitter, the 
more the US lose the media battle. Liang (2015) observed, “ISIS has become the world’s first 
social media war where there are some individuals who are tweeting almost 200 times a day 
and whose tweets are attracting tens of thousands of followers” (p. 6). 
 
 






The importance of the media war was also highlighted by Nashir Political Services,84 as they 
described the media as the strongest weapon in the present time (see Figure 49). 
 
Ultimately, as stated in the Oh Media Correspondent, You Are a Mujahid Too publication, 
the jihad of the tongue is as important as physical jihad. This notion was expanded to 
encompass Twitter and therefore, Twitter has become the preferred medium to conduct the 
jihad of the tongue (see Figure 50). 
 
 
Figure 49. Message forwarded from Nashir Political Service, Telegram channel. 
                                                          






Figure 50. A tweet from @DseVcjd, stating that infidels must be fought with money, hands and 
tongues (including Twitter). 
 
4.10.2 Radicalisation and Recruitment 
    A study of ISIS’ Twitter networks can help to explain how and why the number of ISIS 
fighters has grown from 2,000 fighters in 2012, to 40,000 fighters in 2014. According to 
Berger and Morgan (2015), there are 46,000–90,000 ISIS Twitter accounts and almost every 
account has approximately 1,000 followers. According to Schmitt (2015), these accounts 
produce almost 90,000 tweets per day, including responses to other social media platforms. 
ISIS’ huge account base on Twitter, combined with the volume of disseminated information 
across the Twitter platform, has profoundly contributed to ISIS’ processes of recruitment and 
radicalisation. These processes were accelerated by two factors. First, ISIS used web links 
(i.e., information signs) to its own web pages, on which more information was available, 
allowing individuals to stay connected. This also safeguarded ISIS’ digital base, to protect 
against account suspensions from Twitter. Second, the use of multiple languages targeted 





John Appleweed (2015) noted, “1 in every 5 ISIS supporting twitter accounts select[ed] 
English as their primary language”. 
 
To achieve one of its IO objectives (radicalisation and recruitment), ISIS aimed to “generate 
affiliates in your houses, and we will turn them to Mujahedeen, we will raise them on the 
footsteps of prophet Mohammed” (see Figure 51). Svetoka (2016) explained how ISIS 
utilised the mechanisms of Twitter’s platform for radicalisation purposes, suggesting that: 
 
             Daesh [ISIS] uses Twitter as a connecting medium for all of its distributed content all 
over the web—videos, photos, messages, and press releases posted in uncontrolled 
and unsupervised sites (such as JustPaste.it or archive.org). By using these pages, 
Daesh can reach supporters who have previous knowledge of the locations of those 
messages, however for recruitment and publicity they must share the links to these 
pages in public domains, such as Twitter. (p. 34) 
 
 






4.10.3 Spread of Propaganda 
    ISIS strategically used its Twitter platform to spread its propaganda. Videos, texts, memes, 
infographics, links to its magazines and other media is widely shared across the platform. 
Horror videos—live broadcasted from the battlefield—depicting victories and utopian 
messages representing a wonderful life under the Islamic caliphate are uploaded daily by ISIS 
followers. Kelly (2014) observed ISIS’ threefold branding on Twitter, claiming that brand 
one is “ISIS as the goodwill guys”. Several of their Twitter feeds often depict soldiers playing 
with children, distributing food, performing social services and hanging out with kittens. 
They strive to showcase the humanity of ISIS, mixed in with Western familiarities. Fighters 
also tweet about how much they love Disney movies and strike grinning poses with jars of 
Nutella (see Figure 52). The second aspects of ISIS’ brand on Twitter “is action-man 
themed”. It matches traditional ideals of masculinity with the glorification of war. It portrays 
the conflict as honourable, which is typified by the sale of ISIS hoodies and t-shirts online. 
Through this aspect of their brand, ISIS present themselves as charming freedom fighters. 
 
 
Figure 52. Propaganda material posted to Twitter for recruitment purposes. 
 
The third aspect of the brand “depicts ISIS eradicating evil in the name of Allah, reminding 





the barbaric means the terrorist organisation takes to reach its ultimate end” (Kelly, 2014). 
This type of propaganda is specifically designed to reach naive, uneducated Muslim youth 
living in the West. The use of popular memes85 as propaganda “aimed to infect ignorant 
receivers with jihadist concepts, to recruit them or only to improve the organisation’s image 
among the youth” (Lakomy, 2017, p. 42). Conversely, infographics “were designed to reach 
more demanding and conscious audiences, who usually need illusionary facts and statistics, 
in order to strengthen or to change their attitudes” (Lakomy, 2017, p. 42). Thus, the Twitter 
had a key role in ISIS’ execution of its IO strategy, as the medium permitted the proliferation 
and distribution of ISIS propaganda. 
 
4.11 How ISIS Games Twitter 
     ISIS’ affiliates and members used Twitter in unprecedented ways to execute its C2 
operations and maintain its information flows. ISIS swarmed Twitter to establish centralised 
Twitter accounts, create an abundance of independent affiliates accounts, utilise active 
hashtags, create bots to sustain and increase information flows (Klausen, J., Marks, C., & 
Zaman, T.,2016), and add logistic aid to reproduce and retrieve data. ISIS games (i.e., 
manipulates) Twitter in many ways. 
 
4.11.1 Use of Active Hashtags 
    Part of ISIS’ propaganda strategy is making use of active hashtags to enlarge its audience 
base (see Figure 53). As discussed in section 4.3, the mechanism of hashtags enables wider 
distribution across the Twitter network. For example, after the Nice attack in June 2015, 
                                                          





#PrayForNice was trending and therefore, ISIS encouraged its followers to disseminate its 




Figure 53. An example of active Twitter hashtags after the terror attack in Nice, France. 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 53, followers were instructed to use the #PrayForNice hashtag, 
because it was trending and would permit the spread of fear to the crusaders. They were also 
instructed to upload their material in French. Through hashtag activism, or hashtivism, ISIS 
has demonstrated agile hashtag use. Fisher (2015) reported: 
 
            ISIS has used tactics which are familiar to digital marketers, such as organizing 
hashtag campaigns on Twitter to generate internet traffic and working to get those 
hashtags ‘trending’ by piggy-backing on hashtags around unrelated events, such as 
those about the World Cup or the iPhone 6, which they add in their messages about 






Kelly (2014) also noticed that ISIS: 
 
             hijack[s] trending hashtags, flooding topics like the #WorldCup2014 and Scottish 
independence with pro-ISIS messages. They enlist the help of their supporters to 
tweet at certain times of the day using particular hashtags (see Figure 54). Often these 
campaigns distort the results of Arabic Twitter accounts like @Activehashtags, which 
promote each day trending tags. It results in ISIS propaganda effectively spreading 
into hundreds of thousands of Twitter feeds around the globe. 
 
 
Figure 54. An example of active Twitter hashtags after a terror attack in Germany. Source: Gazo 
Telegram channel. 
 
Further, Nissen (2015) explained the dynamics of use of trending hashtags and its purpose. 
He claimed that: 
 
            The strategy also relies on having these ‘disseminators’ using hashtags crafted to look 
like grass-root initiatives exploiting ‘astro-turfing’ techniques, in some cases also 
hijacking existing hashtags, and thereby lending third party credibility to the 





attention from audiences how would normally not search for IS content or # (Nissen, 
2015, p. 50). 
 
4.11.2 Command and Control Operations 
    As part of its C2 operation, ISIS established a centralised Twitter account to communicate 
its messages to a multitude of independent actors across the Twitter platform. For that 
purpose, the most prominent media arms of ISIS have deepened it roots in the platform. For 
example, Al-Hayat, Al-Itisam, Ajnad and Al-Furqan were responsible for maintaining flows 
of information. Hundreds of propaganda videos were produced by these media wings and 
shared using on Twitter. According to Liang (2015), Al-Hayat Media Centre “was 
responsible for posting almost 40,000 tweets in a single day as IS [ISIS] marched into Mosul” 
(p. 6). 
 
In addition to centralised Twitter accounts many ISIS leaders and affiliates established their 
own accounts on Twitter. For instance, Chatfield et al. (2015) used social network analysis to 
understand ISIS’ then phenomena of tweeting propaganda. By focusing on ISIS’ content 
generator and disseminator, known as @Shamiwitness, Chatfield et al. (2015) noted that 
@Shamiwitness increased user benefits by: 
 
          (1) by controlling network operations to increase intrinsic benefits through enhanced 
information quality, reputation, and other value-added services to attract new account 
holders (network size) and (2) by increasing extrinsic benefits. In order to increase 





network users to actively engage by issuing their own tweets, replying to his tweets or 
retweeting his tweets to their own ‘followers’.86 (p. 6) 
 
This dynamic has helped ISIS, by leveraging its network audience (see Figure 55). 
 
Figure 55. ISIS shows how to connect multiple accounts in one platform. 
 
Another dissemination tactic used by ISIS to leverage their network audience to great effect 
is the use of content that is translated in multiple languages. As Berger and Morgan (2015) 
noted: 
           As far as content, many users tweeted in more than one language, sometimes as part of 
ISIS social media strategies to direct messages at external target audiences, such as 
when it publicizes the beheadings of Western hostages. Tweets also frequently 
featured a mix of languages, such as English hashtags attached to Arabic content. 
(p. 14) 
 
                                                          





4.11.3 Manoeuvre Warfare 
     To prevent suspension and sustain its flows of information ISIS managed to set rules for 
its members and affiliates to follow. These rules were marked with #suicidewithoutbelt. 
Figures 56, 57, 58 and 59 summarise the ways ISIS implemented its information 
manoeuvring operations on Twitter. These tactics include:  
● Guidelines on how to open Twitter accounts without using a phone number. 
● The hiding of location, through a fake location strategy. 
● Guidelines to prevent detection and tactics to follow affiliates. 
● Supply of ready Twitter accounts via @bankansar. 
● Filtering accounts and removal of intruders. 
 
Joseph Shaheen (2015) observed how ISIS members manoeuvred in Twitter to prevent 
detection and avoid suspension. He noted: 
 
             Other Daesh [ISIS] methods to avoid counteractions on Twitter include: - Using 
independent actors to amplify the central message created by Daesh originators, while 
maintaining the independent nature and behaviour of these individual actors. - 
Signalling to each other in order to avoid the discovery of Daesh accounts. - The use 
of symbols and other tricks in account information and posts to avoid detection. This 
is why strict reliance on automated image detection becomes unsustainable. - Speedy 
and adaptive recovery after account closure—to regain the previous levels of 
influence new accounts include requests such as asking others for 1,000 retweets of 
the new account. - Using system vulnerabilities, for example being able to change 






Overall, so far, this research explored the role of information and its logistics in assembling 
and diffusing messages of terror. This chapter has also examined the mechanisms of 
information logistics and the ways it has aided ISIS’ flows of information and networking. 
Further, this chapter has identified that Twitter as a medium of communication has been 
central to ISIS performing, assembling and leveraging messages. 
 
However, understanding digital logistics—as both a physical material and in its association 
with human actors—requires a methodological approach to identify how digital media 
logistics (i.e., network actants) established networks and how these networks transformed the 
message of ISIS. For this purpose, I will use ANT. 
4.12 Actor–Network Theory87 
    To this point, this thesis examined the role of digital media logistics in enabling of 
information warfare and IO in conflicts occurred during Israel -Gaza- Lebanon wars, the 
Arab spring uprisings, Al-Qaeda and ISIS. To understand how networks such as Hezbollah 
and Hamas won the information war against Israel and how networks of rebels emerged so 
quick in Syria and Iraq, and how ISIS depended on digital media platforms, tracing and 
mapping of information logistics is important. As Mitew (2008) argued, “Only a mapping 
tactic that opens its eyes for the intensities performed by heterogeneous entities, neither 
subjects nor objects, will be capable of displaying the full spectrum of logistics upholding an 
otherwise impossibly ephemeral homogeneity”. 
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crude method to learn from the actors without imposing on them a priori definition of their world building 





This thesis argues that information logistics helped in creating decentralised C2 operations, 
IO and enabled information warfare by enrolling information environment and other digital 
logistics to the network. This also helped in creating distributed networks, which permitted 
the exchange of information between human actors, as the function of these networks enabled 
information generation and dissemination in a dynamic loop. The program of ANT is a key to 
understanding the logistics of ISIS’ networks. Thus, understanding networking means, as 
Krieger and Belliger (2014) noted, “understanding those normative principles that guide 
those particular communicative activities that build, maintain, and transform networks. This 
is where new media studies come in” (p. 9). 
 
However, as this thesis proposed in the first use of ANT as a framework to understand terror 
networks, Callon (1986) suggested that a network is built through a four-step process of 
translation: problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. The first step in 
building a network is problematisation, which he described as the stage in which an actor 
makes itself indispensable to others. Callon (1986) stated that in this stage, the primary actor 
attempts to identify the problem and define the role of actors within the network. In reflection 
on ISIS, the problematisation is how to declare caliphate. Before ISIS, Al-Qaeda was hopeful 
to declare caliphate, but worried about its consequences (see Section 3.7). 
 
The second process of establishing a network is by negotiating with other actors, which is 
interessement. This means interesting and attracting an entity by coming between it and some 
other entity (Law, 1987). During this stage the primary actor will need to impose the 
identities and define the roles of the other actors so that they will achieve their own goals 
when they join the network. In the case of ISIS networks, this is the most important stage. To 





accept the idea. Interessement can be achieved through ‘seduction, force, and persuasion’ 
(Callon, 1986). 
 
If interessement was successful, this leads to the third set in ANT: enrolment. Enrolment 
occurs when actors accept the roles they have been given and enrol in the network. When 
defined interests, goals and identities are established, the mobilisation process emerges. 
 
According to Krieger and Belliger (2014), establishing actor networks “requires processes, 
performances, socio-technical rituals, and enactments […] They are driven by the dynamics 
of making connections, of binding things together, of extending associations, of “translating” 
and “enrolling” actors into networks”. As Ashino (2010) explained, “In order to exchange 
data among heterogeneous materials databases, however, some kind of translation table for 
materials data is essential” (p. 59). The innovation translation approach draws on the 
sociology of translations, more commonly known as ANT. The core of this approach is 
translation (Law, 1992), which can be defined as: “the means by which one entity gives a role 
to others” (Singleton & Michael, 1993, p. 229). The enrolment process leads to the 
establishment of irreversible networks; however, to do that, Callon (1991) suggested that 
“actants needed to be organised”. 
 
Understanding the agency of non-human actors—such as digital artefacts, information 
environments, toolkits and techniques—is necessary to trace network actors.88 Additionally, 
understanding network assemblages, mechanisms for the flow of information and logistics is 
essential in identifying network actors. As Krieger and Belliger (2014) contended, “Flow 
                                                          





opens up black boxes and transforms purely functional intermediaries into actors, 
participants, and mediators. When interactions among large numbers of actors become the 
rule and knowledge reconfigures itself into a cloud” (p. 144). To understand why and how 
ISIS, as a terror organisation, interacts with multiple digital media environments to assemble 
and disseminate its message was identified by Stern and Modi (2010), who argued that 
“terrorist[s] respond to changes in their environments by changing their mission and changing 
their shape. What is important in such events is that information logistics is essential in 
disseminating messages of terror” (p. 282). 
 
In Interpreting Networks, Krieger and Belliger (2014) described networks as communicative 
action “in the sense of making connections and associations’ and therefore, communication is 
made possible by and is dependent upon media” (p. 9). In examining Latour’s program of 
ANT, Krieger and Belliger (2014) argued that it is important “to follow the actors in their 
laboratories, in the rainforest, in the factory, and describe how they make associations, 
connections, relations, and assemblies linking actors together up to the level of global 
collectives” (p. 38). 
 
To establish the accounts of ANT, it is important to understand the key aspects of human and 
non-human object relationship. For this purpose, I have divided the logistical operations of 
ISIS into two categories: software and hardware logistics (see Figure 60). 
 
From an ANT perspective, the associations between hardware and software logistics 
produced actants (Latour, 2005, p. 54). They are conceptualised as actants because they 
simultaneously act and are acted upon (Latour, 2005, p. 54). Actants, whether human or non-





interactions between networks (Latour, 2005, p. 71). In other words, agency means “that they 
make a difference: hitting a nail with and without hammer, boiling water with and without a 
kettle, fetching provisions with or without a basket” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). Agency and action 
can be associated with human and non-human elements (Latour, 1999). This also applies to 
digital media tools, mobile phone applications, malware, military clothing and weapons in the 
context of action taken by ISIS jihadi. To apply this to ISIS’ terrorism, an individual jihadist 
who has access to digital technologies, weaponry and video production equipment may 
commit an act of terror. According to Latour (as cited in Architte, 2012, p. 10), “Action is 
therefore not the property of humans only but of associations of actants”. Accordingly, one of 
the main strengths of ANT is that it allows the tracing of actors in a network, based on their 
actual role in the flow of agency. 
      
 






In case of ISIS, the enrolment of media production experts (such as cameramen, post-
production editors and producers) and the establishment of media production outlets (such as 
Al-Hayat and Al-Furqan) is essential to enrol actors in the network. These instances illustrate 
the dynamic and mutual influence between humans and non-humans. Further, they 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of the actant; at times an actant is “a power which enrols and 
dominates or, by contrast, an agent with no initiative which allows itself to be enrolled” 
(Callon, 1999, p. 182). 
 
From ANT perspective, new sharing media technologies serve as information intermediators. 
Laura DeNardis (2014) argued that ANT “would perhaps refer [to] this phenomenon as 
regimes of delegation carried out by technical intermediaries that are often “black-boxed”89 
and overlooked by end users” (p. 257). According to Krieger and Belliger (2014), “The more 
intermediaries there are [,] the larger network becomes. The larger network becomes the 
more stable and therefore the more real it appears” (p. 113). In a further elaboration by 
Krieger and Belliger (2014) they stated that “the larger [the] network, the more effort is 
constantly going on to mobilize, translate and enrol actors, to create associations, and add 
intermediaries” (p. 113). Building an actor network means making associations, connections 
and links between as many heterogeneous elements, regardless of whether these elements are 
human or non-human, individual or collective, or subjects or objects (Krieger & Belliger, 
2014, p. 114). 
 
In this context, the black box is a conceptual metaphor developed in ANT to describe the 
network assemblages that function so well that their internal logistics are opaque from the 
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outside (Callon, 1986, p. 31). Black boxes are created through what ANT terms as “acts of 
translation”, in which actors are first enrolled in the network and then work to stabilise it 
from the inside, which creates the appearance of a monolithic assemblage (Besel, 2011). 
From the perspective of the case studies in this thesis, the black box concept highlights how 
ISIS maintains its networking structure by adaptively shifting operations to lesser known 
online sharing portals (see Section 6.6). Opening a black box allows us to examine the ways 
in which “a variety of social aspects and technical elements are associated and come together 
as a durable whole” (Cressman, 2009, p. 6). The notion of opening and examining a black 
box is possible, because when focusing on a black-boxed entity that is seemingly 
homogenous from the outside, ANT sees “processes, performances, socio-technical rituals, 
and enactments […] driven by the dynamics of making connections, of binding things 
together, of extending associations, of “translating” and “enrolling” actors into networks” 
(Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 9). The same could be said for the role of online sharing portals, 
mobile phone applications and other technical assemblages enrolled in the networks of ISIS 
affiliates. 
 
Thus, the rapid processes of information production and dissemination of propaganda videos 
is another network strength ISIS maintains in the Twittersphere. This network strength is 
dependent on the establishment of network connectivity and controlled flows of information. 
From a networking perspective, ‘flow’ can be described as: 
 
             on one level … the movements of contents through the various connections within the 
network. Flow in this sense refers to the fact that everything is moving through 
networks in one form or another, goods, services, money, people, information, etc. 
On another level [,] flow refers to unpredictable activities and influences of all actors 





      
As Latour (2005) stated, “A network is nothing more than the “trace left behind by some 
moving agent”. Networks should not be understood as stable social structures, but as “flows 
of translations”’ (p. 132). 
 
It can be argued that these new sharing portals created a new terror socio-sphere. According 
to ANT, this socio-sphere “consists neither of objects nor subjects, but actors, and mediators. 
The affordance of digital media makes it increasingly difficult to deny any actor voice in the 
collective” (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 187). These new sharing portals empower ISIS’ 
message to a large extent. From an ANT perspective, the new sharing portals enhance 
connectivity in the network by adding more actors and mediators, which becomes “more 
viable in global network society” (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 188). Therefore, it can be said 
that ISIS has created a new paradigm shift in terror communication that established a global 
network of affiliates who acted on its behalf in the world at large. To understand the physical 
and cognitive paradigms, the highlighting of logistical media actors and content produced by 
these media outlets is essential. 
 
4.13 ISIS’ Media Outlets 
    ISIS has established many media outlets, such as Al-Hayat, Ajnad and Al-Itisam, and 
harnessed the power of the existing media outlets of its predecessor Al-Qaeda, such as Al-
Furqan media. ISIS has also established a radio channel (Albayan), English magazines 
(Dabiq and Rumeyah) and a 24-hour internet television station (Khaliphalive.tv). Further, 
beside the establishment of terror mainstream channels, through which ISIS maintains its 
network structure and flows of information, ISIS also adapted a new network strategy by 





territories in Raqqa, Syria; Barqa, Libya; and Sinai, Egypt) is responsible to produce their 
own media contents in alignment with ISIS’ propaganda to serve its political agendas. 
 
In this section, I highlight the productions of these media outlets that acted as physical 
logistical media production tools. The media outlets did this by producing terror videos that 
helped ISIS in creating a global network of affiliates and maintaining their information flows 
(see Figure 61). 
 
Al-Hayat was established in May 2014 and was based in Raqqa90 of Syria, the second largest 
province controlled by ISIS in 2014. Al-Hayat Media Centre is considered the mouthpiece of 
ISIS, which is akin to the relationship between Al Jazeera and Al-Qaeda. However, Al-Hayat 
also acted as a ministry of information for ISIS. Al-Hayat Media Centre introduced itself on 
its WordPress blog (as cited in Atwan, 2015) as: 
 
            The media wing of IS [ISIS] English Media centre is addressing Muslims in several 
foreign languages [;] its versions of high-quality and highly sophisticated technology 
… match global media channels [,] although they hope the beginning of modern [sic]. 
Al-Hayat has adapted [a] 21[st] century approach to spread[ing] jihadist propaganda 
and shown unique ability to use western media style to their advantage … under the 
leadership of Ahmed Abosamra, a self-radicalised individual of Syrian origins, who 
was born in France in 1981. Abosamra [,] who is an IT and telecommunication 
graduate [,] returned back to Syria during the Syrian revolution in 2011, then he 
joined the Islamic State in Raqqa in 2014 were he masterminded the slick, high-
production videos for Al-Hayat media outlet. 
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Figure 61. ISIS’ media wing and media productions. Illustrated by the author. 
 
Al-Hayat release regular one- to two-minute short films called Mujatweets (an abbreviation 
of mujahedin tweets), which depicts the daily life of mujahedin (i.e., holy warrior) while on 
and off duty. They also represent a utopian image of life under Islamic caliphate. Many 
Mujatweets episodes show foreign fighters expressing their happiness, encouraging others to 
join their cause and explaining why all Muslims should make Hegira (i.e., migration) to the 
Islamic caliphate. The most popular episode on YouTube was “Why Did You Come to Jihad, 
Uncle?” (which no longer exists, as Google waged war against ISIS use of YouTube channels 
to promote its propaganda videos). Most Mujatweets propaganda videos were recorded in 
many languages, such as French, German and Russian, allowing a broad audience to access 
and accept the invitation to live under the utopian Islamic caliphate. Additionally, Al-Hayat 






After Google launched its massive operation to counter ISIS’ propaganda messages, 
YouTube deleted all accounts associated with Al-Hayat media productions and other ISIS 
affiliate productions. 
 
The Al-Hayat Media Centre is ISIS’ media wing that produces video content. In July 2014, 
Al-Hayat distributed 11 releases in English (a new release every 3 days), which were shot in 
HD with proficient editing and consistent branding. Even after ISIS fighters die, they are kept 
alive by continuous images, videos and statements. Before ISIS launched its attack on Mosul, 
a city of 1.5 million people, it released a film called The Clanging of the Swords IV (Liang, 
2015, p. 6). 
 
Al-Furqan was originally the mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda and was established by Abu Musab 
Al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2006. It served under ISIS after they took control over Mosul in April 
2014. The establishment of Al-Furqan Media’s production in November 2006 aimed to target 
Western audiences as the produced materials was translated into multiple foreign languages, 
particularly English and French. Later, their media production was focused on jihadist 
Nasheeds. Al-Furqan has produced whole television series glorifying ISIS’ achievements, 
such as the films The Land of Epic Battles and Flames of War. It has produced its infamous 
production called Cubs of Caliph, which depicted child fighters executing Russian and Israel 
spies in slick HD video production. It also shows the Australian terrorist, Khaled Sharouf, 
and his children holding up severed heads. In February 2015, Al-Furqan produced the video 
of a captured Jordanian pilot, Muath Al-Kasasbeh, being burned alive. Al-Furqan is 
considered the production arm of Al-Hayat Media Centre; all of its video content is first 






Al-Itisam also served under Al-Hayat Media Centre. Al-Itisam is based in Syria and 
responsible for gruesome HD productions. Most of their HD production can be found online 
at https://akhbardawlatalislam.wordpress.com. The most recent production is called 
Defeating Safawies. Al-Itisam also is responsible for press releases and communication from 
the Caliph’s office to local residents. In many ISIS videos, particularly the ones presented by 
John Cantlie,91 I have observed Al-Itisam kiosks, where local residents can obtain 
information and press releases. 
 
Ajnad is based in Iraq and was established in 2014. It specialises in producing jihadi 
Nasheeds. Jihadi Nasheeds production is very important during wartime, to spread the spirit 
of jihad when presented alongside graphic images of propaganda videos. Lemieux and Nill 
(2011) have highlighted the role of music in jihadi propaganda, particularly its role in 
presenting individuals with lyrics that compel them to “engage in deeper processing and 
consideration” (p. 144). Steve Rose (2014) also observed: 
 
            The more violent images from ‘The Flames of War’ have also been edited into a 
rapid-fire, steroidal action montage accompanied by a recruitment Nasheed, or hymn. 
The song lyrics sweep across the screen, karaoke-style in Latin-script Arabic and 
English: ‘Brothers rise up! Claim your victory! Let’s go! Let’s go for jihad!’ It takes a 
while to register that the song itself is in German. 
 
4.14 Propaganda Videos—Content Analysis 
                                                          





In this section, I highlight the most popular HD propaganda videos produced by ISIS’ media 
outlets between 2014 and 2015. I aim to explain how video production logistical tools were 
harnessed to produce powerful and sophisticated videos. In this section, I explain how ISIS 
created a paradigm shift in terror communication, by enlisting new digital and physical 
logistics that impacted the world. These logistical tools include cameras, post-production 
techniques, editing software, graphics, cast and sound effects. As Steve Rose (2014) 
observed: These films were simply made, they are most likely shot on standard equipment, 
such as Canon’s 5D or 7D—easy to operate and to keep in focus. They use radio 
microphones for sound. Effects and graphics and image-manipulation generated by tools like 
Adobe Premier; even phone apps can do a super slo-mo [slow motion] effect.   
 
Arguably, the most important videos circulated by both online media and mainstream media 
were Message to America (see Figure 62), Flames of War (see Figure 63) and Healing of the 
Believers’ Chests (see Figure 64). 
 
4.14.1 Message to America 
 






The structure of the video is simple. It opens with former US president Barack Obama 
speaking of air strike operations in Iraq against ISIS, to protect the US’s interests and save 
Iraqi innocent people. The second shot shows James Foley encouraging his family, friends 
and loved ones to revolt against the US government, which he calls ‘his real killers’. The 
third shot shows Jihad John, who stated: 
 
            This is James Wright Foley, an American citizen of your country, as a government, 
you have been at the forefront of the aggression towards the Islamic State [ISIS]. You 
have plotted against us and have gone far out of your way to find reasons to interfere 
in our affairs. Today, your military air force is attacking us daily in Iraq, your strikes 
have caused casualties among Muslims. 
 
The fourth shot shows the beheading of Foley and the video finished by showing another 
American hostage, Steven Sotloff, present another direct message to Obama: “the life of this 
American citizen depends on your next decision”. 
 
This was the first video produced by ISIS. The 4.40-minute video shows sophisticated use of 
high-quality cameras, multiple angle screenshots, professional montage and use of sound 
devices. Overall, for the first time, a terror group used a good-looking cast for both the victim 
and the terrorist, which indicates the intentionality in production and ISIS’ ability to harness 






4.14.2 Flames of War 
 
Figure 63. Screenshot of Flames of War propaganda production. 
 
On 19 September 2014, ISIS released a 55-minute documentary-style film, produced by Al-
Hayat Media Centre. It was titled Flames of War. The trailer for the video, which was 
originally posted to the internet archiving site archive.org on 16 September, featured footage 
of former US president Barack Obama saying, “combat troops will not be returning to fight in 
Iraq”. The film cut to its title card which said, “Flames of War: Fighting has just begun”. The 
film is professionally edited and highlights the ISIS’ seizure of the Syrian Army’s 17th 
Division base near Raqqa. The film opens with a narrator authoritatively declaring that the 
establishment of the Islamic caliphate has allowed the Muslim community to “unite under 
one call, one banner, one leader”. Svirsky (2014) observed: 
 
            The film utilizes romantic imagery carefully crafted to appeal to dissatisfied and 
alienated young men, replete with explosions, tanks and self-described mujahedeen 
winning battles. Anti-American rhetoric provides the voice-over to stop motion and 
slow-motion action sequences. The use of special effects such as bullet-time is 
interspersed with newsreel footage. 
 
According to Svirsky (2014), “This up-to-date, sophisticated cinematography combined with 





Leni Riefenstahl’s 1935 film, Triumph of the Will”. The film finishes with a written statement 
from Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who refers to the US as the “defender of the Cross”. The 
message appears to indicate that the group believes US combat forces will be sent to Iraq. 
Kiefer (2014) presented an analysis of Flames of War: 
 
             The film shows long slow-motion shots of black-clad young men with beards and 
shoulder-length hair who effortlessly withstand the shock waves of heavy mortar 
rounds. Given these images, it is little wonder that IS [ISIS] fighters are celebrated as 
‘lions’ and ‘heroes’ in the social networks of the neo-Salafists. 
 
A final message is read aloud and flashed on the screen. At one point, it reads: “A proxy war 
won’t help you in Sham just as it didn’t help you in Iraq. As for the near future, you will be 
forced into a direct confrontation”. The film concludes with a message: “the sons of Islam 
have prepared themselves for this day, so wait and see, for we too are also going to wait and 
see.” 
 
4.14.3 Healing of the Believers’ Chests 
 






ISIS released a 22-minute video on 2 March 2015, titled Healing the Believers’ Chests. This 
film showed captured Jordanian air force pilot, Moath Kaseasbeh, being burned alive in a 
cage. This video is considered one of the most gruesome videos produced by ISIS, which has 
incited global outrage, including some extremist Muslims who denounced the method of 
killing. In this video, ISIS producers—for the first time—used different production tactics, 
including cast, graphics, cameras, post-production, Photoshop software, computer-generated 
images (CGI) and sound effects. The 22-minute video is sophisticated, to the extent that the 
excessive use of CGI makes some film analysts believe the video is fake. The films open with 
Al-Kasasbeh speaking directly to a camera, condemning his government for taking action 
against ISIS. During the interrogation, a professional use of infographic data is displayed 
adjacent to sophisticated and eye-catching scenes. Although the message is negative, 
professional producers use of multiple camera angles and a well-presented cast made the film 
akin to a Hollywood production. The burning scenes, which were about 2.30 minutes in 
length, were the most watched and circulated on SMNs and mainstream media. Slow-motion 
effects, sound effects and graphics give global range and power to its rhetorical appeals to its 
target audiences. Overall, this sophisticated media production was successful in delivering its 
compelling message to a worldwide audience. 
 
4.15 Going Viral—Disseminating the Message of Terror 
    In this section, I explain the information loop of ISIS networks. Raber’s (2003) 
information paradigm is used to understand the mechanism processes of transmission, storage 
and retrieval in physical and material informational objects. Examination of these 
mechanisms may lead to understanding the viral nature of terror messages. In their book, 






A social information flow process where many people simultaneously forward a specific 
information item, over a short period of time, within their social networks, and where the 
message spreads beyond their own [social] networks to different, often distant networks, 
resulting in a sharp acceleration in the number of people who are exposed to the message. (p. 
16) 
 
The authors pointed out the parallels between viral events and the gatekeeper’s network in 
Twitter, which they called “Occupying Twitter: a retweet network’ (Nohan & Hermsley, 
2013). Nohan and Hermsley (2013) noted that ‘viral events are not new. What is new is that a 
viral video, a news story, or a photo can reach 40,000 people in hours, even minutes, instead 
of days” (p. 2). Further, Nohan and Hermsley (2013) outlined the connections between the 
emergence of the new information ecosystem—assembled by information flows on SMNs—
and viral videos. They contended that virality can both reproduce and transform existing 
social norms and institutions. 
 
As such, the question arises: how and why have ISIS’ propaganda videos gone viral mere 
seconds after their release? This question can be answered by what Nohan and Hemsley 
(2013) have argued are gatekeeping networks within digital spheres (such as Twitter, 
Facebook and Google) or physical spheres that are controlled by mainstream media networks 
(such as Fox News, CNN and Al Jazeera). In case of the ISIS messages, both gatekeeping 
networks—within digital and physical spheres—have collaborated to disseminate messages 
of terror. 
 
It also must be addressed that anti-ISIS powers, who have worked hard to counter ISIS’ 
message, have ironically served ISIS’ rationale, as the terror narrative dominated and 






             The role of SMN’s as a tool of terror communication has added another larger 
complexity in media coverage of terror events as terror organisations provided their 
point of view and challenged the ‘one-sided messages’ of fear to opponents. In his 
own words ‘the mass media frame in any society is only one factor affecting public 
opinion, which is also affected by real world indicators and by personal experience 
and interpersonal communication’. (p. 13) 
 
To understand the collaboration between networks of adversaries, a study of the norms of 
network relations, network structures, information logistics infrastructures and hybrid online 
interaction (particularly on Twitter) is essential. To understand the oxymoronic relationship, 
it is necessary to study the producers of messages and ascertain whether individuals, media 
outlets or affiliate networks influence the message. Further, it is essential to understand 
whether the message is centralised or decentralised, how it has been established and 
maintained, what tools have been used and who the mediators are. Social network analysis is 
providing answers to these questions. Therefore, ISIS strategically maintains a strong 
presence on SMNs—particularly Twitter—to control information flows. Mapping of ISIS’ 
online activity may lead to clear understanding of the overlapping elements of their 
information logistics infrastructure. 
 
From a virtual networking perspective, “the going viral moment” in relation to ISIS’ 
propaganda videos happens in a three-step process. First, ISIS’ Twitter accounts followers—
including myself—observe that ISIS’ network affiliates start tweeting about important 
productions that are to be released soon. Second, these tweets are instantly retweeted by 
many ISIS affiliates, which ensures the hashtags and topics trend on Twitter until the moment 





as Manbar.me and Nasher.me. These retweets reach hundreds of thousands of people and 
many thousands of other media outlets that disseminate the uncut content of these videos. 
Finally, the disseminated videos can be downloaded and archived on anonymous virtual 
clouds like dump.to (e.g., www.dump.to/Esdarat and www.dump.to/Ismedia) to keep a digital 
legacy of their production. These videos can be stored on archive.org, Google Drive or many 
other websites affiliated with ISIS. For instance, I have observed that ISIS-affiliated Twitter 
accounts had been holding discussions among its supporters, in which they asked for ways to 
“kill the captured Jordanian pilot”. An Arabic Twitter hashtag started by ISIS, ‘Suggest a way 
to kill the Jordanian pilot pig’ (#اقترح_طريقة_لقتل_الطيار_االردني_الخنزير), has been widely shared 
among its followers. The hashtag had been shared over 1,000 times among ISIS’ supporters, 
who suggested several brutal ways to kill the pilot. Some of the ideas included beheading or 
burning Al-Kasabeh alive. 
 
Another important factor of ISIS’ ‘going viral’ moment is what I call the collaboration 
networks of adversaries. News-thirsty media networks and other online media networks that 
have millions of viewers unwittingly disseminated ISIS’ messages of terror. For example, the 
first video released by ISIS, Message to America, was first captured and disseminated by the 
think tank called SITE. The US Department of State has its Twitter site ‘Think Again Turn 
Away’ (which was established in 2014, to counter ISIS’ messages) links to ISIS-related news 
stories and occasionally releases its own videos. The site delivers the same propaganda 
contents that ISIS’ affiliate networks deliver. Further, Fox News defended its choice to 
broadcast the full-length video, Healing of the Believers’ Chests, and list a hyperlink to it on 






             The media and terrorists are in what we might call a symbiotic relationship. Terrorists 
naturally benefit from media that inspires fear in a much larger target audience; they 
use it to turn a local event that affects a limited number of immediate victims into a 
global issue. And, unsavoury as it sounds, the media benefits from terrorist outrages 
too, most obviously by selling papers and winning audiences. 
      
Engel (2014) argued that one of the main reasons that ISIS flourished and consolidated its 
power was because of Western media. The relationship between terrorist media and 
mainstream media is oxymoronic; while mainstream media employed its capabilities to 
counter ISIS’ messages, it also promoted its propaganda, which facilitated the success of 
ISIS’ many video productions because they were given a worldwide audience. 
 
As Rose (2014) noted, “Amateur videos and images are also being uploaded daily by its foot 
soldiers, which are then globally disseminated, both by ordinary users and mainstream news 
organisations hungry for images of a conflict their own cameras cannot access”. The ultimate 
success of ISIS’ networks—including their employment of new information logistics 
infrastructure and the maintenance of their information flows—is evidenced in the fact that 
their produced content is wanted. As Sandkuhl (2007) observed: 
 
              The main objective of Information Logistics is optimized information provision and 
information flow. This is based on demands with respect to the content, the time of 
delivery, the location, the presentation and the quality of information. The scope can 
be a single person, a target group, a machine/facility or any kind of networked 
organisation. (p. 46) 





Within this context, ISIS’ video productions focused on the presentation of content. The 
versatile quality content of propaganda videos forced news-thirty mainstream media to 
disseminate ISIS’ messages, instead of countering them. Anti-ISIS powers have agreed on 
waging information warfare to counter ISIS’ online messages. However, ISIS survives in this 
competitive environment, wherein information dissemination is crucial for the maintenance 
of network structure. This is because connectivity and flows of information are the backbone 
of networks. Although the content and production quality of ISIS’ videos are similar, their 
productions are appealing to mainstream media networks because of their varied ways of 
killing of their victims. From the beheadings in Flames of War to the burning alive in 
Healing of the Believers’ Chests, ISIS uses varied methods to kill their victims (e.g., 
drowning in cages and executions of spies and militias). As such ISIS maintains its flows of 
information and network relationships through a simple supply and demand marketing 
strategy. Sandkuhl (2007) argued: 
 
              If information logistics is regarded as the planning of information flows, this consequently 
implies the planning of an information-logistical infrastructure. In doing so, two essential 
areas need to be distinguished. Whereas on the one hand network relations and/or supplier-
requestors relations need to be defined and structured, on the other hand the resulting 
information-logistical basic infrastructure must be designed and optimized. (p. 46) 
      
ISIS’ media propagators achieved their core objectives by optimising content online by 
borrowing from Western movies, reality shows and hip-hop culture. The symbiotic 
relationship between the media and terror is evident in the media’s coverage of terrorism, 






    In this chapter, I explored the digital media logistics of ISIS’ networks with a focus on 
Twitter as the prime medium of communication used by ISIS and its international affiliates. 
Examining the IO of digital media is the first step to understanding how terror networks 
promote their terror narrative and how these messages are distributed so quickly. This chapter 
examined the information logistics of ISIS’ networks from two perspectives: information as a 
paradigm and ANT. Both perspectives explained how ISIS leveraged its network and 
established decentralised distribution networks by enlisting more actors. This served to 
sustain the network through ISIS’ affiliate engagement. By exploring the information 
logistics of ISIS, researchers can understand how terror networks manoeuvre in information 






5 Chapter 5: Degrading Operation—Attacking the Digital Logistics of 
ISIS’ Networks 
5.1  Introduction 
    As explained in Chapter 4, ISIS runs complex media logistics operations, which are 
dependent on broad digital media networks that enable them to establish decentralised 
distribution networks. These networks exploit the functionality of social media platforms, 
encrypted digital communication applications and anonymous sharing portals. That is, the 
mobilisation of many heterogeneous elements has enabled ISIS to leverage their networks 
and created complex associations between the information environments and human actors. 
These associations will explain how ISIS built decentralised communication networks and 
became an agent of stigmergic operations.  
 
The decentralised structure of ISIS’ networks has enabled a new phase of information 
warfare dependent on decentralised C2 operations. Therefore, approaches to disrupt ISIS 
flows of information are less successful, as ISIS has weaponised multiple digital media 
environments. Moreover, the resilience and fluidity of ISIS’ distributed networks leads to the 
pervasiveness of their terror narrative, which has accelerated their processes of recruitment 
and radicalisation. To hinder ISIS’ flows of information and disrupt its digital media 
activities, an international collaboration has been required between collective hacker groups 
(e.g., Anonymous and CTRLsec), government agencies (e.g., Sawab Centre and United 
States Department of State’s [USDOS] team), security agencies (e.g., CSCC) and social 
media platform administrators (e.g., Twitter and YouTube). Swarmcast operations, carried 
out by these agencies, managed to disrupt ISIS’ flows of information to some extent, by 





swarming operations targeted ISIS’ digital media logistics and aimed to degrade its activities 
on anonymous sharing portals and encrypted communication channels. 
 
In this chapter, I outline the degrading operation conducted on ISIS’ digital media logistics. 
The operation was carried out by the US government and collective hacker groups, such as 
Anonymous and individual hackers (i.e., catallaxies92), who targeted both message logistics 
and content. 
 
This chapter aims to answer the thesis’s secondary question: how has the suspension of 
Twitter and YouTube accounts impacted on ISIS’ networking performance? To answer this 
question, I identify the phases of the degrading operation: degrading and destroying; 
countering ISIS’ propaganda; and hacking and information warfare. Second, I examine the 
role of hacktivists from both sides (such as ISIS’ Cyber United Caliphate93) and how ISIS 
protected its digital legacy. Third, I analyse the effect of network governance on ISIS’ 
network performance. 
 
In Section 5.5, I discuss to what extent should TOS be applied in the context of terror 
organisation, and how effective TOS can be in tracing and suspending ISIS’ digital activity 
on the network. Finally, this chapter includes an overall assessment of the information 
warfare that occurred between ISIS and its adversaries in the information environment. 
                                                          
92 The term catallaxy “describes the process by which order emerges from the seeming chaos of countless  
 
individual interactions between participants in a complex system. This spontaneous human coordination is  
 
the result of the individual action of the system’s participants, but the resulting order is not shaped  
 
consciously by human design” (Pouliot, 2017). 
 





5.2 Attack ISIS’ Digital Logistics 
    The pervasiveness, influence and reach of ISIS’ messages have helped the group to 
establish networks of affiliates, sympathisers and members outside its controlled territories. 
The influx of mujahedin from Arab and foreign countries, who migrated to the Islamic 
caliphate, has significantly improved ISIS’ networking performance. This is reflected by the 
number of triumphs, territories subdued, and military operations conducted outside their 
territories. Additionally, during the 2012–2013 Anbar uprisings, there were no more than 
2,000 ISIS fighters. However, by 2014, there were over 30,000 mujahedin operating inside 
Syria and Iraq, with an unknown number of sympathisers and affiliates operating outside its 
territory. Further, the number of digital jihadists (e.g., Slacktivists and catallaxies) who 
stigmergically contributed to aggregate, generate and spread content in the name of the 
Islamic caliphate is unknown. Collective digital jihadi (or e-jihadists) swarmed popular social 
media platforms—especially Twitter—with propaganda to infuriate the US government, who 
launched the Global War on Terrorism, and combat them in the information environments. 
Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff connected the “information’ aspect of 
conflict with the other major elements of power. He argued that the defeat of ISIS ‘requires 
the application of all the tools of national power, diplomatic, economic, information, 
military” (Waller, 2015, p. 29). 
 
The use of modern technologies by terror organisations has caused controversy among 
policymakers in the US, as they seek strategies for dealing with the issue. For instance, 
during the rise of Al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the fax machine played a role in the spread of Al-
Qaeda’s propaganda (akin to ISIS’ use of Twitter today). Osama bin Laden used fax 
machines to send messages to his affiliates in the UK and US (Hughes, 1998)94. In one of the 
                                                          





messages sent by bin Laden (as cited in Hughes, 1998) through a fax machine, bin Laden 
stated that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies―civilians and military―is an 
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do 
it”. 
 
At that time, the real-time messaging tools opened a new paradigm of terror communication. 
The use of fax machine created panic among security agencies, due to fear that such 
messages would increase and accelerate the process of radicalisation and recruitment. There 
was an urgent need to devise a way to counter the new threat. Three countermeasure practices 
were implemented to tackle the fax machine radicalisation and dissemination of Al-Qaeda’s 
messages. These countermeasures included: fax machine versus fax machine; humans versus 
fax machine; and attacking the logistics of fax machines. 
 
The first countermeasure, fax machine versus fax machine, was labelled by the DOD as 
Project Bain.95 The US government allocated US$10,000,000 to buy two million fax 
machines to counter Al-Qaeda’s messages. According to a senior Pentagon official (as cited 
in Hughes, 1998), Project Bain was “simple. Terrorists have fax machines and we should too. 
We can’t cede the ideological battlefield on data transmission”. Further, according to the 
official (as cited in Hughes, 1998), this project had a straightforward mission: “every time 
Bin Laden releases a declaration of war on one fax machine, there’s got to be another Fax 
machine right next to the bad one that transmits our positive message”. However, the use of 
fax machines to counter Al-Qaeda’s fax machines was a controversial move among 
government officials. One senior government official (as cited in Hughes, 1998) said, “We 
                                                          





shouldn’t be providing counter-faxes. We need to empower other voices to counter-fax 
themselves”.  
 
Countering fax machine communication with more fax machines created confusion among 
security agencies and community activists, because no specific fax numbers were provided 
with which to focus their efforts. Therefore, a community-based organisation was nominated 
to debate the value of the fax machine countermeasure. This was known as a Countering 
Violent Extremism program. Within the debate concerning countering radicalisation via fax 
machine, Senator John Smith of Maine and Congressman William Mahanty (as cited in 
Hughes, 1998) suggested that attacking fax machines logistics would solve the problem, such 
as blocking the phone numbers linked to faxes received from Afghanistan and ceasing fax 
machine ink suppliers’ access to Afghanistan. Mahanty (as cited in Hughes, 1998) argued 
that if the US government “stop[s] the ink, [they] stop the problem”.  
 
Countering Al-Qaeda’s fax machine radicalisation practices are similar to the 
countermeasures undertaken by policymakers in dealing with ISIS’ use of sophisticated 
digital media techniques for radicalisation, mobilisation, recruitment, and the generation and 
dissemination of content. The significant amount of media content produced by ISIS—which 
is only increasing—has required many operations to be conducted by a range of established 
powers in order for the countermeasures against ISIS’ logistics to be effective. Further, 
Milton (2016) noted that ISIS: 
 
            has not just created a media organisation but a media network that relies on a 
geographically diverse group of individuals around the world to push out its 
messages. Defeating it is not the job of any one organisation or country, and it will 






I observed that efforts to deploy countermeasures against ISIS’ online offensive—conducted 
by the US and other adversaries of ISIS—have emerged in three distinct phases. Phase one 
has been concerned with degrading and destroying; phase two has focused on countering 
ISIS’ propaganda; and phase three has taken the form of hacking and information warfare. 
 
5.3 Phase One—Degrading and Destroying 
    The notion of degrading and destroying ISIS’ networks on social media platforms emerged 
in response to ISIS’ images of the beheading of US photojournalist, James Foley. These were 
uploaded to Twitter and distributed through ISIS’ networks. According to Joseph Cox (2014), 
“The hashtag #ISISMediaBlackout quickly gained traction, with users protesting that sharing 
such graphic images of Foley was, in essence, spreading the terrorist group’s propaganda for 
them” (see Figure 65). As ISIS’ propaganda on Twitter gained momentum, policymakers and 
platform administrators were compelled to take action. 
 
 
Figure 65. A tweet by Hend Amry, showcasing the first use of #ISISMediaBlackout hashtag. 
 
This action was affirmed by then president Barack Obama during his speech at the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 2014. Obama (as cited in McCarthy, 2015) 





Obama presented strategic objectives for this mission, including cutting ISIS’ cash flows, 
paralysing the movements of foreign fighters and rooting out jihadi networks from online 
spaces (McCarthy, 2015). 
 
To understand the US’s strategy in degrading and destroying the digital media logistics of 
ISIS’ networks, it is important to define the extent of the operation. ‘Degrading’ means: 
 
             to lower the character or quality of an adversary C2 or communications systems, and 
information collection efforts or means; or to degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the 
target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and actions. 
(Nissen, 2015, p. 67) 
      
While ‘destroy’ refers to “put[ting] an end to the existence of (something) by damaging or 
attacking it (e.g., to damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or 
be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt)” (Nissen, 2015, p. 67). In this 
chapter, I focused on the impact of degrading and destroying the digital capabilities of ISIS’ 
operation in regard to ISIS’ information flows, dynamics of dissemination, C2 operations, 
number of produced messages, recruits and on-ground operations. That is, from ANT context, 
the degrading operation aims at cutting off the logistical support of ISIS networks through 
thwart of enrolment processes of digital actors that sustain ISIS’ information flows and 
communication networks.  
 
Overall, the aim of this chapter is to highlight the strategy of the US and social media 
administrators in destroying and disrupting the information flows of ISIS’ networks on 
information environments. This phase was twofold. First, it required the direct involvement 





pressure to the administrators of social media platforms to control ISIS’ use of their 
platforms. In Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, I examine the processes of the degrading operation at 
tactical level (i.e., the Whack-a-Mole operation and the Interaction and Isolation operation). 
 
5.3.1 The Whack-a-Mole96 Operation 
    Operation Whack-a-Mole is counterinsurgency war strategy initiated by the US in the 
1990s, after the rise of Al-Qaeda. The name of the operation is based on the arcade game of 
the same name (see Figure 66). This strategy was described by the former president, Barack 
Obama (as cited in Faux, 2014), who told CBS News on 22 June 2014, “What we can’t do is 
think that we’re just going to play whack-a-mole and send U.S. troops occupying various 
countries wherever these organisations pop up”. 
 
 
Figure 66. Cartoon depicting the Whack-a-Mole operation. 
 
“Whack-a-mole’ is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “an arcade game in which players 
use a mallet to hit toy moles, which appear at random, back into their holes”.  
 
                                                          
96 ‘Whack A-Mole’ is a metaphor used by the critics to describe the US strategy against terrorism for 





Within the context of the US’s Whack-a-Mole strategy against ISIS’ digital activity on 
Twitter, the question emerged: who was mastering the game? There was a concern that the 
US was being outmanoeuvred, despite its aim to outmanoeuvre ISIS. According to ISIS 
member Abul Muthanna (see Figure 67), trying to stop ISIS on Twitter is like whack-a-mole, 
because ISIS will keep coming back. 
 
 
Figure 67. Abul Muthanna’s reply to the United States Whack-a-Mole operation. 
 
In reacting to the Whack-a-Mole strategy, waged by the US and other anti-ISIS powers, ISIS 
maintained that for every account suspended, another account should be established. For 
ISIS, Twitter is the digital domain wherein it enacts its IO and maintains its flows of 
information. If ISIS lost Twitter, they would lose a significant asset in the media war. Thus, 
the resurgence of ISIS’ Twitter accounts was essential to maintain their flows of information. 
Fisher (2015) observed that “this dispersed structure, which functions as a swarm on Twitter, 
has continued to develop with multiple backup accounts allowing users to maintain contact 
after a specific account is suspended” (p. 9). The speed of re-emerging in Twitter after an 
account suspension is central to ISIS’ IO strategy. Fisher (2015) noted that “resilience against 
takedowns and account suspensions has become an important element of the Jihadist Swarm-






Examining the success of the mission to degrade ISIS’ digital capability operation is a 
difficult task. Further, it may be too soon to determine whether ISIS’ networks are prolific or 
scarce. However, in their report, The ISIS Twitter Census, Berger and Morgan (2015, p. 9) 
claimed that the mass account suspension strategy—known as Whack-a-Mole—was a highly 
successful network degrading too. They claim that ISIS found it challenging to deal with the 
suspended accounts without suffering any negative consequences. It was estimated that there 
were between 46,000 and 90,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts active in the period from 
September to December 2014 (Berger and Morgan, 2015). Twitter claimed it suspended over 
300,000 active Twitter accounts in the period between 2014 and 2016. 
 
The effect of account suspensions on ISIS’ activity on Twitter has diminished significantly. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that ISIS lost the battle in the Twitter sphere, that 
their account suspension equated with the paralysation of their flows of information, or that 
their C2 operations were thwarted. To understand the impact of the degrading mission on 
ISIS’ networks, it is important to understand the dissemination dynamics and tactics used by 
ISIS members and sympathisers to maintain their information flows on Twitter. 
 
5.3.2 Interaction and Isolation 
    As part of their degrading strategy, the US used Interaction and Isolation processes to 
reduce ISIS’ activities on Facebook, YouTube and anonymous sharing portals. Interaction 
with ISIS’ digital content requires an understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of 
SMNs, the nature of engagement with disseminated content, the tools for searching and 
monitoring terror entities, the strategies for identifying disseminated content and the profile 
of potential people who could engage with disseminated content. According to Nissen (2015), 





influencers or key opinion-makers are and how they drive the conversation around topics of 
interest, and people’s conversations and actions online that can be mined for insights and 
understanding” (p. 64). The Interaction and Isolation operation was launched before SMNs 
established policies and approaches to combat ISIS’ exploitation of their networks. In this 
operation, the US CSCC physically identified ISIS’ accounts on social media platforms, 
websites, mobile phone applications to reported them to network administrators or launched 
cyber attacked them using DoS. 
 
For the ‘Interaction and Isolation’ strategy to be successful, a significant amount of resources 
and effective collaborations between security agencies and other ISIS adversaries were 
required. This process required the mobilisation of collective individuals, hackers and 
government agencies to identify, map and analyse the strategic tactics of ISIS’ information 
flows. The US government established a counternarrative strategy while collaborating with 
social media platform administrators (which is discussed in Section 5.7). This operation 
represented a significant amount of work: identify and map ISIS’ content, engage with their 
narrative, and identify potential content generators and disseminators. This workload became 
the responsibility of social media administrators, individual hackers and other international 
security agencies (see Section 5.4). This approach will be analysed from an information 
manoeuvre warfare perspective (see Section 7.4). 
 
5.4 Collective Collaboration—Social Media Platforms Approach to ISIS’ Content 
    To combat the surge of ISIS on their SMNs, the US government requested Twitter and 
Google to delete ISIS’ active accounts on their platforms. This measure resulted in the 
deletion or suspension of thousands of accounts and messages. In effect, this measure led to a 





Microsoft and YouTube collaborated to develop innovative tools to identify terrorist imagery 
and videos. Their statement declared: 
 
              We commit to the creation of a shared industry database of ‘hashes’—unique digital 
‘fingerprints’—for violent imagery or terrorist recruitment videos or images that we 
have removed from our services … By sharing this information with each other, we 
may use the shared hashes to help identify potential terrorist content on our respective 
hosted consumer platforms. (Facebook, 2016) 
      
However, this important agenda was already reflected in the ISIS’ distribution strategies 
(Lakomy, 2017, p. 48). Administrators of social media platforms have established alert 
systems to warn each other when ISIS uses platforms. This process was described by 
Fisherman (as cited in Kranish, 2017) as a “dynamic loop of information sharing known in 
the industry as Hash database. Social media companies use of “hashes” or “digital 
fingerprints” … alert other platforms of troublesome users or content”. 
 
To understand the extent of ISIS’ exploitation of Twitter, I revisit the most important work in 
relation to the degrading operation, The ISIS Twitter Census. In this study, Berger and 
Morgan (2015) collected Twitter data to map ISIS’ activities on that platform. The study was 
based on a sample of 20,000 of ISIS’ supporter accounts. The study established that between 
October and November 2014 “at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS 
supporters”. The study also revealed that 20,000 confirmed ISIS supporters are residing in the 
territories controlled by ISIS. Saudi Arabia was the second most common location for ISIS’ 
supporters. In addition, one-fifth of ISIS’ supporters used English and almost three-quarters 





countermeasures aimed at degrading ISIS’ propaganda were successful, partially because of 
wide Twitter account suspensions (Berger & Morgan, 2015). 
 
Twitter has applied a strong strategy to remove ISIS accounts. This strategy is divided into 
three processes. First, Twitter identify ISIS content and accounts by using the Interaction and 
Isolation strategy. Second, Twitter relied on the reports from ISIS’ adversaries and hackers 
(see Section 5.8), who contacted Twitter using #targets and #OpISIS. A short loop (i.e., the 
decide and act aspects of the OODA perspective) of dynamic processes between Twitter staff 
and anti-ISIS collectives has accelerated suspensions. According to Milton (2016), this 
strategy “relies not only on [the] reporting of suspicious accounts from users and government 
officials, but also on the proactive efforts of Twitter employees and technology to identify 
and remove offensive content” (p. 41). 
 
Third, Twitter identified potential ISIS accounts and affiliates through machine learning or 
AI. In this process, Twitter algorithms mapped the social networks of ISIS members to 
identify networks of followers and affiliates. AI has therefore maximised the number of 
suspended accounts. Gladstone (2015) reported, “Twitter says it suspended 10,000 ISIS-
linked accounts in one day”. In the period between June 2015 and February 2016, Twitter 
claimed to suspend 125,000 jihadi accounts; between January 2016 and August 2016, Twitter 
claimed to suspect 235,000 accounts (as cited in Lakomy, 2017, p. 47). 
 
Facebook’s priority was to ensure that terror-related content was removed before its provoked 
attackers to act (Kranish, 2017). To map, trace and remove ISIS’ digital activity on its 
platform, Facebook employed a network of 150 employees and utilised AI technologies. 





Fisherman explained that “before posts gets to [Facebook’s team], they’re filtered through 
Facebook’s computers, which have been programmed to scan content for buzzwords 
associated with terrorism. Only then are the posts passed onto the team”. This strategy was 
described by Fisherman (as cited in Kranish, 2017) as “using humans to do what humans do 
best, and computers for what computers do best.”' 
 
Frenett (2016) and his MoonShot group, after working with Google’s Jigsaw recently, 
reported their findings of a study on Facebook’s intervention with ISIS followers. Their 
findings led them to conclude that those who wish to fight against terror groups can reach the 
same digital audiences that terrorists do to intervene in various ways, including to pitch them 
counter narrative materials. However, the determination regarding which counter narrative 
materials will work in particular situations has not been identified (Frenett, as cited in 
McDowell-Smith et al., 2017, p. 54). The question remains: to what extent do social media 
platforms apply their TOS to remove terror content and suspend associated accounts? 
 
5.5 Terms of Service Violations 
    Popular social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, are using their 
TOS to exercise control over the type of information produced and disseminated over their 
networks. For example, YouTube’s TOS states in relation to hateful, violent and graphic 
content that “it’s not okay to post violent or gory content that’s primarily intended to be 
shocking, sensational or disrespectful. If a video is particularly graphic or disturbing, it 
should be balanced with additional context and information”.97 Silverman (2014) observed 
that YouTube acts robustly when dealing with terror content. YouTube can quickly delete 
                                                          





content and suspend associated accounts. Under YouTube’s TOS, the platform reserves the 
right to remove content and, in some instances, suspend accounts. According to a YouTube 
spokesperson: 
 
            YouTube has clear policies prohibiting content intended to incite violence, and we 
remove videos violating these policies when flagged by our users. We also terminate 
any account registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation 
and used in an official capacity to further its interests. 
 
Berger and Strathearn (2013, p. 14) indicated that when it comes to freedom of speech, social 
media platforms are biased. They suggest that these platforms should make it clear that 
freedom of speech is limited when it comes to using their service. 
 
Similarly, Twitter applies its TOS policies to content that breeches their terms. With rising 
international pressure on these social network platforms, particularly from the US 
government over ISIS’ online materials, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have acted swiftly 
and imposed harsh policies by targeting gruesome content generated by ISIS. 
 
The global coalition against ISIS should work in close cooperation with corporations and 
media owners to counter and eliminate the terrorist communication network, which is highly 
efficient and resistant to account suspensions or deletions. Removing individual accounts is 
not enough, because that will not disturb the flow of information within ISIS’ holistic 
information strategy. For effective action, a community-based approach is needed to disrupt 
the networking ISIS does through various social media platforms. All organisations using 
social media are responsible for maintaining their sites; this includes monitoring and blocking 





5.6 Phase Two—Countering ISIS’ Narrative 
    The principle objective that underpins the degrading of ISIS’ digital logistics is to 
minimise ISIS’ visibility and influence in information environments. Knowing that ISIS’ IO 
is based on the strategic narrative inherited from its predecessor (Al-Qaeda), anti-ISIS 
collectives fought ISIS in the information environments to paralyse ISIS’ tools of 
dissemination, attack its C2 operations and disrupt its flows of information. However, the US 
realised that attacking ISIS’ digital media logistics alone was ineffective in reducing the 
number of recruits and the influence of jihadi around the world. Thus, to counter ISIS’ 
narrative, the US and other ISIS adversaries established a narrative versus narrative strategy. 
Casebeer and Russell (2005) suggested that the most effective way to counter terrorism is by 
developing a ‘better story’ to replace the extremists [sic]’ one. 
 
Braddock and Horgan (2015) outlined that an effective counter narrative must address the 
four criteria; the counter narrative must be effective in “revealing incongruities and 
contradictions in the terrorist narratives and how terrorists act, disrupting analogies between 
the target narrative and real-world events, disrupting binary themes of the group’s ideology, 
and advocating an alternative view of the terrorist narrative’s target” (p. 397). Through their 
study, they were able to conclude that narratives can significantly impact the “beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviours” of their audiences (Braddock & Dillard, 2016, p. 18). 
This study identifies the need to address ISIS’ narratives through counternarratives (as cited 






When ISIS seized control of Mosul and declared the Caliphate in June 2014, the US CSCC98 
intensified its operational measures by working on strategies to counter ISIS’ narrative 
(Fernandez, 2015, p. 15). The CSCC had followed three main strategies in countering ISIS’ 
narratives. First, they established a video versus video strategy (akin to fax machine versus 
fax machine, see Section 5.2). Second, the CSCC traced digital activity on social media 
platforms and notified administrators (as part of the Interaction and Isolation strategy 
discussed in Section 5.3.2). Third, the CSCC worked intensively to educate Muslim youth 
living in the West about the menace depicted in ISIS’ propaganda based on a narrative versus 
narrative strategy. 
 
For example, to compete with ISIS’ propaganda online, the CSCC debuted a video 
production, titled Welcome to ISIS Land. According to Higham, “The video became a viral 
phenomenon—viewed more than 844,000 times on YouTube—and a cause of significant 
irritation to its target”. The narrowing of the CSCC’s focus to ISIS’ propaganda allowed for a 
boost in the CSCC’s overall production. In 2014, the CSCC released at least 93 Arabic 
videos. In the time between the fall of Mosul (10 June 2014) and the end of the year 
(specifically, 5 December 2014), the CSCC’s videos were viewed on YouTube 959,187 
times, with additional views occurring on Vimeo and via bootleg versions posted on Iraqi and 
Syrian Facebook pages. Fernandez (2015) observed that “the single most successful Arabic 
video, “DAESH Threatens Sunnis,” was viewed 115,050 times in two postings since ISIS 
supporters briefly knocked it from YouTube by manipulating YouTube community 
                                                          
98 Established in 2011 to bring security agencies in one hub for coordinating efforts in countering Al-





standards” (p. 15). Like the work of the Saudis, the work of the CSCC has received 
considerable media attention; however, it has had limited impact (Fernandez, 2015, p. 15).  
 
In addition, the CSCC launched the ‘Think Again Turn Away’99 page on Twitter to stop 
foreign fighters joining ISIS and document the atrocities committed by ISIS’ jihadi. Since the 
rise of ISIS, the CSCC “targeted counter-messaging against ISIS in Arabic and in English” 
(Fernandez, 2015, pp. 14–15). In return, ISIS launched the ‘Run Do Not Walk to U.S. 
Terrorist State’ page on Twitter to recruit potential members from the West. 
 
Worried European countries have also joined in the countermeasure efforts to stop ISIS’ 
propaganda. For instance, the British Army are creating a special digital force called 
Facebook Warriors, who are skilled in PSYOP. Similarly, the French Ministry of the Interior 
have produced a new website to counter jihad, which is aimed at discouraging young people 
from joining ISIS by using graphic images and messages that state, “They say: sacrifice 
yourself with us, you will defend a just cause. In reality: you will discover hell on earth and 
die alone, away from home” (Liang, 2015, p. 11). 
 
Satirical productions have also been popular on social media platforms. The video entitled 
What It’s Really Like to Fight for the Islamic State, which was published on YouTube by 
Vice News in April 2016, is an example of a satirical production. According to Lakomy 
(2017): 
                                                          
99 Now called the USDOS team, operating in both Arabic and English, it produces videos showing the 





            This piece was recorded by the headcam of a fallen member of the IS [ISIS] and 
depicted an extraordinarily clumsy fighter called Abu Hajaar during a firefight. The 
film instantly went viral (above 7 million views by the end of 2016). (p. 47) 
 
5.7 Counternarrative Actors 
    As stated earlier, security agencies and collective groups of ISIS’ adversaries established 
counter narrative strategies. In Sections 5.7.1–5.7.4, I outline the role of the counter narrative 
strategies carried out by security agencies other than the CSCC. These are Sawab Centre, 
USDOS team, #AllAboutISIS and UK against Daesh. As this thesis examines the online 
activities of ISIS’ counter narrative actors, it is important to examine their online activity, not 
just the physical activities inside the centres they established in UAE and the USA. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to do so. Those actors were chosen simply because they are 
the most important counter narrative actors. ANT suggests following the actors wherever 
they are. In my opinion, the later mentioned actors were the most important as they have the 
capacity to carry out a strategic counter narrative of ISIS’ online activities.  
 
 
5.7.1 Sawab Centre100 
Sawab Centre is an Arabic-based centre, established by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to 
raise awareness about the atrocities committed by ISIS, counter youth recruitment, combat 
ISIS’ online propaganda and promote positive alternatives to extremism. Sawab Centre 
operates on Twitter only and focused on building a narrative to counter ISIS’ recruitment 
narrative (see Figure 68). Their production includes short videos of youth who have survived 
                                                          





ISIS, and depictions of the miserable life under the Islamic caliphate and the subsequent 
refugee crisis. 
 
Figure 68. Screenshot of Sawab Centre. Source: Twitter. 
 
Under the motto ‘united against extremism’, Sawab Centre’s mission is to: 
● Warn youth against ISIS’ youth recruitment (see Figure 69). 
● Highlight ISIS’ bankrupt ideology online. 






Figure 69. Screenshot of the narrative disseminated by Sawab Centre. 
 
Figure 70. Screenshot of Sawab Centre’s anti-ISIS narrative. 
 
The centre highlights the role of the internet in radicalising and recruiting children through 
the hashtag, #ISISStealsYourChildhood. The Sawab Centre also runs the #DeludedFollowers 





underlying complexes and issues of vulnerable youth, including loneliness, social isolation, 
bullying and boredom. As stated on the UAE government’s website:101 
 
             Sawab’s messaging will humanize the victims of ISIS attacks through highlighting 
the stories of parents, siblings, children, and other loved ones killed by Daesh [ISIS]. 
The campaign will also offer inspirational and motivational messages directed to at-
risk youth to help them resist the deceptions and false promises of Daesh agents. 
 
5.7.2 United States Department of State’s Team 
    The USDOS team, also known as Global Engagement Centre, was initiated by the US’s 
Department of State to counter extremism messages. This centre was established to replace 
the CSCC. Its mission, as stated on USDOS’s website,102 is to “lead the coordination, 
integration, and synchronisation of government-wide communications activities directed at 
foreign audiences abroad to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international 
terrorist organisations, such as ISIS”. The activity of the USDOS team is only available on 
Twitter and messages are presented in Arabic (see Figure 71). Its clear messaging strategy 
aims to decrease the allure of ISIS and prevent the recruitment of new extremists. 
 








Figure 71. Screenshot of the Arabic USDOS Team Twitter account. 
 
According to the Department of State website, the work of the USDOS team is focused on 
four core areas103: 
● Partnerships—The aim is to build partnerships with NGOs, schools, governments, 
civil society groups and religious leaders. The USDOS team aims to build a strong 
global network of positive messages to counter violent extremism. The USDOS team 
is committed to supporting its partners with essential funding, technical assistance and 
capacity building. 
● Data analytics—The USDOS team uses data analytics systems from both the public 
and private sectors to better understand radicalisation dynamics online, which guides 
and informs their messaging efforts and measures their effectiveness. In addition to 
data analytics systems, the USDOS team has drawn from polling operations, target 
audience studies and academic research. 
● Content—The USDOS team is pursuing collaborative, thematic campaigns in 
coordination with a coalition of nations and global partners to counter ISIS. The 
                                                          





USDOS team also developed and procured unbranded content and make it available 
to their global network of partners. 
● Interagency engagement—The USDOS team liaise daily with the interagency to 
coordinate day-to-day operations and campaign efforts among the many US national 
security agencies that operate in the information space. The USDOS team is staffed 
by detailers from several US agencies, allowing it to effectively coordinate, integrate 
and synchronise efforts across the interagency. 
 
5.7.3 #TruthAboutISIS Hashtag 
 
Figure 72. Screenshot of #TruthAboutISIS hashtag Twitter account. 
 
While ISIS’ propaganda and its online messages focused on daily on-ground triumphs, 
#TruthAboutISIS presented messages to counter ISIS’ narrative. All news broadcasted on its 
website104 and on its Twitter feed exposed the failure of ISIS’ propaganda (see Figure 72). 






When this Twitter feed emerged, The Guardian reporter, Wright (2015), observed that 
#TruthAboutISIS “has for the past few months been turning fire on ISIS using the same 
sophisticated video and social media techniques used by the group itself”. Wright (2015) also 
noted that “the site has no email contact, phone number or address, and is registered 
anonymously using a proxy server based in Dayton, Ohio”. The man behind the 
#TruthAboutISIS was interviewed by Wright (2015) who declared that “he was deliberately 
trying to mimic ISIS’ use of slick video production and social media tactics to engage an 
audience who might be tempted to join the group”. 
 
This demonstrates the success of the strategy of fighting narrative with narrative. Arguably, 
this countermeasure was so effective because the man behind #TruthAboutISIS had studied 
sophisticated production and analysed the thematic narrative of ISIS. As Casebeer and 
Russell (2005) argued, “In practice, effective counter-narrative strategy will require 
understanding the components and content of the story being told so we can predict how they 






5.7.4 UK Against Daesh 
 
Figure 73. Screenshot of ‘UK Against Daesh’ Twitter account. 
 
Similarly, the same counter narrative policy was introduced by many security agencies. The 
UK government have initiated a counternarrative operation, aimed to expose the brutality of 
ISIS. The British Foreign Office created a Twitter account, ‘UK Against Daesh’ (see Figure 
7), which was aimed to restrain ISIS’ recruitment and radicalisation efforts (see Figure 74). 
Initiated in 2014, it was composed of multilingual videos and social media messages 
(Lakomy, 2017, p. 48). 
 





5.8 Phase Three—Hacking and Information Warfare 
    In this chapter, I discussed the US’s strategies for countering the narrative and digital 
logistics of ISIS’ networks. Despite these approaches, ISIS remains active and its flows of 
information seem less interrupted. This is because ISIS has learned how to manoeuvre in the 
information environment and always finds an alternative route to maintain their networking 
structure. 
 
In this section, I analyse the role of hacker activisms (i.e., ‘hacktivism’) and digital 
catallaxies as part of the information warfare against ISIS. This includes the role of 
Anonymous and CTRLSec as collectives, as well as other individual catallaxies, such as Nun 
believer, Daesh eliminator and Noon. However, before examining the role of hacktivism 
within the degrading operation, it is important to define its terminology, understand the 
nature of its existence and analyse the role of hacktivism in similar events in the Arab region. 
 
Hacktivist was a term coined in 1996 by Omega, a member of a group of internet hackers 
who called themselves The Cult of the Dead Cow. Mills (2012) defined hacktivism as “the 
use of legal and/or illegal digital tools in pursuit of political ends”. Hacktivist groups, which 
are leaderless, aim to protect the free flow of information on the internet. Their mission was 
clearly stated on the Anonymous website, “We want transparency and we counter censorship 
… this is why we intend to utilise our resources to raise awareness, attack those against and 
support those who are helping lead our world to freedom and democracy” (Anon’s.org, 
2013). According to Frediani (2013), “Anonymous is a galaxy of individuals who find 
themselves attracted by the same forces […] that are created and undone according to their 





“are not hackers, or terrorists but ordinary citizens who decide to take the virtual streets to 
demonstrate” (Frediani, 2013, p. 386). 
 
Jordan and Taylor (2004), in their book Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels With a Cause? 
have documented the hackers activity and its effect on the 21st century’s movements. They 
suggested, “These hacktivists seek to radicalise hacking’s original obsessions with 
information freedom and access by creating tools that ensure cyberspace remains a place 
where information is freely and securely available” (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, p. 4). Examining 
hacktivism and its involvement in social movements is significant and important. Jordan and 
Taylor (2004) noted, “As a movement it deserves attention because it is situated where it is; 
drawing in powerful alternative visions of society, arming these visions with informational 
tools and injecting itself as a radical virus into twenty-first-century societies” (p. 165). 
 
The digital roots of the Arab Spring uprisings attracted the attention of hacktivist groups. As 
such, they sought to support Arab civil society actors in the information warfare against their 
governments. The significance of hacktivists direct involvement in the events of the Arab 
Spring uprisings was twofold. First, hacktivism dismantled the barrier of information 
production and dissemination by creating more options. Second, hacktivism empowered 
social actors, by shifting the balance of power from governments to activists by enhancing 
the latter’s communication technology usage and by trying to paralyse governmental 
communication facilities (Shehabat, 2015, p. 73). 
 
Digital hacktivists bring together technical experts, and increasingly, activists with the 
common aim of uniting in non-violent—but often illegal—action. As Jordan and Taylor 





of people—in cyberspace. It is a combination of grassroots political protest, with computer 
hacking. Hacktivists operate within the fabric of cyberspace, assessing what is 
technologically possible in virtual lives; they reach out of cyberspace, utilising their virtual 
powers to shape offline life. Social movements and popular protests are integral parts of 21st 
century societies. Hacktivism is activism, influenced by the digital and electronic age (Jordan 
& Taylor, 2004, p. 1). 
 
To this end, to recruit members to join their cause, hacktivist groups created what they call 
‘operations’. The word operation reinforced the idea that they were not engaging in a mere 
protest or anarchy, they are embarking on a mission (Olson, 2013, p. 135). Any Anonymous 
member could create and name operations, simply by accessing the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
Anonymous channel. For example, long before the development of the Arab Spring, 
Anonymous waged Operation USA and Operation Payback. When the events of the Arab 
Spring started to unfold, Anonymous commenced one of its largest operations called 
Operation Egypt (#OpEgypt). Soon after the emergence of ISIS, Anonymous declared 
#OpIceISIS. This operation aimed to destroy ISIS’ propaganda and influence on the internet 
(see Figure 75). 






Figure 75. Screenshot of ‘Operation Ice ISIS’ Twitter account, operated by Anonymous. 
 
Part of the efforts to suppress jihadist propaganda online, the hacktivist group Anonymous 
declared operation ISIS. Griffin (2015) suggested that this operation concentrated its efforts 
on searching and neutralising ISIS’ online content on both social media platforms and 
websites using DDoS attacks. Known as #OpIceISIS, this operation succeeded in paralysing 
hundreds of ISIS-related channels of information dissemination, such as the ‘The Dawn of 
Glad Tidings’ application (#op_ISIS, 2015). This application, according to Berger and 
Morgan (2015), was the official mobile phone application, responsible for disseminating the 
latest news about ISIS’ operations. 
 
To examine the role of hacktivists in attacking digital logistics of ISIS’ networks, I discuss 
the most prominent hacking collectives (e.g., GhostSec and CtrlSec) and individuals (e.g., 
Nun believer, Noon and Daesh eliminator), who voluntarily participated in #OpIceISIS. For 
the purpose of this discussion, primary data was obtained from the hackers themselves, 






GhostSec claimed that they attacked 233 websites, destroyed 85 websites and had 25,000 
Twitter accounts terminated. Jonny Appleweed, an anonymous hacker, devoted his time to 
attack ISIS on Twitter and on other digital platforms. He reported that: 
 
              GhostSec operates like a military unit with members responsible for intelligence 
gathering, organising, logistics and of course, those operating the weapons, digital 
weapons that is. The group uses its skills and advanced tools to remove ISIS sites 
from the web either temporarily or in some cases permanently. (Appleweed, 2015) 
 
Appleweed also explained the hacking techniques used by GhostSec to remove ISIS’ sites, 
including DoS attacks, Domain Name System (DNS) amplification, Structured Query 




    CtrlSec is a collective of hackers, who started to fight terrorist groups from their 
computers. They initiated #OpIceISIS after the Nice attack in August 2014, and subsequently 
aimed to identify and report as many ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts as possible (see Figure 
75). In other words, they are acting as the hammer in the ongoing game of whack-a-mole (see 
Section 5.3.1). According to Cottee (2015), the founder of CtrlSec is called Mikro. Cottee 
(2015) claimed that CtrlSec is closely related to GhostSec; both groups originated from 
Anonymous and thus, they share personnel and resources. 
 
Mikro (as cited in Cottee, 2015) explained the techniques used to trace ISIS’ accounts on 





by one of the group’s 28 operatives, many of whom can read Arabic” (Mikro, as cited in 
Cottee, 2015). 
 
Mikro (as cited in Cottee, 2015) claimed that CtrlSec identifies 200 to 600 pro-ISIS Twitter 
accounts per day. I have monitored the activity of CtrlSec on Twitter; it is obvious that the 
group reported hundreds of suspected ISIS accounts as #targets. However, many of these 
accounts appear to be false flags. That is, several reported accounts are owned by either anti-
ISIS individuals, belong to Arab Twitter activists, or (in some cases) are news agencies, such 
as Al Jazeera. Through personal contact with the group administration on Twitter, I have 
suggested that CtrlSec are targeting random people, especially those who tweet mostly in 
Arabic (see Figure 76). To fight ISIS on Twitter, CtrlSec established a step-by-step tutorial to 
report ISIS’ accounts to Twitter support (see Figure 77). Also, on their webpage they 
encouraged people to take part in war on terrorism (see Figure 78). 
 







Figure 77. Screenshot of CtrlSec’s Twitter account. 
 
Figure 78. Screenshot of CtrlSec website. 
 
CtrlSec’s operation is more advanced than just searching for hashtags and filing reports. 
(Collier, 2015) reported that CtrlSec leader said, “that part of their operation includes 
enlisting native Arabic speakers, who pretend to be ISIS sympathisers, in order for CtrlSec 
operatives to be introduced to more reclusive ISIS members”. When targeting mass 
identification of ISIS’ affiliates, CtrlSec uses the very openness of Twitter—the same 
openness that helped ISIS spread its propaganda—against ISIS To examine the significance 
of reporting ISIS’ Twitter accounts and activity, I will discuss the data produced by CtrlSec 





5.11 Data Analysis of Reported Accounts 
    Primary data were obtained from CtrlSec regarding the number of ISIS’ accounts on 
Twitter that were targeted between February 2014 and September 2016. As shown in Figure 
79, the total number of accounts reported to Twitter was over 25,000. As of March 2015, 
Twitter had suspended approximately 13,700 accounts. However, almost 11,600 reported 
accounts were not suspended. 
 
 
Figure 79. Screenshot of ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts, as reported by CtrlSec in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 80. Screenshot of ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts, as reported by CtrlSec in 2016. 
 
In September 2016 alone, CtrlSec’s total number of reported accounts exceeded 157,000, 
with almost 144,000 accounts suspended. In the previous month (August 2016), there were 
151,000 reported accounts and 138,000 of these accounts were suspended (see Figure 80). 





● ISIS’ resurgence on Twitter is dynamic. 
● ISIS is an agile and resilient network, which maintains its presence on Twitter. 
● The number of ISIS’ accounts appears to be beyond the imagination of platform 
owners, scholars and counterterrorism organisations.  
 
Moreover, CtrlSec traces ISIS’ digital activity on JustPaste.it sharing portal. The data indicate 
(see Figure 81) that from January 2017 until September 2017, there were 7,223 accounts 
targeted. JustPaste.it suspended 4,045 accounts, while 3,176 remained active.  
 
 
Figure 81. Screenshot of number of ISIS-affiliated content on JustPaste.it, reported by CtrlSec in 
2017. 
 
Milton (2016) also observed the effect of the degrading operation on Justpaste.it portals 
between January 2015 and April 2016 (see Figure 82). As shown in Figures 81 and 82, the 






Figure 82. Monthly removal rate of ISIS’ products on JustPaste.it. Source: Milton (2016, p. 24). 
 
Overall, to measure the far-reaching impact of account suspensions on ISIS’ network 
performance is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I have several observations 
regarding ISIS’ digital activity on Twitter, since the degrading operation started in August 
2014: 
● Despite its attempts to maintain its strong presence on Twitter, ISIS’ accounts have 
less followers compared to when ISIS started its Twitter activity in early 2014. 
● ISIS’ communication strategy has changed; their focus has shifted towards 
disseminating propaganda videos. 
● ISIS’ followers appeared to not follow other ISIS members, perhaps to evade 
suspension or identification as a target. 
● ISIS continues to link its information on Twitter to other digital platforms. 
● ISIS minimised use of #IslamicState, #Khilafah and #baqyia to evade suspensions. 







    This chapter examined the degrading operation on ISIS’ digital activity across digital 
media platforms. This chapter explored three countermeasures initiated by ISIS’ adversaries 
to paralyse ISIS’ IO over digital media platforms. These countermeasures involved degrading 
and destroying, countering ISIS’ propaganda, and hacking and information warfare. 
 
According to data obtained from the hackers running #OpIceISIS, it appears that 
decentralised networks have performed robustly, compared to the countermeasures taken by 
government security agencies. This chapter has shown that Twitter—ISIS’ main hub—
remains unable to cope with the resurgence of ISIS’ accounts. Further, Twitter is unable to 
control ISIS’ propaganda, because of the group’s use of trending hashtags. As Winter (2015a) 
argued: 
 
             No group does this more effectively than Islamic State [ISIS], the supporters of which have 
proved to be both resilient and quick to adapt to all counter-measures to date. Indeed, over the 
past year, despite the formidable obstacles that Twitter’s administrators now present them 
with, Islamic State’s propaganda productivity and rate of dissemination has continued to 
accelerate. (pp. 10–11) 
 
While anti-ISIS powers worked hard to degrade its digital capabilities, ISIS managed to 
evade and minimise the effect account suspensions by harnessing anonymous sharing portals 
and encryption communication applications. In Chapter 6, I will examine the role of 







6 Chapter 6: ISIS’ Information Feedback Loop 
6.1 Introduction 
    In chapter 5, I discussed the strategy of ISIS adversaries to thwart information loop of ISIS 
networks by attacking its digital media logistics. The purpose of this chapter is to map of the 
media strategy of ISIS and to understand how they manoeuvred in information environments 
to maintain their networking structure and sustain flows of information. This manoeuvring 
sustained ISIS’ information flows and led to the accomplishment of its IO, by using micro 
platforms as the basis for auxiliary media logistics. This strategy was employed intensively 
after ISIS’ activity diminished on Twitter. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to propose an examination of ISIS’ use of these portals as a 
response to the countermeasures against its online propaganda operations. This chapter 
suggests that anonymous sharing portals (e.g., sendvid.com, JustPaste.it and dump.to) and 
encryption communication channels (e.g., Telegram) have been instrumental in allowing 
jihadi groups to generate content, disseminate propaganda and communicate freely. These 
networks diminished the effects of the broad jihadi propaganda filtering efforts of popular 
SMNs. Crucially, while much of the literature’s attention has been concentrated on analysing 
the role of encrypted communication channels (such as Telegram), little attention has been 
paid to anonymous sharing portals that acted as black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda. 
Telegram played a critical role in recruitment and maintained a secure medium of 
communication. As such, the focus of this case study is on Telegram’s role in recruitment and 
as a catalyst for jihadis to initiate attacks in the West. 
 
That said, the rise of distributed communication networks has offered new possibilities for 





to utilise digital media communication technologies to disseminate globally its propaganda 
content and foster communication between its members. In particular, images and video 
footage aimed to generate fear have been successfully broadcasted globally by the ISIS 
propaganda network. Noticing a correlation between the growing spread of ISIS’ propaganda 
videos on social media platforms, anonymous sharing portals, encrypted applications and the 
rise of terrorist activity in the Middle East and Europe, the US government established 
countermeasures in 2015, which were aimed to degrade and hinder the spread of ISIS’ 
propaganda online. These efforts included the deletion of ISIS’ online content and suspension 
of social media accounts, as well as hacker attacks against the websites used by ISIS 
affiliates. These countermeasures were largely successful in suppressing ISIS’ propaganda 
across popular social media platforms (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5).  
 
In a clear effort to adapt to these countermeasures and sustain its information flows, ISIS 
moved the core of its propaganda network to other online platforms, substituting anonymous 
sharing portals for the popular sites they had previously dominated, such as Twitter and 
YouTube. These new online platforms were primarily encrypted communication channels 
such as Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp, as well as anonymous sharing portals, such as 
JustPaste.it, sendvid.com and dump.to. Shehabat and Mitew (2018) referred to them as 
‘anonymous’, because they protected the anonymity of their users and were, at the time, little 
known to the wider internet audience. It is important to emphasise that ISIS used these 
channels even before the network degrading countermeasures began. However, prior to the 
degrading countermeasures, these online platforms arguably played an auxiliary role in the 






These digital platforms have helped ISIS in building of an actor-networks. In other words, 
these digital platforms enable associations, connections and links between as many as 
heterogeneous elements as possible regardless they are human or non-human, individuals or 
collectives’ subjects or objects (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 114).  
 
This chapter is divided into two case studies. The first examines the role of anonymous 
sharing portals and their role in maintaining ISIS’ networking structure and sustaining its 
flows of information during the degrading operation. These portals will be analysed through 
an ANT concept of black box. ANT recognises the complexity of ISIS’ network assemblage 
and provides a means with which to conceptualise the role of anonymous sharing platforms in 
ISIS’ propaganda networks. The second case study explores the role of the encrypted 
application, Telegram, in its significance in catalysing lone wolf attacks in the West. This 
case study was derived from socio-sphere perspective, which Shehabat, Mitew, and Alzoubi 
(2017) called the ‘emergence of terror socio-sphere. These case studies acknowledge the 
paradigm shift that occurred in ISIS’ communication strategy. Early versions of these two 
case studies were published as journal articles.105 
6.2 Case Study One: Black-Boxing the Black Flag—Anonymous Sharing Platforms 
and ISIS’ Content Distribution Tactics 
    Due to their unique characteristics, anonymous sharing platforms play an important role in 
ISIS’ online strategy and thus, demand a specific framework of analysis. The ease of sharing 
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content and the anonymity of the users create a dynamic whereby platforms act as automated 
message amplifiers, playing the role of black boxes in the wider information network. 
Virtually all users on these platforms fall in one of three—often overlapping—roles: they 
either dynamically produce and aggregate content, act as intermediaries retranslating and 
curating content across multiple platforms, or passively consume the information flowing 
across the network. In other words, the content flowing through these platforms is highly 
dynamic and visual, lending itself to visual data gathering and ethnographic observation. As 
Moore (2014) argued, screenshots are a useful research method in this context because: 
 
             as digital tools, they diminish permanence in exchange for malleability and 
performativity. As media objects, they can be dynamically traced across the networks 
of their dissemination and require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural production 
that considers texts independently of experience. (Moore, 2014, p. 141) 
 
In this case study, I first examine the broad online effects of the countermeasures aimed at the 
ISIS propaganda network. Second, using the notion of a black box drawn from ANT, I 
examine the relationship between ISIS jihadi and the emergence of anonymous sharing 
platforms. Finally, I examine three anonymous sharing portals to understand how they could 
have contributed to ISIS’ IO.  
6.3 The Rise of ISIS on Information Environments 
    Since its emergence in 2013, ISIS quickly gained notoriety as a terror network, arguably 
due to the savagery it demonstrated against its enemies and people under its control. 
Concurrently, ISIS appeared to quickly recognise the importance of digital communication 
tools in its self-proclaimed goal to establish a global caliphate. Images of savagery were 





enemies and lead to further gains on the ground in both Syria and Iraq. Twitter, YouTube and 
JustPaste.it were extensively utilised by ISIS to conduct its IOs: producing and disseminating 
propaganda videos for potential recruits and spreading its radical views among Muslim youth 
globally (see section 4.2). 
 
The role of social media platforms in aiding terror organisations has been examined 
extensively by scholars, journalists and think tanks. For example, in Populism, Extremism 
and Media: Mapping an Uncertain Terrain, Alvares and Dahlgren (2016) highlighted the 
role played by web 2.0 platforms in the pervasiveness of the terror narrative, as these 
platforms created space for uncensored violent content. Alvares and Dahlgren (2016) argued 
that file sharing portals, videos and personal spaces, targeted different audiences namely, 
supporters, public opinion and enemies. 
 
Before Alvares and Dahlgren (2016), in Tweeting the Jihad, Jytte Klausen (2015) claimed 
that the “jihadist insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media apps and file-
sharing platforms, most prominently Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Pal Talk, kik, 
viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr” (p. 1), while Twitter was the preferred domain of 
communication. Klausen’s (2015) article aims to address to what extent access and content to 
SMNs was controlled, and how the web 2.0 media environment altered not only the 
theatricality of violent incidents but also, more broadly, how media usage has affected terror 
organisations. To do so, Klausen (2015) collected information retrieved from 59 Western-
origin fighters from the most notorious ISIS Twitter accounts known in Syria. She found out 
that “stream of self-publication using social media is, in fact, controlled communications” 
(Klausen, 2015). Terrorist-controlled social media now drives the ‘slow media’ coverage, 





vulnerable to misinformation campaigns and tactics of deception and misinformation. This is 
because social media easily amplifies false images of strength (Klausen, 2015, p. 20). 
 
However, the social media activities of ISIS were monitored closely by the US and 
proprietors of social media platforms (Kimery, 2015), and were met by a series of 
countermeasures intended to degrade ISIS’ online presence (Higham, 2015). As stated in 
Chapter 5, the efforts—by the US and other anti-ISIS powers—to deploy countermeasures 
against ISIS’ online offensive have taken the form of three distinct phases of development. 
 
Phase one involved degrading and destroying (see section 5.3). The US government 
requested Twitter and Google to delete ISIS’ active accounts on their platforms (Arthur, 
2014). This measure resulted in deleting thousands of accounts and messages, in effect 
leading to global cyberwar against ISIS’ affiliates. 
 
Phase two involved countering ISIS’ propaganda (see section 5.6). To compete with ISIS 
propaganda online, the US government and ISIS’ adversaries directed the efforts of the 
CSCC, USDOS team, Sawab Centre and UK Against Daesh (see Section 5.8).  
 
Phase three involved hacking and information warfare (see section 5.8). Part of the less overt 
efforts at suppressing jihadist propaganda online, the hacktivist group Anonymous declared 
#Operation ISIS. Anonymous and other hacktivist groups claimed to take down and deface 
hundreds of ISIS’ Facebook pages and websites (see Section 5.10).  
 
The online war against ISIS has reached a point whereby the US coalition forces, 





information dissemination capabilities across popular SMNs. The countermeasures against 
ISIS’ propaganda on popular social media platforms encouraged ISIS to shift the emphasis of 
its IO to anonymous digital portals and encrypted communication channels, such as 
JustPaste.it, sendvid.com, dump.to, SHAREit, Wood Vid and archive.org, as well as 
Telegram, WordPress, Pinterest and Tumblr.  
 
That being said, it is important to note that anonymous sharing portals (such as Telegram, 
JustPaste.it, sendvid.com and dump.to) were already used by ISIS as auxiliary 
communication channels prior to the degrading operation. However, for the purpose of this 
case study, I aim to demonstrate that coordinated filtering across popular social media forced 
ISIS to switch its primary IOs to these platforms and leverage them as communication black 
boxes, which allowed ISIS to circumvent the primary vector of the campaign against its 
operations. 
 
This case study focuses on the lesser known anonymous sharing platforms (i.e., JustPaste.it, 
sendvid.com and dump.to), which were used by ISIS to further its IOs and communication 
objectives. 
 
6.4 Degrading ISIS’ Online Activities 
    Popular social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are using their 
TOS to exercise control over the type of information produced and disseminated through 
their networks. For example, YouTube’s TOS state in relation to hateful, violent and graphic 
content that, “it’s not okay to post violent or gory content that’s primarily intended to be 





should be balanced with additional context and information”.106 Silverman (2014) observed 
that YouTube acts robustly when dealing with terror content. Under YouTube’s TOS, the 
platform reserves the right to remove content and, in some instances, suspend accounts. 
According to a YouTube spokesperson: 
 
            YouTube has clear policies prohibiting content intended to incite violence, and we 
remove videos violating these policies when flagged by our users. We also terminate 
any account registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation 
and used in an official capacity to further its interests. 
 
Berger and Strathearn (2013) indicated that when it comes to freedom of speech, social media 
platforms are biased. They suggested that these platforms should make it clear that freedom 
of speech is limited when it comes to using their service (p.41). In a similar vein, Twitter 
governs what is posted against its TOS policies (see section 5.5). With rising international 
pressure on these social network platforms, particularly from the US government over ISIS’ 
online materials, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have acted swiftly and imposed harsh 
policies in which the gruesome content generated by ISIS is targeted. Twitter, for instance, 
waged a Twitter war against pro-ISIS accounts and managed to suspend many thousands of 
accounts, which resulted in a significant degradation of ISIS’ Twitter presence. 
 
 It also appeared that the broad countermeasures aimed at degrading ISIS’ propaganda was 
successful, at least in part because of wide Twitter account suspensions. Berger and Morgan 
(2015) argued that the mass account suspension strategy—known as Whack-a-Mole (see 
Section 5.3.1)—was highly successful as a network degrading tool (see Figure 83). ISIS 
                                                          





found it challenging to keep up with replacing suspended accounts without suffering any 
negative consequences. 
 
Figure 83. A tweet posted by Jim Berger on 20 September 2014. 
 
In other words, Berger and Morgan’s (2015) study offered conclusive evidence that when 
account suspensions are carried out on a consistent basis across a range of platforms, they 
have an adverse effect on the targeted network. While Twitter has been largely successful in 
suppressing ISIS propaganda, Silverman (2014) suggested that hosting extreme content posed 
long-term challenges for all social media platforms, and that YouTube and Facebook in 
particular must keep updating their tools to dynamically trace and report graphic materials 
disseminated by potential terrorists. In this respect, proactive monitoring of platforms and 
targeted account removals have noticeably harmed ISIS’ content distribution and propaganda 
tactics on social media. 
 
Interestingly, and in an apparent effort to resist such persistent network degrading operations, 
ISIS has tried to recruit personnel tasked with mitigating the effects of network attacks and 
sustaining their IO. As Atwan (2015) observed: 
 
             Most of Islamic state [ISIS] commanders and recruits are tech-savvy; coding (writing 





tongue. Most of the digital caliphate business is conducted online, from recruitment 
to propaganda to battlefield strategy and instructions. 
 
ISIS members and sympathisers have specifically targeted unpoliced, anonymous and safe 
sharing platforms, which allow the anonymous dissemination of uncensored content. Often, 
such platforms are also relatively obscure and unknown to the wider public—a factor 
contributing to their anonymity. 
 
Ironically, and in a development reminiscent of the NCW theories of John Boyd, the overall 
success of the strategy of degrading any overt social media presence by ISIS appears to have 
led to the rapid changing of media dissemination tactics by ISIS, and the fast adoption of 
anonymous alternatives. Specifically, it appears that the ISIS switch to anonymous and 
obscure alternatives to popular social media platforms was made possible through the 
adoption of storage and sharing portals, such as JustPaste.it, dump.to, sendvid.com, 
archive.org, dailymotion.com and liveleak.com. As Boyd (as cited in Brehmer, 2005) 
famously argued: 
 
             Generating a rapidly changing environment—that is, engaging in an activity that is so 
quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy—inhibits 
the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes 
an adversary to overreact or underreact ... [T]he message is that whoever can handle 
the quickest rate of change is the one who survives. (Brehmer, 2005, p. 10) 
      
Boyd (1976) famously suggested that to win in an environment of high information density, 
one has to manoeuvre at speed and therefore, operate inside the OODA loop of one’s 





enabled ISIS to mass-disseminate propaganda while avoiding suppressive actions. This is an 
information equivalent of manoeuvring at speed and has provided a way for ISIS to operate 
inside the OODA loop of its adversaries. Further, as Shehabat and Mitew (2017) have argued, 
ISIS has successfully trialled stigmergic swarming operations, in which they harnessed 
multiple anonymous platforms to maintain their network structure. 
 
In section 6.1.3, I focus on three case studies of anonymous online portals to illustrate their 
use by ISIS in establishing new channels of content dissemination and communication. 
Further, I examine how these portals allowed ISIS to maintain an operational network 
structure. 
 
6.5 Anonymous Platforms as Black Boxes 
    As discussed in Section 4.12, to understand how ISIS has managed to route around 
extensive account suspension operations waged against it on popular social media platforms, 
it is necessary to examine the role of anonymous sharing platforms, by using a conceptual 
toolkit informed by ANT (Latour, 2005). From an ANT perspective, networks are populated 
by entities conceptualised as actants, because they simultaneously act and are acted upon. 
Actants, whether human or non-human, always have agency, which here stands for the ability 
to force change or a detour in the interactions between networks (Latour, 2005, p. 7). Agency, 
and action in turn, are always already the property of associations of human and non-human 
elements. Accordingly, one of the main strengths of ANT is that it allows the tracing of actors 
in a network, based on their actual role in the flow of agency (Law, 1999, p. 3). 
 
When examining the role played by an anonymous sharing platform within the wider ISIS 





nodes in the network. The ANT perspective focuses on entities actively performing within a 
network. Therefore, anonymous sharing platforms immediately stand out, because they act as 
accelerators of information flows, while making it harder to trace the logistics of how these 
flows are performed. In effect, they black-box certain elements of the network. In this 
context, the black box is a conceptual metaphor developed in ANT to describe network 
assemblages that function so well that their internal logistics are “opaque from the outside” 
(Callon, 1986, p. 31). Black boxes are created through what ANT terms as “acts of 
translation”, in which actors are first enrolled in the network and then work to stabilise it 
from the inside, which creates the appearance of a monolithic assemblage (Besel, 2011). 
From the perspective of these case studies, the black box concept helps to understand how 
ISIS maintained its networking structure by adaptively shifting operations to lesser known 
online sharing portals. 
 
Opening a black box allows examination of the ways in which “a variety of social aspects and 
technical elements are associated and come together as a durable whole” (Cressman, 2009, p. 
6). The notion of opening and examining a black box is possible, because when focusing on a 
black-boxed entity, which is seemingly homogenous from the outside, ANT sees “processes, 
performances, socio-technical rituals, and enactments […] driven by the dynamics of making 
connections, of binding things together, of extending associations, of “translating” and 
“enrolling” actors into networks” (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 9). The same could be said for 
the role of online sharing portals, mobile phone applications and other technical assemblages 
enrolled in the networks of ISIS’ affiliates.  
 
When analysing the case studies in section (6.2.4), it appears that ISIS is leveraging the 





enlist new actants, which in turn facilitates the emergence of new networks. Crucially, the 
relative opacity of lesser known cloud portals, such as JustPaste.it and sendvid.com, coupled 
with the migration of already established distributed networks of ISIS affiliates, who are 
drawn to these anonymous platforms by their appealing TOS, creates a black-boxing 
dynamic. Ironically, the operations degrading ISIS’ overt digital capabilities on popular 
social media sites have resulted in the migration and development of this dynamic. That is, 
ISIS’ networks seem to have reacted to the degradation of their capabilities on popular SMNs 
and rapidly migrated to new anonymous portals. As Stern and Modi (2010) pointed out, 
“Terrorists respond to changes in their environments by changing their mission and changing 
their shape. What is important in such events is that information logistics is essential in 
disseminating messages of terror” (Stern & Modi, 2010, p. 282). 
 
6.6 ISIS’ Black Boxes 
6.6.1 JustPaste.it 
    JustPaste.it is a free content sharing portal, which provides document storage and file 
sharing services under the motto of “sharing text and images the easy way”. The site is hosted 
by Cloudflare and owned by Polish entrepreneur Mariusz Zurawek (as cited in Fishwick, 
2015), who described JustPaste.it as a platform in which ‘you are able to do what you want 
with almost two clicks. It doesn’t require registration, it isn’t searchable and access to 
specific content is only available via a link or if it makes the “most popular” page’. However, 
early in 2014, ISIS harnessed this service to disseminate its online videos, brutal images of 
beheadings, texts that aimed to spread its radical ideology and most importantly, the 
controversial digital edition of ISIS’ online magazine, Dabiq. Since its emergence in July 
2014, Dabiq was hosted by JustPaste.it and archive.org. The English language magazine 







Figure 84. Cover of Dabiq magazine, issue hosted by JustPaste.it. Note: Full URL is obfuscated. 
 




Figure 86. Tweet with material advertising migration to ISIS-held territory posted on JustPaste.it. 






JustPaste.it not only allows ISIS to host the magazine, but also offers a free folder share 
option, through which ISIS’ networked affiliates can share, store and disseminate information 
to global audiences. The platform offers advanced features, such as pasting text directly from 
a word processor or a web page, formatting and exporting to PDF, automatic importing of 
images, secure content publishing, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connection and password-
protected access. To protect the contents of text notes from web crawlers, the site allows the 
use of encrypted tags. Indeed, one of the most valuable options JustPaste.it offers is password 
protection for disseminated content, which makes it a uniquely secure environment for 
exchanging messages or files. 
 
Describing the site’s appeal to users, Fishwick (2015) also pointed out the easy-to-use 
template that functions effectively even on slow internet connections. JustPaste.it also has a 
mobile phone application, with no interruptions from pop-ups or other advertising 
materials.107 Leveraging these features, ISIS’ members and affiliates have utilised JustPaste.it 
to send encrypted messages, upload videos and files (such as jihadi materials, books and 
instructions), share information and upload online magazines. Links to the content uploaded 
on the site have been shared via Twitter, Facebook, Telegram and other social media 
platforms to increase participation for potential recruits, propaganda and other logistical 
support. Overall, JustPaste.it appears to have proved helpful to ISIS affiliates, as folders and 
files can be widely shared by only copying a hybrid link, allowing the file to be printed or 
read online. 
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Arguably, the pervasiveness of ISIS’ Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines is indebted to the 
existence of this sharing portal. Interestingly, files uploaded to JustPaste.it can be deleted 
under the TOS agreement, according to JustPaste.it TOS: 
● Any material posted anonymously will be deleted after five days. 
● Any content that may spread hate or cause harm will be removed instantly. 
 
Fishwick (2015) emphasised how the anonymity of JustPaste.it served ISIS, noting that “it’s 
role in Islamic state’s [ISIS’] propaganda machine has largely gone unnoticed”. All the 
images uploaded to the service by ISIS members have details of a related Twitter account 
stamped on them. The user’s Twitter handle is also printed at the bottom of each image, so 
reporters have been crediting the images to Twitter. The use of JustPaste.it by ISIS’ members 
has brought international attention to the site, with the site’s traffic approaching 10,000,000-
page views per month (see Figure 87). 
 






According to Google Analytics (2015) “The platform has about 2.5 million unique users a 
month, which works out at about 10 million views every month”. Zurawek, the site’s founder, 
started seeing what he called “a large growth” of traffic to his website from Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Syria. The site makes it easy to publish text, photos or PDFs. At the beginning of 
2014, rebels and civilians in Syria discovered JustPaste.it and began using it to post news. 
However, at some point over the summer of 2014, Silverman (2014) noted that “jihadists 
discovered it as well, and the site soon became one of the favoured tools of the Islamic State 
[ISIS] for sharing news, official communiques, and graphic propaganda”. As stated by its 
founder (cited in Fishwick, 2015), the site: “does not compete with advanced online text 
editors, such as Google Docs or Microsoft Office 365, but rather creates a place that is 
extremely easy and simple to use. It’s similar to Pastebin, the service popular with hackers, 
but with image files too”. 
 
 As the activity of ISIS on JustPaste.it drew the attention of authorities in the UK, the police 
requested that the site delete ISIS’ content, including all videos showing graphic executions 
at the hands of ISIS, as well as all pro-ISIS propaganda. In combating ISIS’ use of his 
service, Zurawek (cited in Fishwick, 2015) commented: “It’s not my choice that ISIS has 
selected my site … As long as I’m cooperating with the police, removing content, and not 
allowing ISIS to make propaganda, I think it’s good for the site that many people will know 
about it”. 
 
The architecture of JustPaste.it, coupled with the possibility of using Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) and The Onion Routers (TOR) to obfuscate IP addresses, makes it hard to 
ban specific users. Nevertheless, the site appears to have made an effort to police the content 





Abu Talout Al-Khurasani—messaged Zurawek to condemn the site’s efforts to police 
uploaded content. This demonstrates how significant the platform is to ISIS in maintaining its 
communication and dissemination structure. In the letter (see Figure 88), the author claims 




Figure 88. A copy of the letter sent by Abu Talout Al-Khurasani to Zurawek. Source: JustPaste.it. 
 
6.6.2 Sendvid.com 
    Sendvid is an instant video upload portal, used by ISIS to route around wide account 
suspension and content deletion on YouTube and DailyMotion. Specifically, ISIS media 
production outlets such as Al-Hayat, Al-Furqan, and Al-Itisam extensively used the video 
uploading portal in their propaganda dissemination. HD quality videos, such as Flames of 
War, Message Covered With Blood, and Healing of the Believers’ Chests were first uploaded 
to Sendvid and then popularised virally through Twitter networks. A simple search for 
Sendvid on Twitter returns mostly links to ISIS propaganda videos. Sendvid is a crucial 





other social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, archive.org, Tumblr, Telegram, dump.to 
and email, or can be stored in users Google Drive or Dropbox for future retrieval.  
 
Sendvid has been used by ISIS affiliates from early 2015 to widely copy and aggregate 
propaganda materials and thus, build publicly available collections of terrorist-related 
content. As Mahzam (2015) pointed out: 
 
            The electronic digitisation of the extremist identity of ISIS has been made effective 
through its frequent injection of videos, incessant release of periodicals and 
downloading of visual reports in multiple languages, eventually building up a digital 
compendium that will remain accessible for future generations for reference. 
 
Further, unlike YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, wherein administrators are alerted to 
remove both jihadi content and the associated accounts, Sendvid is a safely unpoliced 
archiving platform, in which data can be uploaded anonymously, even under false Facebook, 
Twitter or Google accounts. 
 
The following appears to be the standard reply to enquiries regarding jihadi content by the 
Sendvid support team: 
 
             Thank you for contacting us regarding this matter. As a service provider, we try to 
promote freedom of speech and remain as neutral as possible to all groups regardless 
of their views. With that being said, we do work with several foreign and domestic 
agencies in removing videos that we deem to be in violation of our Terms of Service. 
If you encounter any videos that violate our TOS, we encourage you to report them to 






In theory, all online sharing portals have the same TOS in regard to removing videos or 
documents promoting violence. Sendvid’s TOS are quite clear that the service does not allow 
“adult, obscene, illegal or objectionable content’ and that ‘accounts and content that violate 
this will be removed without warning”. However, in practice, Sendvid host these videos 
unless explicitly notified of breach of the TOS. Most of the gruesome videos uploaded by 
ISIS are in fact still available on the Sendvid service and are freely shared on Twitter (see 
Figures 89 and 90). Interestingly, Sendvid recently has become a preferred site for 
pornographic materials, which appears to have caused ISIS affiliates to reduce their presence, 
as this contradicts with Islamic sharia values. 
 
 








Figure 90. Sendvid links to ISIS content, titled Message to the Tyrants of Jordan. 
 
6.6.3 Dump.to 
    Dump.to is an online sharing platform with no requirements for login credentials,108 using 
archive.is as a web carrier. The sharing portal also has no clear TOS policies that govern the 
dissemination of its content. The importance of this service in the context of ISIS is that it 
allows users to share, upload and converge links from similar sharing sites such as 
JustPaste.it and sendvid.com; all types of data can be stored and shared via link to ISIS’ 
affiliate networks. Dump.to allows documents, video, voice messages and music to be stored 
and shared, which in turn allows ISIS’ affiliates to aggregate, edit, curate, reclassify and 
republish jihadi propaganda content. In addition, content shared on the site can be protected 
by password, commented on and edited anonymously or by using a pseudonym. Most 
importantly, the lack of policing and governance makes dump.to a vital medium for 
information sharing among jihadi, who can communicate in the open through encrypted 
messages posted directly through the site’s interface. 
                                                          






The site hosts most of ISIS’ online video propaganda content, as well as jihadi music (e.g., 
Nasheeds), Dabiq magazine links, and extremist jihadi books. For example, most of ISIS’ 
controversial books such as Hijra to the Islamic State (which translates as ‘migrating to ISIS 
land’) and How to Survive in the West were available to download for free, arguably helping 
ISIS recruit Western affiliates and encouraging migration to ISIS-controlled territories (see 
Figures 91–96). 
 
Figure 91. Screenshot of iBRABO Twitter account, highlighting the use of dump.to by ISIS. 
 
 











Figure 94: Some significant dumps by Al-Hayat Media Centre (e.g., news reports, breaking news). 
 
Dump.to considers itself a free and anonymous publishing platform that never takes 
responsibility for content being published. Typical of similar sharing portals, Dump.to’s TOS 





violent threats, spam campaigns, private and confidential information, or invasion of 
privacy.109 
6.7 Discussion 
    As their presence started to fade on Twitter and YouTube—as a result of the globally 
coordinated filtering campaign—ISIS decided to move the primary hub of their IOs to 
anonymous sharing portals such as Telegram, JustPaste.it, sendvid.com and dump.to. This 
was a strategic decision, to transition these sites from being used as auxiliary platforms to 
ISIS’ primary communication and dissemination channels within ISIS’ strategy. The 
characteristics and typology of these anonymous sharing portals—including ready templates, 
easy video uploads and mobile phone supported applications—created ‘participatory media’ 
(Jenkins, 2006) environments wherein information could be accessed across multiple SMNs. 
In other words, these digital platforms worked as information feedback loop to sustain 
information flows across multiple digital media environments include SMN’s. the dynamic of 
anonymous digital media portals that include aggregation and dissemination of videos, 
images, hyperlinks, documents and connectivity across other information environments 
created actor network that leveraged ISIS networks. That is, for ANT Anonymous sharing 
portals are actor networks that make a difference in the behaviour of human users. 
                                                          
109 An enquiry about ISIS’ use of dump.to services leads to the following standard reply from the 
company: 
Dear visitor,  
We are sorry that you have found improper content in our network. Please note that in order to process 
your abuse report and protect our users’ privacy and integrity, we request that you provide a photo ID 
(ID/Driving License/Passport/...) within 24 hours by replying to this email. 







However, to understand dissemination dynamics and its connectivity across other information 
environments, it is estimated that JustPaste.it, sendvid.com and dump.to portals have 
contributed approximately 20 percent of the information disseminated by ISIS to Twitter 
alone (see Figure 97).  
 
Figure 97. Detrimental use of social media by ISIS: an information warfare perspective. Source: 
Joseph Shasheen (2015), ‘Detrimental Use of Social Media and the Case of Daesh: An Information 
Warfare Perspective’, Riga Strategic Communication Dialogue: Perception Matt. 
 
To an extent, these new sharing portals empowered ISIS’ message, by enhancing connectivity 
in the network and by adding more actors to its structure. From an ANT perspective, these 
new sharing portals served as information intermediaries, allowing for fluid and anonymous 
information aggregation, curation and dispersal. Publicly available, with the anonymity of no 
login required, allowed links and content to be aggregated and mass-distributed continuously 
and with variable dynamic intensity based on ad hoc requirements. 
 
These platforms allowed ISIS to maintain its flow of information, enlist new actors and 





jihadi around the world. Further, as suggested in section 6.2, anonymous sharing platforms 
had a key role in the ongoing information warfare waged by ISIS. By using anonymous 
sharing platforms as black boxes in its information network, ISIS routed around social media 
account suspensions and leveraged new platforms as strategic information weapons to serve 
its IO objectives. 
 
Importantly, as Krieger and Belliger (2014) pointed out, enhancing connectivity across the 
network generates information flows that are “increasingly difficult to control and steer” 
(p.143). It can be argued that anonymous sharing portals such as sendvid.com, JustPaste.it 
and dump.to “consist[ed] neither of objects nor subjects, but actors and mediators” (Krieger 
& Belliger, 2014, p. 187), which enabled the black-boxing of media hubs in ISIS’ IO 
strategy. 
 
By examining the TOS policies of SMNs and anonymous sharing portals in relation to ISIS’ 
use of their services, it was identified that the financial capabilities and reputation of Twitter, 
Facebook and Google motivated them to take immediate actions against jihadi content. 
Meanwhile, the three anonymous sharing portals examined have the overriding aim of 
expanding their user base and seem to have extremely limited resources to track content 
disseminated by ISIS or other extremist networks who seek an easy, secure and fast medium 
of communication. The lack of resources makes the policing and active removal of ISIS’ 
content prohibitively expensive to the proprietors of these platforms. 
 
Moreover, as already mentioned, the coordinated campaign to police Twitter and YouTube 
for jihadist content has forced ISIS to shift its focus towards using anonymous sharing portals 





anonymous functionality of these portals acts as a black box, obfuscating the logistics of 
ISIS’ global propaganda network. When coupled with the ability to create hybrid web links 
and PDF files, which then can be disseminated across most social media, these platforms 
enable the rapid redistribution of content, even under conditions of severe policing and 
filtering. Even though anonymous sharing portals seem to have intensified their efforts to 
remove ISIS-related content, this does not solve the underlying problem. ISIS’ affiliates can 
still use these services for the aggregation of content advertised on other anonymous social 
media platforms, such as Telegram. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
    This chapter examined the role of anonymous sharing portals in relation to the 
dissemination of ISIS’ propaganda and network communication in the aftermath of the global 
degrading operation, orchestrated by the most popular social media platforms. The aim was 
to highlight the significance of anonymous sharing portals in terms of ISIS’ propaganda 
campaign. The main argument in this chapter is that anonymous sharing portals acted as 
black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda content, helping terror networks to sustain high-
intensity information flows and maintain global communication channels. The emergence of 
these portals has fundamentally changed the way ISIS distributes its propaganda globally; 
these platforms allow terror networks safe aggregation and the ability to disseminate content 
links rapidly across popular social media without suffering from efforts to degrade the 
network. This in turn has enabled terror networks to maintain global IOs, even in the face of 
coordinated efforts at policing and filtering110. 
                                                          
110 Internal challenges and dilemmas that social media platforms experienced is internal issues of policies 





6.9 Case Study Two: Encrypted Jihad—Investigating the Role of Telegram 
Application in Lone Wolf Attacks in the West 
6.10 Introduction 
    Between February 2015 and August 2016, Europe was subjected to a series of attacks by 
individual lone wolf terrorists111, pledging their allegiance to ISIS. Nice, Brussels and 
Cologne suffered over 400 casualties caused by lone wolf attacks. According to the Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI, 2016), the phenomenon of lone wolf attacks in Europe and North 
America intensified after the rise of ISIS. Calls for individuals to carry out lone wolf attacks 
were spread online through a sophisticated IOs strategy adopted by ISIS, with the self-
professed goal of striking back at coalition forces. Communication technologies—such as 
social media platforms (e.g., Facebook), anonymous sharing portals (e.g., JustPaste.it), cloud 
computing (e.g., Google Drive) and encrypted communication applications (e.g., 
Telegram)—were the backbone of ISIS’ modus operandi. Importantly, the use of mobile end-
to-end encrypted applications such as WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram contributed to the 
emergence of a new paradigm of terror communication—an online terror-sphere. As Hughes 
and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2017) argued: 
 
                                                          
regular basis, according to developments and occurrences in their platforms. However, I have highlighted 
some of these issues, but to examine internal dilemma’s is way beyond the scope and limits of this thesis.   
111 The term lone-wolf is widely used by ISIS propaganda outlets to encourage attacks against western  
targets. For that purpose, I have used the same term used by ISIS not lone actors.  Lone-actors is more 
convincingly within this context, but other scholars and academic, such as Wiemann (2015, 2013), have 










             The emergence of applications such as Telegram, SureSpot, Kik, and—since its 
recent offering of end-to-end encryption—WhatsApp has been a particular game 
changer for the Islamic State [ISIS] and its efforts in the West. The wide adoption of 
newly introduced ‘end-end’ encryption communication technologies have allowed 
ISIS, as well as other groups, to establish and successfully leverage a secure medium 
of communication (p.1). 
 
In particular, Telegram—largely due to its native support of encrypted one-to-one and one-to-
many communication—has been widely adopted by ISIS and its affiliates globally. This case 
study aims to examine the role played by Telegram in ISIS’ strategy of encouraging lone 
wolf attacks to target Western countries. Launched in 2013 by the Durov brothers, the 
developers behind the Russian social network VKontakte, Telegram has arguably popularised 
the use of end-to-end encryption in social media messengers. In 2015, the Telegram platform 
introduced public channels, which enabled one-to-many communication alongside its core 
one-to-one functionality. Telegram channels enabled ISIS members and affiliates to establish 
their own media platforms with numerous followers. They were able to receive one-to-many 
messages, while also communicating individually across encrypted connections. ISIS 
members and affiliates created hundreds of channels, using the Telegram service to generate 
content, personalise encrypted one-to-one communications and therefore, control the logistics 
of dissemination of sensitive information and propaganda. Information broadcasted over 
Telegram channels can be instantly shared across multiple digital platforms and vice versa.  
 
The significance of ISIS’ use of the platform lies in the ability to establish multipurpose 
channels, which strengthen ISIS’ propaganda machine. Crucially, this allows for ISIS 
affiliates, only latently connected to the central hub of the organisation, to receive and share a 





channels with each other. Such channels act as systems of coordination, message 
reinforcement and activity planning. 
 
The objective of this case study is to conceptualise the relationship between the emergence of 
Telegram as an information logistics tool of ISIS and identify its role in the surge of lone 
wolf attacks in the West. The case study focuses on the dynamics of ISIS’ IO to recognise 
different themes that characterise its use of the platform for terrorist mobilisation. Following 
a brief discussion of the methodology of the argument, the paper discusses the notion of a 
terror socio-sphere and concludes with preliminary findings. 
 
6.11 Methodology 
     The study is based on an approach—informed by digital ethnography. This approach as 
ANT suggested requiring the tracing and mapping of network of actants. For that purpose, 
this approach required the researcher to join, as an observer, the public Telegram channels 
operated by ISIS members and affiliates. Identifying publicly available ISIS channels on 
Telegram was not difficult, because ISIS maintains a designated public channel called Nashir 
(which means ‘disseminator’ in Arabic). The broadcasting role of the channel is 
demonstrated by the number of ISIS affiliates on Twitter, who share and rebroadcast links to 
content originating from Nashir. In line with its broadcasting function, this channel operates 
in several languages, including Arabic, English, Turkish, and Spanish, and recommends 
trusted ISIS channels for its members to follow. 
 
One of the important considerations when encountering such channels is their authenticity as 
legitimate ISIS-operated content distribution nodes. The author adopted a practical rule-of-





prevalent in the content and messages shared. For example, it is highly probable that any 
channel spreading hate towards the West, sharing authentic ISIS propaganda and encouraging 
attacks against Western targets is a trusted ISIS channel. In addition, another important 
metric that can be used as a filter of authenticity is the peer-to-peer filtering performed by 
ISIS channels themselves. Such channels will vet and share information from other trusted 
channels that are operated by ISIS affiliates and therefore, leverage a distributed crowd-
filtered network to achieve a snowballing effect in terms of information dissemination. 
The study mirrored this snowballing approach and involved the researcher joining 70 ISIS-
affiliated Telegram channels. To collect the data from these channels, the researcher 
established a channel on Telegram, named ‘Data Collection’. The collected data includes all 
shared content, such as images and graphics, as well as videos encouraging individuals to 
attack Western interests (e.g., attacks against potential infrastructure networks, such as 
airports, water supplies and electricity grids) and the killing of military or police personnel. 
The information shared across these channels also includes instructional content aimed at 
potential lone wolf attackers, digital logistics advice aimed at channel members (e.g., opening 
a Twitter account using a hacked phone number), instructions for making small bombs and 
explosives and—most importantly—instructions for lone wolves on leaving media traces, 
such as videos or notes pledging allegiance to ISIS. 
 
For the purposes of this case study, Shebabat et al. (2017) focused on three types of content: 
● Information aimed at lone wolves, encouraging attacks and including instructions and 
methods of attacks. 
● Information aimed to inspire other potential lone wolves to carry attacks. 






All gathered information is being presented as screenshots captured directly from Telegram 
channels. Screenshots are: 
 
            Excellent examples: as digital tools, they diminish permanence in exchange for 
malleability and performativity. As media objects, they can be dynamically traced 
across the networks of their dissemination and require a re-evaluation of the axioms 
of cultural production that considers texts independently of experience. (Moore, 
2014) 
 
Further, screenshots play an important role in making sense of data visualisation and provide 
the ability to map and graph the research method. For this study, the analysis sought to 
answer two important ontological and epistemological questions:  
1. What do these data represent? 
2. What claims can be made from them? 
 
6.12 Terror Socio-Sphere 
    Since its emergence, ISIS rapidly adapted cutting-edge communication technologies to 
attain its IO objectives (see section 3.4). In many ways, this process resembles the way 
popular social movements across the Arab world leveraged social media platforms as a 
catalyst for political mobilisation during the ‘Arab Spring’.  
 
Arguably, the important role of SMNs during the events of the Arab Spring uprisings 
precipitated the shift to a new communication paradigm in the Arab world, a phenomenon 
which has been termed the emergence of “new Arab public sphere” (see Section 3.5; (Lynch, 





generation that has gained the platforms and the mechanisms to engage in sustained 
arguments, debate and discussions about their common concerns”. By contrast, as most Arab 
countries are ruled by either military personnel or coercive secular or theocratic regimes, 
freedom of speech, personal liberty and political debate are highly restricted. Most Arab 
regimes are non-democratic, and any call for grassroots political mobilisation condemning 
political power is persecuted. During the Arab Spring events, grassroots movements across 
the region were using social media to broadcast content calling for freedom, democracy and 
social justice. In effect, the emergence of social media facilitated the participation of Arab 
publics in political debate and acted as a powerful catalyst for political mobilisation.  
 
The debate over the role of digital platforms in the emergence of this new public sphere is 
connected to the work of Jürgen Habermas, who developed the concept of the public sphere 
to account for “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed” (Habermas, 1989, p. 85).According to Habermas, the most important feature of 
the public sphere is its engagement of the public in a “rational-critical debate”, involving 
such fundamental liberal rights as freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom of assembly and association. Interpreting Habermas’s argument, David Krieger, and 
Andréa Belliger coined the term “socio-sphere”, suggesting an abstract space that is “neither 
private nor public, but it is based upon the new form of communication made possible by 
digital media, namely ‘many to many’ communication” (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, 
p.157).They argued that the new socio-sphere enables and encourages participation in 
different ways regardless of traditional boundaries.  
 
The notion of a socio-sphere provides a useful framework within the context of this study, as 





network-focused perspective. In supporting one-to-many as well as one-to-one 
communications, Telegram has in effect transformed ISIS sympathisers and affiliates into 
distributed information aggregators and disseminators, able to act stigmergically without 
direct coordination and control. As Krieger and Belliger point out, socio-spheres allow 
participants to be network actors despite geographic boundaries. Arguably, the rise of 
encrypted social media applications has produced a new triadic paradigm shift in 
communication, enabling the simultaneous performing of private-to-private, private-to-
public, and public-to-public communication. To situate Telegram in the emergence of a 
digital terror socio-sphere, it is important to understand how terror organisations have 
harnessed the platform and how Telegram has served their agendas. Also, it is important to 
assess the topology and architecture of the platform, as well as the ways in which it has 
changed the dynamics of communication. Within this context, Shehabat et al (2017) argued 
that the encrypted communication affordances provided by Telegram have contributed to the 
emergence of a public terror socio-sphere. In particular, ISIS’ IO on Telegram is centred on 
one-to-many, many-to-many, and one-to-one communication with far-reaching ramifications.  
 
Zizi Papacharissi has argued that individuals can engage socially in a private media sphere 
situated within their personal and private spaces (Papacharissi, 2010). This private social 
interaction sphere is rhetorically established by utilising existing and imagined geographical 
places (Papacharissi, 2010). Encrypted communication applications such as Telegram, 
WhatsApp, and Signal act as such geographic spaces, in effect enabling a participatory terror 
socio-sphere of information flows. This is in distinct contrast to other public communication 
channels such as Twitter and Facebook. The private/public socio-spheres of terror are enacted 
as spaces for potential terrorists to share common grievances in and thus, have become 





example, messages showing the brutality of coalition forces destroying homes and killing 
innocent people are constantly diffused across Telegram channels. This type of content serves 
as a force multiplier, in that it acts to unify affiliates around a cause perceived as just, as well 
as inspire potential lone wolves to carry on attacks. Importantly, the significant increase of 
the number of attacks against Western interests during the years 2015–2016 can be mapped to 
the rapid adoption of Telegram by ISIS in 2015. It has been established that the perpetrators 
of a number of lone wolf attacks in this time period used Telegram as their main 
communication channel (GTI, 2016). Consequently, Telegram has been perceived as a threat 
to the security of the European continent and the USA, insofar as it enables secure end-to-end 
communications across the new terror socio-sphere. Within this context, it is important to 
consider why ISIS shifted its IO strategy away from popular SMNs and migrated to 
Telegram. 
 
6.13 ISIS’ Digital Migration to Telegram 
    Telegram promotes itself as an ultra-secure instant messaging system because all data is 
encrypted from start to finish, a process known in the industry as end-to-end encryption. 
Headquartered in Berlin, Telegram has more than 100 million active subscribers and is 
widely used in the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia, and Latin America (Torbati, 
2016). Telegram is considered the main hub for ISIS’ communication (Russon & Murdock, 
2016). 
 
While in this case study an attempt is made to examine the role of Telegram in lone wolf 
attacks, we set to examine the extent to which ISIS members and their affiliates are using 
Telegram to inspire potential lone wolves to carry attacks. The collected data obtained from 





Telegram: (1) seeking encryption, (2) seeking a channel-supporting platform, (3) enhancing 
ISIS’ digital infrastructure against cyber-attacks, and (4) decreasing exposure to hacktivism 
and other information warfare countermeasures.  
 
6.14 Seeking Encryption 
    Prior to the emergence of ISIS, terror organisations such as Al-Qaeda were keen to encrypt 
and secure their communications. In the past, Al-Qaeda coordinated terrorist activities in 
Europe using draft messages on shared email accounts or by sending encrypted files (Nesser, 
Stenersen, & Oftedal, 2016). Personal anonymity and secure chat are important capabilities 
driving ISIS to adopt the platform. Using Telegram has made obfuscating and protecting 
attacker identities from Western intelligence agencies much easier, since only few electronic 
clues are left in intercepted datasets (Schechner & Faucon, 2016).While Telegram has been 
helpful to establish a socio-sphere and hide the identity of potential lone wolves, Nico Prucha 
has argued that anonymity and encryption have not benefited the strategic level of ISIS IOs 
(Prucha, 2016).He argues that the “secrecy and encryption of Telegram is harmful for IS’ 
swarming operations as the networks which are sustained on Telegram lack the outreach as 
well as the opportunities for projecting influence, which Twitter in particular allowed”. In 
addition, unlike encrypted applications such as Signal, which has been endorsed by Edward 
Snowden, some encryption specialists question the quality of Telegram encryption, 
suggesting that the platform may have a backdoor. That being said, Pavel Durov, the 
developer of Telegram, has consistently argued that the core of strength of Telegram is user 
anonymity, and has challenged encryption specialists to test Telegram’s protocols for exploits 






Interestingly, WhatsApp, which is another popular encrypted communication app, was not 
adopted by ISIS because Facebook purchased it in 2013. Despite WhatsApp’s recent 
adoption of the same end-to-end encryption protocol as Signal, ISIS supporters are convinced 
it is not safe and is the easiest application to be hacked. Kavanaugh and Shiloach noticed that 
ISIS supporters who have long used other mainstream social media platforms, such as 
Twitter, have been increasingly joining Telegram. As stated in section 6.2.5, this is because 
Telegram allows its users to send encrypted messages, providing an advantage to jihadi while 
making it more difficult for law enforcement to identify ISIS affiliates online. 
 
6.15 Seeking a Channel-Supporting Platform 
    As mentioned in section 6.2.1, one of the most important Telegram features, unveiled in 
September 2015, is the creation of public and private channels on the platform. This new 
feature enables users to establish their own channels to share information with an unlimited 
number of anonymous subscribers. ISIS strategically harnesses this feature by swarming 
Telegram with a large number of private and public channels in multiple languages and 
therefore, generates ad hoc networks ensuring its IO objectives. For instance, in the aftermath 
of the Paris attacks, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, Telegram suspended 78 pro-ISIS 
Telegram channels. Despite that, the Nashir political channel was relaunched in English, 
Russian, French, Turkish and Somali to maintain network presence and target potential 
international subscribers. In November 2015, ISIS swarmed Telegram with hundreds of 
channels, each specialised in a specific type of content. The most popular ISIS channels on 
Telegram are Dabiq, Nashir, Amaq and Gazwa. According to Berger and Perez (2016), these 
channels “have been used as the initial point of distribution for propaganda releases. Once 






6.16 Enhancing ISIS’ Digital Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks 
    In an effort to disrupt ISIS communications and other core functions, the US military’s 
Cyber Command announced the launch of its first attack against the organisation’s digital 
infrastructure in August 2015, during president Barack Obama’s visit in Hanover (Wie, 
2016).Google, Twitter, and Facebook responded to calls from US Cyber Command to help 
shutting down accounts affiliated with ISIS, with Twitter suspending over 300,000 accounts 
related to the organisation. The degrading of ISIS’ Twitter affiliates network led many 
Western analysts to believe that ISIS in general was in decline (see section 5.2) (Prucha, 
2016). These coordinated network degrading attacks pressured ISIS to shift some of its digital 
activities away from popular social media such as Twitter to other platforms such as 
Telegram, even though initially, as Berger and Perez argue, “these other platforms are used 
primarily as backups for Twitter” (Berger & Perez, 2016) While efforts have been made 
to severely degrade ISIS presence on Twitter and Facebook, governments have been finding 
it increasingly difficult to track and monitor communications on Telegram (Russon & 
Murdock, 2016). 
 
Telegram’s functionality enables users to have one-to-one and group conversations that are 
end-to-end encrypted, and ISIS has taken full advantage of the platform’s privacy benefits to 
establish a community of channels, bots, and secret chat rooms. As Kavanaugh and Shiloach 
point out, “even anonymous, which claims to have hacked or crippled thousands of ISIS 
Twitter accounts and online forums, has been ineffective on Telegram” (Kavanaugh & 
Shiloach, 2015).An ISIS member called Abu-Osama Sinan Algazi has claimed that the 
network degrading operation has been largely unsuccessful, as “in this electronic war 
between the supporters and the Crusaders, lots of our brothers prefer Telegram over anything 





Unlike Facebook or Twitter, which are capable of regularly suspending accounts in a 
centralised manner, Telegram’s more distributed nature, coupled with end-to-end encryption, 
demands a collective user-led effort to report ISIS-affiliated channels to the Telegram 
administrators.  
 
6.17 Decreasing Exposure to Hacktivism and Other Information Warfare 
Countermeasures 
    In the context of US Cyber Command operations against the organisation in 2015, 
hacktivist groups such as “Anonymous” and “CtrlSec” declared #OpIceISIS (see Figure 98), 
aimed at hacking and disrupting ISIS’ online presence across a variety of blog hosting 
platforms, Twitter accounts, and mobile phone applications. Under the motto “ISIS we are 
going to kick you out of the Internet”, anonymous attacked affiliated ISIS websites such as 
“ummetislam.net” and took down the ‘glade of tiding’ mobile app, as well as thousands of 
ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts (see sections 5.8 and 5.9). These swarm-like attacks were 
successful, to the extent that they forced ISIS to migrate its network to Telegram, perceived 







Figure 98. OpIceISIS screenshot. Source: Twitter.com. 
 
6.18 ISIS on Telegram 
    The strategic rationale behind ISIS’ use of Telegram was outlined clearly by its Nashir 
channel in the following three objectives: (1) declaring electronic jihad, (2) waging media 
manoeuvre warfare, and (3) providing an online platform for the recruitment of lone wolves. 
 
6.18.1 Declaring Electronic Jihad 
    The concept of electronic jihad was widely used by Al-Qaeda leaders such as Al-Zawahiri 
and Al-Awlaki to inspire and recruit potential members to Al-Qaeda. Al-Awlaki, for instance, 
used the concept “WWW Jihad for mobilizing prospective adherents and inciting terrorist 
actions” (Rudner, 2016). In a similar vein, ISIS used the concept of e-jihad to encourage 
followers and affiliates to establish Telegram channels and Twitter accounts. Throughout our 
observation of ISIS’ Telegram channels, we noticed a widespread conviction among the 






The concept of electronic jihad has been leveraged by ISIS to enrol numerous affiliates into a 
distributed network used to disseminate propaganda videos, organise financial support, issue 
warfare activity updates, reach out globally to potential recruits, and paint a propagandised 
utopian picture of daily life in the territories controlled by ISIS. Activities as simple as the 
dissemination of the ISIS weekly multilingual magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, or the sharing 
of instructional materials focused on setting up encrypted communications and evading 
surveillance, or sharing updated safe channel lists, all count as electronic jihad. 
 
6.18.2 Waging Media Manoeuvre Warfare 
     Periodically ISIS’ Telegram channels declare media manoeuvre warfare, or what they call 
“Gazwa e’lamyah”in Arabic. In practice, media manoeuvre warfare involves the mass re-
opening of suspended social media accounts across multiple platforms, in conjunction with 
the creation of new accounts. This is viewed as manoeuvre warfare insofar as it is understood 
that the re-established accounts will exist only temporarily, soon to be shut down by the host 
platforms, though long enough to achieve a pulse-like broadcasting of messages aimed at a 
broader global audience. The pulse messages could like the following: “dear brother, don’t 
imprison yourself in Telegram channels only as most of your channel members are ISIS 
supporters, but break the chain and join channels of infidels and other social networks to 
upset your enemies. Strive to be among them in the networks they have created and be 
steadfast therein, patiently awaiting your reward”. In general, ISIS’ media manoeuvre warfare 
aims to: 
● Identify and report anti-ISIS channels to be suspended. 
● Post and upload videos and materials on Facebook and YouTube. 





● Tweet daily at peak times propagandising purported atrocities committed by coalition 
forces. 
 
These messages are usually coordinated by ISIS affiliates calling themselves ‘The Media 
Mujahedeen’. Figure 99 shows an example of these messages, explaining the importance of 
media in winning the war against coalition forces. As stated clearly in Figure 99, the ISIS 
propaganda arm considers the media battle to be worth at least 75% of the overall victory. 
Framed in this way, ISIS supporters are considered to have direct responsibility to use media 
as a weapon. In addition, the message encourages followers to keep re-engaging with Twitter, 
considering it as the most important media field. In other words, ISIS believes winning the 
media war means winning the war against coalition forces. 
 
 






6.18.3 Online Platform for the Recruitment of Lone Wolves 
    Part of ISIS’ stated IO objectives are to spread a message of fear among the native 
populations of coalition forces, and to inspire Muslims to engage in lone wolf attacks striking 
at Western targets (see sections 3.4 & 3.5). According to Ramon Spaaij, lone wolf attacks are 
characterised by a person working individually, not belonging to an organised terrorist group, 
and not directed by an outside command or hierarchy (Spaaij, 2010). However, direct online 
ties between individuals carrying out attacks in the West and ISIS networks are hard to prove 
and often uncertain, even though ISIS has claimed responsibility for most attacks occurring in 
the period between 2015 and 2016. Data gathered by Nesser, Stenersen and Oftedal shows 
that “only 6 out of 23 single actors […] acted solely based on online inspiration” (Nesser et 
al., 2016). 
 
6.19 ISIS’ Telegram Channels 
     On November 26, 2016, the ISIS media channel Al-Furat released a video in French with 
Arabic subtitles, titled “Sur leur pas”, meaning ‘on their way’ in Arabic. According to Nico 
Purcha, “the video is in the 16:9 format, full HD, and features praise for the spate of ‘lone 
wolf’ attackers in 2016. The film demonstrates vividly how ISIS uses Telegram to instigate 
attacks” (Prucha, 2016). Reviewing the role of encrypted communication platforms such as 
Telegram in catalysing lone wolf attacks; our observations over the type of messages 
generated and disseminated via ISIS’ Telegram channels involve two main themes: (1) 






6.19.1 Inspiring Lone Wolf Attacks 
     The term “lone wolf” was initially coined in the late 1990s by two white supremacists, 
Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis, as part of an effort to encourage other supremacists to act 
alone in committing violent crimes. Other terms that have been used to describe similar or 
comparable forms of political violence include “leaderless resistance” and “freelance 
terrorism” (Weimann, 2012). According to the US Homeland Security Committee report 
(2016), ISIS “has successfully crowd-sourced its terrorism agenda by inspiring independent 
followers to conduct most of its attacks. Two-thirds of ISIS plots against the West appear to 
have been inspired by the terror outfit, rather than directed by it or carried out by trained 
jihadists” (HLSC, 2016). This skill to franchise terror has decreased the cost of the group’s 
operations and increased the impact of its violence.  
 
As shown in Figure 100, the frequency of individual attacks occurring in the West increased 
markedly between July and August 2015, after ISIS called for lone wolves to carry on 
attacks. Significantly, two-thirds of these attacks were carried out by inspired individuals 






Figure 100. Infographic demonstrating ISIS’ links to lone actor attacks. Source: GTI, 2015. 
 
According to the Homeland Security Committee report, ISIS has been tied to at least 75 
terrorist attacks against Western interests since early 2014 (HLSC, 2016). A list of ‘do it 
yourself jihad’ attacks against Western interests, compiled from ISIS’ Telegram channels, 









Date Country City Weapon Causalities 
14 July 2015 France Nice Truck 80 killed 
 Germany Wurzburg Axe/knife 4 wounded 
24 July 2015 Germany Ansbach Suicide 
bombing 
15 wounded 
24 July 2015 France  Rouen Knife 1 killed (84 years 
priest)  
22 March 2016 Brussels Brussels  Suicide 
bombings 





Shooting 14 killed; 21 wounded 
1 January 2017 Turkey Istanbul Shooting 39 killed; 71 wounded 
 
Table 2: Number of Lone Wolf Attacks Against Western Countries, Weapons Used and  
Number of Casualties. Illustrated by the author. 
 
As an illustration of the method of catalysing lone wolf attacks, Figure 101 shows a message 
broadcast by the Nashir channel, encouraging individuals to carry out what they call ‘do it 
yourself jihad’. The message provides ideas to encourage lone wolf attacks, including 






Figure 101. Screenshot from ISIS Telegram channel, Nashir Political Services. 
 
In a significant example of escalating targeting capabilities, the UCC Telegram channel 
broadcast a link to a ‘kill list’ file posted on JustPaste.it and addressed at lone wolves, 
containing the alleged names, addresses, and telephone numbers of a hundred US soldiers 
(see Figure 102). The message uses two main hashtags, “#kill Dogs” and “#Individual 
wolves” and reads: “we know all your citizens INFO, and we have all your personal data. 
And your systems have failed to protect the most of your data [sic]. We are watching you. 






Figure 102. Screenshot obtained from UCC Telegram Channel. 
 
The UCC channel has also previously broadcasted links to manuals and instructions on terror 
tactics and methods aimed at lone. Such messages are usually identified with the “lone 
wolves #get ready” hashtag in Arabic (Figure 103), and suggest terror tools for ‘do it yourself 
jihad’ including guns, cars, trucks, knives, etc. 
 
Additionally, prior to the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, ISIS-related Telegram channels 
encouraged individuals to adopt Munich-style112 attacks targeting Western athletes. The use 
of the #RioLW hashtag (LW refers to lone wolves) on ISIS-related Telegram channels (see 
Figure 104) were considered serious enough to force Brazilian authorities to mobilise extra 
200,000 military personnel to secure the Olympics.  
 
                                                          





At any one point, a number of visual messages aimed at potential lone wolves circulate across 
ISIS-related Telegram channels, with the clear purpose of inspiring further terrorist attacks 
(see Figures 105 and 106). 
 
Figure 103. Screenshot obtained from UCC Telegram Channel, titled ‘Lone Wolves #getready’. 
 
 

















Overall, the number of people that have been killed by jihadi violence in Western Europe 
from 2014 to 2016 (273 people) is greater than the number in all previous years combined 
(267 people; (Nesser et al., 2016). This is due to a small number of highly deadly incidents, 
as shown in Table 2. In the period of 2014 to 2016 alone, 42 well-documented plots were 
registered (of the 42 plots, 38 were reported to be linked to ISIS), with nine plots registered in 
2014, 17 in 2015, and 16 in 2016. 
 
6.19.2 Claiming Responsibility for and Celebrating Acts of Terror 
    In the aftermath of each individual attack on a Western target, pro-ISIS channels on 
Telegram are flooded with images and posts mass-produced by online collectives of e-
jihadists celebrating these attacks by hijacking popular hashtags such as #NiceAttack, #Nice, 
#Brussels (see Figure 107). 
 
 






The process of establishing responsibility for and celebrating in the aftermath of lone wolf 
acts of terror works fluidly, whereby Amaq News Agency (the main media wing of ISIS) 
would usually claim responsibility for an attack in its immediate aftermath, and 
simultaneously encourage affiliates to celebrate the lone wolf across related Telegram 
channels and propagandise his pledge of allegiance, if there is one, across wider social media 
(Harris, 2015)see Figure 108 and 109). 
 
 
Figure 108. Amaq News Agency claiming responsibility for lone wolf attacks. 
 
Ironically, it appears that content disseminated by Amaq News Agency is considered 
authentic and trustworthy both by international media outlets and ISIS sympathisers. Even so, 
Western-led efforts to degrade and suppress its social media presence have pushed Amaq into 
adopting Telegram as its primary platform. To date, it appears that despite Telegram’s 
continuous attempts to take down the Amaq News Agency channel it keeps resurfacing with 
a large number of followers. The channel is important enough in the ISIS information warfare 







Figure 109. Video of Wurzburg attacker, Muhammad Riyad, pledging allegiance to ISIS. 
 
There appears to be substantial evidence that Telegram is used by ISIS as a propaganda 
platform inspiring individual jihadist to act against Western targets. To ascertain its role in 
context, it is important to analyse lone wolf attacks in the West before and after the 
emergence of ISIS.  
 
6.20 Analysis of Lone Wolf Attacks 
    To date, there is little evidence proving that ISIS is directly coordinating terror plots 
against the West, even though the organisation celebrates these attacks when they occur and 
claiming responsibility post factum. On a more conceptual level, Gartenstein-Ross has argued 
that the failure to identify direct ties between lone wolf attacks and ISIS is part of a broader 
and long-lasting pattern of underestimating the goals of jihadist networks in Western 
countries (Gartenstein-Ross, 2016). In France, ISIS member Rachid Kassim has been linked 





no oversight or direction from ISIS. He is also thought to have been the orchestrator of over 
half of the 17 total plots foiled by French authorities in 2016. Most of the planning was done 
through his Telegram channel ‘Sabre de Lumière’ (i.e., Sword of Light). In an analysis of 38 
ISIS-linked plots and attacks in Europe between 2014 and October 2016, 19 (50%) were 
found to have involved online instruction from members of ISIS’ networks. By contrast, prior 
to the emergence of ISIS on Telegram, GTI indicates that in 2014 lone wolf attacks motivated 
by political extremism accounted for most deaths, compared to Islamic fundamentalism 







Figure 110. Screenshot shows Islamic fundamentalism is not a major catalyst for lone wolf attacks in 
the West. Source: GTI. 
 
After the emergence of ISIS and its subsequent calls for individual attacks against Western 
interest, Islamic fundamentalism became the primary motivation for terror attacks in Western 
countries. The strategy was outlined by Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, the spokesperson of 
ISIS, who is on record saying that “lone wolf attacks in the US and Europe were dearer to us 
than the biggest action by us in Iraq and Syria” (Withnall, 2016). ISIS propaganda aimed at 
potential Muslim lone wolf attackers in the West have been systematically broadcast via 





they hunt in packs. So, with the lone-wolf terrorists: there is a virtual pack, a social network, 
behind them. They may operate alone, but they are recruited, radicalized, taught, trained, and 
directed by others” (Weimann, 2012).Even though so far, the number of attacks that can be 
credited to lone wolves is less than 2% of overall terrorist activity in most countries, the 
problem is in the rapidly growing number of attacks and the tremendous difficulty in 
predicting and disrupting them (Spaaij, 2010). 
 
Crucially, as argued in sections 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, this process maps onto the ongoing efforts 
aimed at degrading ISIS’ digital capabilities, as the primary achievement of these efforts has 
been to push ISIS IOs to Telegram. Consecutively, security agencies and terrorism 
researchers have started highlighting the role of Telegram as a catalyst for terrorist 
mobilisation. In popular media this is typically framed as a new a sinister discovery:  
 
             The two men who are accused of killing a French priest on July 26 met on the service 
(Telegram), and the BBC reported that one of the attackers discussed his murder plan 
in a closed group there. So, it makes sense that French law enforcement would want 
to be seen as cracking down on possible terrorism plans on the app (Morrison, 2016). 
 
In the aftermath of ISIS’ shift to Telegram there has been growing awareness in media and 
policy circles of the role played by encrypted communication technologies and the rise of 
lone wolf attacks in the West. In an October 2015 testimony before the House Homeland 
Security Committee, the then FBI director James Comey stated that:  
 
             ISIS has used ubiquitous social media to push into the United States, into the pockets, 
onto the mobile devices of troubled souls throughout our country in all 50 states with 





of glory, participate in the final battle between good and evil on God’s side. Come to 
the caliphate, and if you can’t come, kill where you are (HLSC, 2016). 
      
Telegram is often considered the primary driver behind the emergence of a new style of 
digital jihad because of its facilitation of encrypted communication between ISIS members 
and affiliates (Russon & Murdock, 2016). There has been increasing awareness of the role of 
private Telegram channels in the facilitation of radicalisation and coordination between ISIS 
members and potential lone wolf recruits (Garcia, 2016). These types of channels act not only 
as one-to-many propaganda outlets, but also as one-to-one and many-to-many coordination 
platforms. Importantly, the secure format of these communications makes it that much harder 
for security agencies to ascertain the coordination logistics of terror acts and disrupt potential 
attacks (Khalaf, 2015)see Figure 111). For example, even though there is no evidence that 
Telegram was used to coordinate the Paris terrorist attacks, the attackers managed to 
coordinate and execute their plans while evading detection by counterterrorism officials 
(Kavanaugh & Shiloach, 2015). ISIS propaganda has been quick to claim responsibility for 
lone wolf attacks while maintaining a propaganda image of overwhelming success (see 






Figure 111. Coordination among ISIS networks. Source: Perspectives (2016, p. 52). 
 
 
Figure 112. ISIS claiming successful attacks in Europe. 
 
6.21 Discussion 
    Most messages posted on Telegram by ISIS members and affiliates highlight the role of 
lone wolves in perpetrating terrorist attacks across Western countries. These posts work to 





as catalyse and recruit new lone wolf attackers from among a multitude of ISIS sympathisers. 
ISIS members and affiliates acting as e-jihadists are using Telegram channels as logistical 
tools to support outreach to and communication with potential lone wolves. Logistical 
support extends from facilitating secure one-to-many and many-to-many communication 
channels, to producing and rapidly sharing visual propaganda in support of attacks, free 
distribution of hacked or sock-puppet Twitter accounts, and instructions to evade surveillance 
through TOR and VPN.  For ANT, this mechanism that connects network actors and integrate 
them in a social form. This new social form brings stability and determines the flexibility of 
the network (Krieger & Belliger, 2014, p. 186). Specific logistics information for perpetrating 
lone wolf attacks includes tools, potential locations, tactics for target identification, and 
methods of concealment. Weimann has argued that “in fact, almost all of the lone-wolf cases 
in recent years have involved the use of electronic social media. For lone wolves, online 
communication provides the needed social bonding, a (virtual) community and a source of 
guidance, support and moral backing” (Weimann, 2012). 
 
In addition, Telegram channels have provided ISIS with a safe media environment allowing it 
to communicate propaganda to a global multilingual audience. Key propaganda messages are 
disseminated in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, German, Turkish, and Spanish making 
it much harder to disrupt ISIS’ IOs. In effect, Telegram acts as an open-source marketplace of 
communication between leading figures of the terror organisation and a multitude of globally 
distributed affiliates and sympathisers. This is consistent with Gartenstein-Ross’s conclusion 
that encrypted social media applications such as Telegram have allowed ISIS to build 







It is important to note that, while Telegram has been leveraged effectively by ISIS and its 
affiliates, the terror organisation has failed to establish and maintain a wide media presence 
across popular social media platforms. ISIS-affiliated Telegram channels constantly 
encourage followers to reopen suspended Twitter accounts, demonstrating that the 
organisation still sees Telegram as a poor substitute for the global public platform of Twitter. 
The specific architecture of Telegram has forced ISIS to use it as a semi-closed coordination 
and initial media generation network involving: 1) ISIS fighters uploading information and 
receiving updates from battles in real time, 2) ISIS affiliates or sympathisers sharing news 
and updates, 3) anti-ISIS actors (Intelligence agencies, hackers…etc.), and 4) researchers and 
journalists. 
 
Although direct links between ISIS and individual lone wolves are hard to substantiate, 
studies have found a link between lone wolf attacks in the West and specific calls from ISIS 
preceding them (Spaaij, 2010). That being said, the nature of lone wolf attacks necessities a 
case-by-case study of each incident. Lone wolf attacks may be motivated by a combination of 
beliefs, personal vendettas, religious, or political objections. Moreover, the emergence of 
ISIS-related “virtual entrepreneurs” has injected additional network complexity into what 
were traditionally considered radicalised lone wolves attacking Western targets (Hughes & 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017). For example, ISIS-related virtual entrepreneurs have been 
involved in assisting with travel logistics and therefore, act as connecting hubs between fully 
distributed lone wolves operating in target countries. This development has made it much 







    This study represents an understanding of the role of encrypted social media in enabling 
lone wolf attacks. this case study illustrated how ISIS affiliates utilise Telegram, and the 
reasons behind the organisation’s digital migration. Although ISIS has effectively leveraged 
the affordances of Telegram, the organisation always asks its followers to harness other 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Throughout this study, ISIS’ Telegram channels 
were persistently vulnerable to suspension by Telegram administrators. Popular channels 
such as Dabiq, Amaq and Nashir have been suspended hundreds of times, dramatically 
reducing their audience. Further, anti-ISIS actors have also migrated to Telegram, countering 
its propaganda and reporting channels for suspension. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that 
ISIS has harnessed Telegram’s affordances to encourage, coordinate where possible, and 
propagandise lone wolf attacks against Western countries, as well as maintain its global 
network of terrorist IOs. 
 
However, to understand the role of micro-platforms and encryption communication 
applications in maintaining networking structure of ISIS networks, I argue that these new 
information environments are also enabled ISIS to launch swarming attacks as part of the 
information-centric warfare against its adversaries. In Chapter 7, I will explain how ISIS 







7 Chapter 7: Distributed Swarming and Stigmergic Effects on ISIS’ 
Networks—Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop Model113 
7.1 Introduction 
    Up to this point this thesis has examined ISIS’ IO and digital media logistics that attempted 
to gain information superiority to maintain its networking structure and sustain flows of 
information. The aim of this chapter is to understand information warfare that has occurred 
between ISIS and its adversaries from a manoeuvre warfare perspective (see section 6.18.2). 
 
The emergence of digital communication technologies has enrolled actors (humans and non-
humans) through processes of translation and enrolment as suggested by ANT (Latour, 1987, 
2005; Callon, 1986), which fundamentally changed the structure and communication 
dynamics and assisted the formation of new actor-networks, such as networks of terror. 
Previously hierarchical, centralized organisations have been reorganised as interconnected, 
decentralised and distributed networks. This shift has affected ISIS’ IOs, personnel 
communication and dissemination tactics (see section 6.1). To hinder ISIS’ communication 
and disrupt its IOs, the US government declared operation ‘degrading ISIS’ digital 
capabilities’ (see section 5.1). This operation leads to the intensity of information-centric 
warfare, as ISIS’ networks adapted stigmergic swarming operations to survive the 
interruption of its information infrastructure. In this chapter, I argue a paradigm shift in terror 
communication has emerged from adapting decentralised information logistical tools. The 
advent of anonymous sharing portals (e.g., JustPaste.it, sendvid.com), cloud computing (e.g., 
Google Drive, Dropbox) and encrypted applications (e.g., Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal) have 
supplemented terror organisations with logistical tools that helped the organisation to 
                                                          
113 An early version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Media and Information Warfare, 





maintain its networking structure, evade interceptions and survive attempts targeting its IO 
capabilities. However, this analysis has a time period associated with it between 2014 and 
2016 – that as part of the shift to distributed networks, the flexibility and movement to and 
away from platforms is common and that this chapter is not suggesting the use of these 
platforms in particular is static. 
 
Ultimately, these new digital media environments enabled ISIS to launch swarming activities 
and play a pivotal role in information-centric warfare against its adversaries and vice versa. 
To analyse information-centric and manoeuvre warfare in the context of this study, I expand 
on Boyd’s (1974) model of manoeuvre warfare theory ‘Observe-Orient-Decide-Act’, 
commonly known as the OODA loop. In this chapter, first, I shed light on the OODA loop 
model and its role in the information manoeuvre warfare perspective. Second, I use the 
OODA loop framework as lenses through which to examine the change in ISIS and the IO of 
its adversaries as a result of new digital media environments. Finally, I highlight swarming 
and stigmergic practices ISIS opted to use to strategically engage in battles in the digital 
media environment.  
7.2 Network-Centric Warfare: ISIS Versus the World 
    As observed in section (3.5) the declaration of Islamic Caliphate in August 2014 has 
fundamentally changed the network architecture of ISIS’ organisation. The shift from non-
state actors to state actors and naming Mosul as the capital city of Caliph Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi—required ISIS to use digital media technologies for C2 operations. This includes: 
networking, communication, information dissemination and propaganda. As Nissen (2015) 
argued, non-state actors such as rebel groups in Syria that do not have a formal structure need 






The US, Shia militants, individual hackers and hacker collectives, attempted to disable ISIS’ 
communication capabilities by suspending accounts on popular social media platforms, 
hacking web pages and disseminating misinformation (see Section 5.2). To maintain its 
network structure,114 and organisation of C2 operations, ISIS managed to adapt its activities 
in multiple digital media environments to manoeuvre and survive the degrading operation 
strategy initiated by its adversaries. One way to understand this change is to employ the 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) approach to the study of the networking by terror 
organisations. Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) argued that “the occurrence of structural and 
logical of NCW depended on information hosted by a high-quality information backplane” 
(p.5).  
 
The logical model of NCW suggests that in the study of ISIS networks we should focus on 
the emergence of new tendencies of communication processes that transformed confrontation 
between ISIS and its adversaries into ‘open-source warfare’115 depending on a complex 
processes of communication strategies. That is, as Robb (2015) argued that ISIS are using 
open- source warfare “to radically improve the quality and the security of its global 
insurgency and using the unmonitored one to one communication of the PlayStation Network 
(PSN) to coordinate attacks across the world”. 
 
In other words, NCW is about taking advantage of digital networks by manoeuvring and 
exploiting IOs over digital media networks. It is important to acknowledge that 
                                                          
114 This includes controlling information flows, keeping channels of dissemination intact, opening channels 
of communication, and preserving their digital legacy for propaganda purposes. 
115 A term coined by John Robb to describe how insurgent leverage on open source software and other  
 





geographically isolated forces depended on strong networking which considered the 
backbone for NCW (Smith, 2003, p.3 ). The distributed networking structure of ISIS 
depended on decentralised C2 operations and to some extent decentralised information 
logistics. This was revealed in ISIS’ on-ground advances and the reach of their message 
beyond the capacity of its adversaries. In the period between 2014-2016 ISIS clearly showed 
its ability to be a powerful organisation, capable of surviving sustained information-centric 
warfare.  
 
C2 “is about employing the organisation’s logistics and capabilities (people, systems, 
material and the relationships between them) towards a specific objective or task” (NATO, 
2006, pp. 5–7). From an ANT perspective, it is the enrolment of network actors that help to 
form network assemblages and maintain flows of information (see 4.11). To sustain flows of 
information and maintain networking structure ISIS managed to enrol many digital actors, 
including those offered by open-source digital media communications. Cebrowski & Garstka 
(1998, p.3) predicted that terror organisations would take advantage of the emergence of new 
cloud computing, sharing portals and encrypted applications. They observed: “access to all 
necessary information sources, weapons reach and manoeuvre with accuracy and speed of 
response are the facilitating elements to achieve to achieve high performance information 
grid which advanced C2 practices” (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998, p. 6). This suggests that the 
high speed and accessibility of internet technologies enables the creation and distribution of 
content to flow across various information environments in the world at large (p.3). 
Cebrowski & Garstka prediction became reality as ISIS accessed these digital media 
technologies that became part of its C2 operation which enabled them to enrol actors to their 
network. For example, the architecture of sharing portals (e.g., JustPaste.it, share.it), 





WhatsApp) enabled ISIS’ IO to enrol more actors in the formation of their information 
environment. This occurred as collaboration between networked digital environments shifted 
to network-centric operations, which “[…] are characterized by information-intensive 
interactions between computational nodes on the network” (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998, p. 
3). Moreover, Edward Smith argued that the militants’ capability to collaborate, aggregate, 
disseminate (see Section 7.8.3), create, analyse and access information gives them an 
advantage over their opponents and superiority in digital media environments (Smith, 2003). 
For example, information shared on anonymous digital platforms can be uploaded and shared 
on almost every digital technology including mobile phone applications. Hybrid links of 
shared information (see 7.6) can be downloaded, adjusted and shared. 
 
To understand the need for ISIS to establish communication networks in the information 
environments we must examine the geographical space they operate in; the battle fronts they 
wage; the need for logistics; and the political structure of their organisation. On the one hand, 
the massive geographical space ISIS controlled in Syria and Iraq between2014- end of 2016 
(23 welayats or provinces) made it the largest terror organisation in the world.  
 
Communication technology was essential to coordinate communication between divided 
forces across Welayats. Therefore, to keep their territory under control, ISIS established a 
communication hub in every Welayat (effectively establishing nodes in the network) to 
coordinate military action and maintain IO. The former Dutch General Fran Osinga asserts 
that this embrace of information revolution enabled the growth of ISIS networks. Dispersed 
forces were able to join, communicate, consult and coordinate efforts in more effective ways.  
It also assisted militants in adapting to new networking structures. To counter these newly 





Safranski, 2008). In other words, this counter strategy worked in Iraq and Syria as the 
government forces were unable to defeat ISIS militants (centralised versus decentralised). 
The involvement of other networked militant groups such as Shia militant groups has 
declared many victories in fighting against ISIS (decentralised vs decentralised).  
 
In the context of ISIS networks, it was crucial for ISIS to adopt a distributed networking 
structure rather than depend on the centralised operational network of its previously hieratical 
C2 operations. IO of ISIS networks therefore, is empowered by what Edward Smith (2003) 
calls ‘self-synchronized’ operations that accelerate the speed of command of ISIS networks. 
Smith suggested that, 
 
the network would permit us (the military) to decentralize or flatten the command 
structure, taking the control function down to the lowest practicable level of 
command and shortening the response cycle by removing unneeded levels of 
command and control. (Smith, 2003) 
 
The effectiveness of this decentralisation was observed in November 2016 while ISIS was 
under pressure from coalition forces in the battle of Raqqa (Syria). Despite coordinated 
opposition ISIS managed to take control of Palmyra city116. This move demonstrated that the 
speed of command by the decentralised networking structure of ISIS was more effective in 
urban warfare compared to its adversaries centralised organisation. The battle of Al-Bab 
(October 2017- Feb 2017) is another example of how the decentralised networking structure 
of ISIS defeated Turkish forces during the first weeks of the attack. Turkey suffered severe 
casualties and losses of military equipment as a result of the ISIS’ C2 operations which 
                                                          





depended on information shared between units operating on the ground without an official 
hierarchy of command.  
 
To understand speed of command of decentralised networks, in the context of information-
centric warfare, Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) suggested that speed of command, has three 
parts: First, information superiority is a decisive factor to understand battlespaces. This can 
be achieved by adapting fast and powerful networks that depend on technology, simulation 
capabilities and excellent sensors. Second, speed and precision of effect-based swarming 
operations (to be discussed in section 7.5). Third, blocking of enemy’s operation before they 
start, this is referred to as operating inside the OODA loop of adversaries (which will be 
considered in section see 7.2). The aspects of speed of command, as suggested by Cebrowski 
& Garstka, were successfully employed by ISIS in the information warfare which was part of 
NCW. Applying speed of command aspects Cebrowski & Garstka regarded the technology 
used by unequal forces, number of military personnel and position they hold is a strength of 
NCW (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998, p. 4). 
 
Understanding Cebrowski &Garstka’s analysis of the speed of command from NCW 
perspective in relation to correlation between OODA loop and information network–centric 
warfare, Mark Safranski recognised three significant Boydian ideas have found their place in 
NCW: (1) the idea of manoeuvre warfare; 2) Swarming operations depended on unites acting 
in synch. Which Boyd refer to as auftragstaktik decentralised-based C2. These operations 
depended on complex information systems; and 3) Information superiority is decisive 
advantage in completing OODA loop cycle accurately and rapidly (Safranski, 2008). To 
emphasise on how network structure of ISIS networks deepened its roots in digital 





would help identify the dynamic of information-centric warfare arose in the networked digital 
media environment. 
 
7.3 The Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop 
    The OODA loop is a theory for manoeuvre warfare developed by US fighter pilot Colonel 
John Boyd in 1974. Boyd established his strategy theory during the Korean war where he 
succeeded in taking down enemy fighter jets using the increased speed of decision-making, a 
process based on his OODA loop. The outcome of this approach is that “the side that can 
make the quickest decisions is most likely to win” (Osinga, 2005).  The acronym OODA 
stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act which Osinga (2007) defined OODA loop as:  
 
            A circular arrangement of causally connected elements, in which an initial cause 
propagates around the links of the loop, so that each element has an effect on the 
next, until the last ‘feeds back’ into the first element of the cycle. The consequence is 
that the first link (‘input’) is affected by the last (‘output’), which results in self-
regulation for the entire system (P.72).   
      
Major Jeffrey L. Cowan, from U.S. Air Force described Boyd’s theory of manoeuvre warfare 
as the following: during air combat, a fighter pilot first observes his enemy using onboard 
sensors or his own vision. Then the pilot applies manoeuvring tactics based on his assessment 
to energy rate, tactics, type of aircraft and how to move into an advantageous position. Then, 
the overall assessment of type of manoeuvre needed to get advantage to be in offensive rather 
defensive position. Finally, unpredictable and asymmetrical manoeuvre to be accomplished 
with great speed. Then the pilot to repeat the cycle (Cowan, N. D). To understand manoeuvre 





warfare from an operational level “as the destruction of the enemy’s vital cohesion—
disruption—not by piece-by-piece physical destruction. The objective of manoeuvre warfare 
is to disrupt the enemy’s mind. The principal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at 
surprisingly high speeds” (Lind, 2004, p. 56). However, manoeuvre warfare, according to 
Marine Corps doctrine “is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s 
cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent 
and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (Corps, 1997, p. 73).  
 
To win the war, suggested Boyd, it is important to understand the OODA loop of your 
opponent more rapidly than they understand yours and to continue to do so. (Cited in F. 
Osinga, 2005, p. 6). Carol Kopp explained that the functions of the OODA loop are all about 
making the right decision and acting upon information gathered, distributed, analysed and 
understood. The faster we gather, analyse distribute and understand information the faster our 
decision is able to be made. The faster we act upon provided information the greater the 
superiority during combat (Kopp, 2005, p. 2). 
 
Defeating the OODA loop of one’s opponent is achieved by going through the four stages in 
a faster loop than the opponent. This means that in the context of the overall dynamics of a 
complex theatre-wide engagement, the organisation able to operate in a more decentralised 
manner, in a pattern consistent with auftragstaktik, would likely be able to close its OODA 
loops faster and therefore is more likely to be victorious. For example, the faster a combatant 
gathers data from the field (observe), and analyses it into meaningful information (orient), the 
faster their decision-making (decide), which in turn gives them the opportunity to act beyond 






However, Boyd’s manoeuvre warfare strategy theory was never officially published. 
According to James Scaminaci, Boyd “spread his thinking throughout the Pentagon via 
constantly evolving marathon briefings, each of which could last between 14 and 18 hours” 
(Scaminaci, 2016). Nonetheless, Boyd’s theory A Discourse on Winning and Losing has been 
reproduced thousands of times as journal articles, essays, and dissertations. As Grant T. 
Hammond, Boyd’s biographer, said, “He wanted to give things away-especially ideas” (cited 
in Cowan, N. D). Colonel Osinga, was the first to interpret and unveil the idea behind Boyd’s 
OODA loop model and suggested that the “significant operational advantage will accrue to 
the side that can complete the decision cycle—Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action—in 
the shortest time span’ (F. P. Osinga, 2007). In his PhD thesis, Science, Strategy and War, 
Osinga (2005) described the usual interpretation of the OODA loop as a tool for strategy (a 
strategy for winning wars). Additionally, In Patterns of Conflict Boyd (1986) explained his 
“adapt and survive” strategy to win battles. As he puts it ‘operating inside an adversary’s 
OODA loop involves “Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, 
and with more irregularity […]”’ (as cited in Richards, 2012, p. 9). Moreover, in Essence of 
Winning and Losing Boyd claims that our decided actions in combat cannot be achieve 
accurately without OODA loops. Applying the function of the OODA loop model enhances 
our senses and observations and helps in collecting necessary information, so we can carry 
out our actions accordingly (Boyd, 1996, p. 1).  
 
In the illustration of the OODA loop (see Figure 113) Boyd documented the dynamic process 
of the OODA cycle and its relationship between components of his loop cycle operating 
inside enemy’s OODA. Boyd (1996) explains, “how orientation shapes observation, shapes 
decision, shapes action, and in turn is shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming 





observations followed by orientation, decision-making, and acting. The faster a fighter loops 
using the four components the more likely they are to win. Edward Smith emphasised the 
OODA effects during crisis, war and peace times suggesting: observe phase depended on new 
information technologies that require greater time compression and precision. Sensor-based 
awareness is basic element of effect-based warfare that require vulnerability of opponents to 
act against and to achieve wanted outcomes. (vulnerability of the West is targeting and 
bombing publics or potential targets such as train stations, airports…etc (Smith, 2003). 
Within the context of this study, Boyd’s OODA theory is useful for considering C2 
operations dictated by centralised hieratical networks without reference to distributed versus 
centralised networks. While the notion of OODA and NCW is about manoeuvrer warfare 
occur between hierarchical centralised networks (states) in the physical world. Therefore, in 
the following, this chapter first applies OODA theory to distributed networks competing 
against centralised networks in battle, which occurred in the information environment (with 
some further reflections of physical warfare occurring between ISIS and its adversaries). 
 
 
Figure 113. A diagram of the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, showing the OODA loop 






The OODA loop model helps to understand patterns and effects of speed of command for 
both networks from NCW perspective. Boyd used the phrase “operating inside opponents’ 
OODA loops” which according to Osinga (2005) he “seemed careful never to define”. To 
operate inside the OODA loop of ISIS adversaries, Osinga’s suggested that this can be 
achieved through destabilising their adversary’s capacity to adapt and orient to various 
situations, while improving their own capacity to respond (F. Osinga, 2005). To better 
understand the pattern of conflict between ISIS and its adversaries in information 
environments from OODA loop perspective, the following shall examine information 
processes of OODA loop elements of both sides of the conflict. 
 
7.4 Inside ISIS’ Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop 
    Examining ISIS’ OODA feedback loop helps to understand the function of distributed 
networks of ISIS in adapting and migrating to new digital environments and arrays of 
information-centric warfare. That is, ISIS can’t achieve its IO without having access to digital 
media technologies. These communication technologies enable ISIS to establish their actor 
networks and therefore it enabled them to sustain information flows and connectivity. In what 
follows, this chapter examines Boyd’s influence on NCW and the strategy of ISIS adapting to 
various digital media environments and includes analysis of the OODA loops of both ISIS 
and its adversaries, with attention to the dynamics of stigmergy and swarm operations. The 
argument put forward here is that, the speed of the decision-making process of ISIS networks 
is increased by harnessing anonymous sharing portals, cloud computing sites and end-end 
encryption applications. Speed of command helped in maintaining ISIS’ IO and created new 
trajectories for information dissemination tactics. Also, the topography of new digital 
environments enabled ISIS to launch distributed swarming operations based on a large-scale 






The OODA loop cycle of ISIS (as noted in section 7.2) depended on a large number of 
smaller operations in the digital media environments, replicating what Edward Smith calls 
“semi-independent operations” (Smith, 2003, p. 61). For instance, hijacking Twitter hashtags 
using swarming strategies strengthened the spread of terror narrative (see Figure 114). 
 
Figure 114. ISIS used #shahz al-hemam—that is, ‘glad tiding’—to assert their continued use of 
popular social media networks for electronic jihad. 
 
These operations were masterminded by dispersed individual media jihadi or affiliates, who 
repeatedly disseminated information on a large scale and kept doing it. The can be considered 
as the Act phase in OODA cycle. These operations were facilitated by utilising multiple 
digital media environments in hope of disrupting opponents’ decision-making cycle by 
degrading their operation across popular social networking platforms. Based on the above 
knowledge, and through tracing of digital logistics of ISIS’ actor network, the OODA loop of 






    Between 2013 and 2015, ISIS adapted digital media technologies to achieve its global 
ambitions by copycatting Al-Qaeda’s IO tactics in utilising internet technologies, including 
Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, which were the prime hubs for ISIS communication and 
dissemination strategies. Other digital media portals (e.g., Sendvid, dump.to) and end-end 
encrypted applications (e.g., Telegram, WhatsApp) were presented, but played a subservient 
role in ISIS’ IO strategy. Pro-ISIS digital jihadi observed interruption occurred to its IO 
caused by its opponents. Also, ISIS observed the emergence of new digital dissemination 
tools (share.it, Daily Motion, JustPaste.it), which enabled them to preserve and resume their 
IO through these online environments. 
 
7.4.2 Orient 
    ISIS were oriented about the existence of new digital media environments such as 
JustPaste.it, sendvid.com, woodvid.com, dump.to, Telegram, Signal, Top4top, Tumblr and 
Pinterest that maintain connectivity and enable information dissemination. Also, 
understanding of SMNs vulnerability in terms of hacking, disinformation and media warfare 
was vital to ISIS— that sped up loop cycle of ISIS (decision phase) by disseminating 
misinformation and obtain sensitive information which required a costly security response 
from its adversaries. The function of new online environments where ISIS operated, enabled 
information movement from one medium of communication to another (e.g. Justpaste to 
Telegram). It also meant the use of many environments at the same time without losing the 
IO objectives of the dynamics of anonymous and encrypted communication platforms (see 
Chapter 6 for details). Hence, the adaption of new digital environments sped up decision-








Figure 115. An illustration of ISIS’ implementation of the observe, orient, decide and act loop. 
Illustrated by the Author. 
 
7.4.3 Decide 
    To maintain connectivity and dissemination while ‘degrading operation’ underway (see 
sections 5.31 and 5.3.2), ISIS decided to launch its IO through the new digital media 
environments mentioned in the ‘Orient’ loop. Therefore, the existence of anonymous sharing 
platforms, encrypted applications and cloud computing site gives ISIS speed in adapting new 
information dissemination tactics. 
7.4.4 Act 
    To maintain flows of information and carry out successful IO strategy, ISIS acted so 
quickly to degrading operation by adapting of new digital media environments. Speed in 
shifting its IO to new digital media environments have greater impact on ISIS’ IO and in 
maintaining of its networking structure (speed in command). Nevertheless, new processes of 






To this end, in examining speed of command and superiority in the battle of information 
environment, it is important to assess the OODA loop cycle of ISIS adversaries. 
7.5 Inside the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop of ISIS’ Adversaries 
     The function of OODA model is to assist in winning battles. So, to defeat ISIS in the 
information environment, it is essential for its adversaries to operate inside the loop of ISIS 
networks and paralyse its IOs. To do that, Boyd suggested, […] we change the situation more 
rapidly than the opponent can comprehend and keep doing it (Boyd, 1986, p. 5, as cited in 
Richards, 2012, p. 9). In interpreting Boyd’s thoughts of OODA functions, Osinga argued 
that, as an enemy relies on information and communication systems, disrupting and 
destroying their information and communication systems is essential. Attacking the 
communication systems of enemies can lead to superiority during conflict (Osinga, 2007 as 
cited in Safranski, 2008). That is, trace activity of ISIS by its adversaries in new digital 
environment and block it before content reached wider audience. For example, recently ISIS 
adversaries succeeded in collaboration with Mr Mariusz Zurawek, the developer of 
anonymous sharing portal JustPaste.it, to blackout content linked to ISIS accounts (see 6.1.4). 
Therefore, to achieve dominance over information disseminated by ISIS affiliates, Osinga 
asserted, it is important to get advantage over information flows of adversaries. This will lead 
to destroying the enemy’s C2 operations and to operating inside their OODA decision more 
rapidly (Safranski, 2008 as cited Osinga 2007).  
 
To achieve the objectives of degrading operations, Osinga suggests adapting to a game of 
Interaction and Isolation (see section 5.3.2). This can be achieved through complete isolation 
of opponents from the information environments they operate on. This process will lead to 
losing internal and external cohesion of opponents’ networks by disruption of information 





5.2.2). As a result, ISIS called on affiliates to initiate operation #elzamthagrak, which means 
‘stay in your domain’, to maintain their processes of communication. The aim behind the 
strategy of Interaction and Isolation, as Osinga (as cited in Safranski, 2008)  pointed out, “is 
to change the opponent from an open into a closed system which slowly suffers the fate of all 
closed systems”. Within the latter context, to understand how OODA loop feedback of ISIS 
adversaries operate is illustrated in Figure 116. 
 
Figure 116. Inside the observe, orient, decide and act loop of ISIS’ adversaries. Illustrated by the 
author. 
7.5.1 Observe 
    In this phase ISIS opponents seek to observe ISIS’ IO objectives and processes of 
information diffusion. This includes collecting data to identify strengths and weakness of 
terror narratives and motivations to help establish and direct counter narrative agendas. ISIS 
adversaries observed that the terror narrative moved across popular social media platforms 
particularly on Twitter and YouTube in 2014. For example, Berger and Morgan (2015) 
monitored activity of ISIS on Twitter suggesting ISIS has almost 90 thousand Twitter 







    Identification of the many new digital environments aiding ISIS’ message to spread, which 
included: identify the disseminators and type of message; ontology of messages, generators 
and dissemination processes; Aggregating and analysing of disseminated content.  
which in this phase ISIS adversaries managed to identify the main nodes of communication 
and message generators. For example, targeting messages generated by Asawrity media and 
Shami Witness have impacted on the number of propaganda produced to serve ISIS’ IO. 
Also, the contentious attacks on the main channels of dissemination on Telegram such as 
Dabiq, Nashir political and Amaq have helped to control the spread of ISIS channels on 
Telegram.    
 
7.5.3 Decide 
     In this phase ISIS opponents moved in fast to counter ISIS’ messages by tracing and 
identifying dissemination processes and creating chaos in ISIS’ information environments. 
Disrupting ISIS dissemination tactics was critical and hindering its message of terror was a 
step towards adapting the ‘Interaction and Isolation’ strategy as suggested by Osinga. ISIS 
opponents managed to create noise in the communication networks of ISIS (mostly in 
Telegram and Twitter) by waging information warfare, which included; inserting 
disinformation through network participation; suspension of ISIS accounts; hacking 
operations and creating counternarratives on digital networks. In Telegram channels, for 
example, ISIS opponents were able to join ISIS’ Telegram channels and report it to Telegram 
as channels spread hate and terrorism. As a result, Telegram opted to suspend these channels 







    In identifying the dissemination processes of ISIS networks, ISIS opponents’ response was 
twofold. First, they degraded ISIS’ digital capabilities by hacking, introducing 
misinformation and tracing locations of disseminators. The ‘whack a mole’ operation, for 
instance, was successful in paralysing ISIS’ social media accounts on Twitter and YouTube 
(see section 5.3.1). The most powerful pro-ISIS affiliates, Shami Witness and Turjuman 
Asawrty networks, were paralysed permanently after police traced their location and leads to 
the arrest of Shami Witness (see Figure 117). Also, it has been reported than more than 
300,000 accounts associated with ISIS have been suspended by Twitter Inc. 
 
 
Figure 117. Screenshot of Twitter feed of ISIS propagandist, Shami Witness. 
 
In examining the OODA loops of both, ISIS and its adversaries, it can be observed that speed 
of command of ISIS was faster in adaptation and survival game compared to its adversaries. 
The more attacks on ISIS information infrastructure the more it moved to new digital 
environments. This argument was echoed by Michael Waller (2015) US military strategist 
and Secretary of Defence Advisor who argued that jihadi movements including ISIS and Al-





and act” (Waller, 2015, p. 30). However, the resilience of ISIS networks and survival of 
degrading operation is because of ISIS’ adaption of distributed swarming operation in the 
information environment, to be discussed in the following section.  
 
7.6 Swarming and ISIS’ Information Operations 
    This aim of this section is to examine the information-centric warfare of swarm operations 
of both ISIS and its adversaries. Since the rise of Calipha in 2014 the success of on-ground 
operations and the expansion of territories fall under ISIS control, ISIS called collectives of 
e-jihadists and fighting groups to swarm digital media environments to achieve speed of 
command and carry out IO objectives. Meanwhile, ISIS adversaries, employed swarming 
operation to degrade ISIS’ digital capabilities and destroy information networking 
infrastructure. The US government established the United Counter-terrorism Centre (UCC) to 
counter the narrative of Al-Qaeda and then directed its activity to fight ISIS in the 
information environments (see section 5.7.2). Also, the collective hacker groups such as 
Anonymous established #OpIceISIS in 2014 to help in degrading operation (see 5.10). 
 
Swarming is a military tactic derived from animals and insect behaviour when attacking its 
enemies. A swarming attack occurs from multiple directions in order to control and paralyse 
an enemy. Swarming attacks rely on what Libicki (1994 as cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
2000 ) calls “the many and the small” (p.22). Arquilla & Ronfeldt argued that “swarming is 
also likely to prove valuable to terrorist and transnational criminal organisations” (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 43). Furthermore, John Robb, in Brave New War, identified two types of 
swarming operation, the “massed” and the “dispersed” (Robb, 2007, p. 122). According to 
Robb (2007), massed swarming is based on distributed operations, such as those that occur in 





Dispersed swarming, on the other hand, is based on small operations by decentralised groups 
that have special tasks; one example of dispersed swarming is the Minutemen, who inflicted 
heavy casualties on the British army during the American revolution in the battle of Concord 
during the American civil war. Robb gave another account of dispersed swarming, which 
occurred in Iraq in 2007, where small groups or individuals of anti-US actors/guerrillas 
attacked identified targets such as a sniper (Robb, 2007, p. 122). 
 
The swarm activity of ISIS affiliates can be described as spontaneous coordination between 
ISIS members/affiliates in diffusing, sharing and generating information across the spectrum 
of digital media environments. In ISIS Telegram channels, for example, ISIS’ propaganda 
videos, publications and personnel communication is shared across the platform via hybrid 
links codes that lead to the anonymous sharing portals. Purcha (2016) observed that ISIS 
Telegram channels maximised the global reach of its propaganda during the Brussels attack 
in March 2016. ISIS Telegram channel operatives encouraged affiliates to hijack trending 
Twitter hashtags and disseminate information in French language. Also, ISIS harnessed other 
media environments to conduct what they call “social media raids” to maximise flow of 
information and reach of this information (Prucha, 2016, p. 52).  
 
The decentralisation of ISIS networks empowered the swarming operations as collectives of 
e-jihadists carried out ISIS IO strategy without coordination and even an identifiable leader. 
Prucha observed that jihadist media strategies have been demonstrated to be resilient and 
intelligibly implemented during online swarming operations: “The disbelievers ... are 
confronted in their media war by an army of [IS] supporters who dedicate their time for the 
defence of the people of jihad” (Al-Ghazzi as cited in Prucha, 2016, p. 54). These jihadist 





As digital media became the backbone of ISIS networks, the study of media manoeuvre 
warfare in context of swarming operations part of NCW is required. Cebrowski and Garstka 
(1998) noted “Information technology is undergoing a fundamental shift from platform-
centric computing to network-centric computing” (p.3). Which means that NCW occurs when 
outnumbered ISIS agents storm multiple digital media environments with information to fill 
them with terror narrative and propaganda. According to Leonard Doob “Propaganda was 
considered an arm of warfare” (Doob, 1950, p. 424). For instance, ISIS appeal to affiliates to 
launch swarm attacks on Twitter, which includes: the re-opening of suspended accounts; the 
hijacking of trending hashtags; the hacking of opponents’ accounts; and the mass and diffuse 
spread of information and misinformation across multiple digital media environments, 
because (as discussed 4.10.2/3) ISIS believes that Twitter is the most important medium for 
information dissemination. These swarm operations were coordinated and directed by e-
jihadists through digital media environments. Arquilla & Ronfeldt argued that “swarming 
depending completely on robust, rapid communications” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. vii). 
To understand the role of digital media technologies in ISIS’ swarming operations and speed 
of command, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2004) suggested that, new information technologies 
“render an ability to connect and coordinate the actions of widely distributed “nodes” in 
almost unprecedented ways” (P.4).  
 
Successful swarming can happen when participants “engage adversaries from all directions 
simultaneously” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. vii), which ISIS performed and coordinated 
utilising different digital media environments simultaneously. These swarming actions 
occurred, consequently to its opponents’ degrading operations. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000) 
argued that swarming is enabled by information transformation and IOs circulated across 





defeat adversaries in detail (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 5). An example of coordinated 
distributed swarming of networks in the information environment is the reopening of 
suspended Twitter accounts and it has been estimated that ISIS managed to open almost 
900,000 accounts using fake names, generic emails and hacked phone numbers. This 
swarming operation were a major blow to degrading operations.  
 
Digital communications enable the rise of swarm networks and to hinder the swarming 
activity of networked actors, Arquilla & Ronfeldt suggested, a high level of information 
security is needed. Poor information security would rise the cost of decoding and intercepting 
adversary’s communication (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 67). 
 
7.7 Stigmergy Operations of ISIS Networks 
    The coordinated efforts of ISIS actors to swarm digital media environments of IOs is what 
military and network analyst John Robb (2007) in his book Brave New War and in Global 
Guerrillas blog analyse from a stigmergy perspective. According to Robb (2004) “stigmergy 
can be used as a mechanism to understand underlying patterns in swarming activity. As such, 
it can be applied to the understanding of swarming attacks by diverse bands of global 
guerrilla”. The indirect coordination between ISIS e-jihadists using digital media 
environments is an example of the practice of stigmergy. That is “Creating baths for 
information distribution through Self-organised cluster of individuals who have knowledge in 
access to digital networks” (Robb, 2004). The study of stigmergy in context of ISIS networks 
enables ISIS adversaries to understand mechanisms of ISIS digital networks for the purpose 
of disrupting its IO. However, stigmergy “is a term used in biology, from the work of French 
biologist Pierre-Paul Grasse, to describe environmental mechanisms for coordinating the 





pheromones to create chemical trails for other ants to follow. In a similar way people use 
weblog links to establish information paths, for others to follow (see Figure 118).  
 
 
Figure 118. Hybrid web log links to ISIS content disseminated via Telegram. 
 
The term stigmergy is derived from the Greek words’ stigma ("sign") and ergon ("to act"; 
Robb, 2007, p. 124). In the context of this study, I examine the indirect communication 
between ISIS affiliates and e-jihadists in digital media environments that have affected the 
speed of command for ISIS IO.  
 
Robb (2007) described the mechanisms of environmental coordination in the context of 
global guerrillas as marker-based, sematectonic, quantitative and qualitative, which will be 
discussed and analysed in the following sections.  
 
7.7.1 Marker-Based 
    Markers or signs left by actors influence the actions of other actors. In the context of global 





delivered by traditional broadcast and the newer forms of social media. The description of the 
attack in the media is a stigmergic marker for others to follow. An important example of this 
stigmergic marking is the idea of ‘lone wolf’ attacks. Lone wolf attacks include ISIS 
perpetrators, loners who committed terror attacks, which leave distinct marks behind them. 
Markers can be a short video of the perpetrator/s pledge of support to ISIS or describing their 




    Environmental conditions influence the behaviour of all actors in a system. This applies to 
terrorist activity, for example multiple guerrilla’s attacks on a certain type of target can 
generate a global security response by nation-states, which changes the potential of attacks 
against that type of target in the immediate future. An increased security presence is a 
sematectonic signal to terrorist operatives to select something else. Robb (2007) notes that 
“stigmergic systems use simple environmental signals to coordinate the actions of 
independent agents (each with their own decision-making process)” (P.124). A key example 
of this is the attacks on train and airport network systems by ISIS lone wolf or wolf pack 
operations in Brussels, Turkey and USA that occurred between 2015 and 2016 (see Section 
6.2 for greater detail). Similarly, part of the electronic jihad operations that ISIS encouraged 
it affiliates to engage in used hacking strategies to attack energy networks. ISIS urged 
followers using Telegram to secure communication by adopting anonymous sharing portals 
and utilise ZeroNet Network technology to evade degrading operations. As ZeroNet system 







    Environmental signals are scalable. This means that the size of a global guerrilla attack on 
a given location can meter the scale of the security response. For instance, the attack in Nice, 
France, on the 14th of July 2016, involved a perpetrator running over Bastille day celebrants 
with his truck, killing 80 people. The size of the attack carried out with a basic and easily 
available resource worried security agencies across Europe. Security agencies were not 
familiar with the vehicular method of attack and as a result, France declared a state of 
emergency, deploying and mobilising the military to protect the network infrastructure from 
future attacks. Moreover, during the 2016 New Year’s Eve celebrations, authorities in most 
European countries, Australia and Canada built barricades to hinder Nice-style attacks. The 
simple attack produced a massive scale of effect. The small size of the attack produced a 
large number of casualties and draw attention to at risk infrastructure and alerted security 
agencies across the globe to a new method of terrorism.  
 
Quantitative stigmergic in digital media environments can be common social networking 
mechanisms seen on Facebook or Twitter as ‘likes’, ‘shares’, ‘retweets’ and on Telegram by 
the number of views. Part of ISIS’ IO objects are the effective engagement of digital content 
measures. The more shares, likes and retweet the more these stigmergic indicates help to 
create new audiences. For example, most European recruits may have affected by 
Mujatweets, which impacted on increase number of ISIS recruits from European countries. 
Some of those recruits migrated to ISIS land, and some carried out acts of terror or became 







     Environmental signals are varied and can change a message based on their combination. 
Robb (2004) suggested “Attacks on major networks such as airports or trains is qualitative as 
huge security response acted quickly to secure such networks from shutting down”. 
Qualitative stigmergic signals of ISIS can be the planning for responding to messages 
disseminated through digital media to ISIS sympathisers to commit an act of terror in 
Western countries. 
 
Stigmergic operations of ISIS networks can be observed through what Marsh and Onof calls 
the cybernetic loop of three aspects (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p. 7): 
 
● Agents: collective of ISIS’ e-jihadists (media jihadists) and affiliates targeted digital 
media environments to generate, aggregate and disseminate information (will be discussed in 
section 7.7.5). “All that is necessary for stigmergy to occur is for the outcome of the 
behaviour of the relevant agent to be appropriately affected by previous environmental 
changes” (Holland & Melhuish, 1999, p. 174). 
● Environment: the medium of communication ISIS agents utilised can be encrypted, 
secure or even open-source network. To understand how dynamic and rapid change of agents 
in adapting to new environments, Marsh and Onof (2008) suggested: 
 
  Stigmergy distinctively relies on the cybernetic relationship of agent -- environment -- agent 
environment through ongoing and mutual modification or conditioning enabled by the rise of 
computing technologies (and the democratisation of technology), the possibilities and the 
scope of a stigmergic environment have exponentially increased—collaboration mediated and 






● Sign: used for communication as a collection of tails linked to ISIS content. This 
includes direct links to ISIS propaganda distributed across digital media environments. The 
rise of anonymous sharing portals has created unique sign for ISIS content as all uploaded 
content transformed and shared as pheromones tails that can be easily followed, duplicated 
and distributed across digital media environments. 
 
Marsh and Onof argued that mutual process of modification and conditioning of the 
cybernetic loop of agent-environment-agent-environment are ongoing and being part of 
stigmergy, which dissolve tension between self-serving individual and the social corpuses 
through indirect interaction (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p. 14). The dynamic of stigmergic 
operation have helped ISIS to build robust networks of information sharing and participation. 
 
7.8 Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop Effect on ISIS’ Networks 
    To examine what has been said, I shall summarise OODA loop, distributed swarming and 
stigmergic effects on ISIS networks. The following section seeks to explain how the 
utilisation of new digital information environments in the context of OODA loop can 
generate a networking centric warfare effect. This effect can be examined through 
observation of ISIS and its opponents’ OODA loops. Tracing of ISIS’ online activity can 
explain how swarming activity occurred and how the interaction between Jihadists and the 
online environments has shaped the organisational form of ISIS networks that enabled it to 
carry out IO and engage in NCW. From lenses of ANT, swarming activity of ISIS has 
changed the agency of the online environment. In other words, Justpaste.it, Telegram and 
Sendvid were created to share videos and files, the extensive use of these portals by terror 





communication. Therefore, these portals became suspicious for ordinary usage and became a 
target for security agencies.  
 
To understand the paradigm shift in ISIS’ IO strategy and the effect of utilising of digital 
information environments. This information environment according to the DOD (as cited in 
Prisco, 2012) “consists of three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with 
individuals, organisations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical, 
informational, and cognitive” (see 4.2). The function of the physical dimension “is composed 
of command and control systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that 
enable individuals and organisations to create effects” (Prisco, 2012). While, the 
informational dimension specifies where and how information is collected, processed, stored, 
disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who 
transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information (as cited in Prisco, 2012, pp. iv-iiv).  
 
To contextualise the role of information environments harnessed by ISIS from paradigm shift 
and information warfare perspectives it is important to understand the function and 
architecture of these environments. On the one hand, the rise of anonymous sharing 
platforms, cloud computing technologies and encrypted communication applications is 
twofold: a) ready template for immediate information upload and; b) Personal anonymity and 
security at the centre. In other words, new digital communication technologies enhance 
efficiency, security, and privacy of users (to some extent) and impact on information warfare. 
On the other hand, interaction, collaboration and convergence between digital entities 
(network actors) is critical. For example, generated content can be shared, duplicated, and 






More bluntly, putting decision into action by transmitting from one digital environment to 
another is a key success of ISIS networks. The information swarm operation ISIS performed 
on multiple digital media environments disseminated a high volume of information and sped 
up the process of their OODA by shortening its cycle to Decide and Act (see Figure 119). 
 
Figure 119. Diagram explaining the observe, orient, decide and act loop effects on ISIS 
networks. Illustrated by the author. 
 
ISIS stigmergic swarming operations are helped through the creation of short information 
loops. These short loops assist the network to maintain itself through speed. In other words, 
the process of ‘Interaction and Isolation’ and ‘Whack a Mole’, adapted by ISIS adversaries 
based on centralised C2 operations was slower than ISIS digital operations. ISIS established 
distributed networks as it orients itself of what is happening in the information environment.  
For example, ISIS affiliates were encouraged to share propaganda videos and ISIS messages 
to all followers active on Telegram and Twitter. 
 
Observing the existence of new environments fastened the decision-making process and 
adjusted the ISIS loop. Agility and speed of ISIS OODA advanced its operation inside 
opponents’ OODA. Agility and speed can be achieved through self- synchronisation of ISIS 
e-jihadists adapting swarming operations warfare achieved through stigmergic operations of 





multiple digital environments via distributed swarming operation. As Cebrowski & Garstka 
(1998) argued: 
 
           Speed of Command is the process by which a superior information position is turned 
into a competitive advantage. It is characterized by the decisive altering of initial 
conditions, the development of high rates of change, and locking in success while 
locking out alternative enemy strategies. It recognizes all elements of the operating 
situation as parts of a complex adaptive ecosystem and achieves profound effect 
through the impact of closely coupled events (P.6).   
 
Within this context, ISIS have increasingly observed the continuous suspension of their 
accounts so that their OODA cycle have been shortened lapses between ‘Observe’ and ‘Act’. 
That is to say, the adaption of swarm operations helped ISIS to function effectively as 
swarmers shared information across multi-digital media environments with other affiliates. 
To analyse ISIS speed of command it is important to examine ISIS digital swarmers and how 
they operate. The swarming operation of ISIS networks, therefore, works as the following 






Figure 120. Illustration of the swarming operation of ISIS networks. Illustrated by the Author. 
 
As shown in Figure 120, ISIS agents conducting self-synchronized swarming operations 
include generators, aggregators and disseminators, each of which will be detailed in the 
following sections.  
 
7.8.1 Generators 
    There are two types of information generators with ISIS IO, the first are active agents who 
are active combatants witnessing live the actions of ISIS on-the-ground operations. The 
second type of generators are ISIS affiliates who gather videos and photos and information 
shared by active combatants for propaganda purposes. An example of the second type of 
information generators are Asawrty and Shami witness on Twitter. Another example exists 
on the Telegram platform, where Nashir news and the Dabiq and Amaq channels were 
established as information generators of the second type that aggregate and disseminate 







Figure 121. Example of information generator #al-Hayat. 
 
7.8.2 Aggregators 
    The category of aggregators (see Figure 122) includes active combatants and e-jihadists 
who respond to calls of ISIS spokesman, such as Abu Muhammed Al-Adnani who claimed 
that fighting in the media is more important than fighting in physical war. The role of 
aggregators is focused on collecting necessary data to be included in propaganda war. 
Fundamentally, the aggregators role is mapping and collecting data regarding distributed 
content over digital media environments. The collected data is a twofold manner. First, the 
data is collected for future retrieval and redistribution, and second, the data is then used for 
propaganda purposes. Aggregators played pivotal roles in sustaining ISIS’ propaganda 
operations and keeping collected data safe to recycle when needed. ISIS aggregators can be 
observed via Telegram channels, where information collected from multiple sources to keep 








Figure 122. Example of information aggregator on Telegram channel. 
 
7.8.3 Disseminators 
    Digital disseminators are non-physical combatants.  ISIS disseminators formed a digital 
army of ISIS contributors keeping ISIS propaganda moving across media networks. 
Disseminators are self-synchronized and operate via swarms. ISIS disseminators concentrated 
their activity in finding and establishing channels of information diffusion (see Figure 123). 
The adaption of anonymous media networks, cloud computing and encryption application is 











The collaboration of ISIS agents through processes of information117 aggregation, generation 
and dissemination, self-synchronisation and swarming operations has formed its network-
centric structure. As Arquilla & Ronfeldt (2000) argued, “swarming is crucially important 
because swarm forces depend upon uninterrupted flows of information to actualize their 
potential” (P.67). That is, synchronisation of information of ISIS e-jihadists using swarming 
operations have infiltrated most of media environments with information, has been decisive 
factor in high speed manoeuvring its adversaries.  
 
To this end, this is “Open Source warfare” (Robb, 2007, p. 116). As John Robb (2007) 
asserts, “terrorism and guerrilla warfare are rapidly evolving to allow non-state networks to 
challenge the structure and order of nation (P.175). That is, internet technologies enabled 
terror organisations to network, facilitate direct/indirect coordination launch swarm operation 
which pose a great challenge to nation-states.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
    This chapter has investigated the information-centric warfare that occurred between ISIS 
and its adversaries in the information environment. I extensively examined the swarming 
operations of both sides of the conflict using the OODA feedback loop model of manoeuvre 
warfare to better understand the dynamic of information-centric warfare. To overcome 
dispersed forces and massive geographical space ISIS relied on, digital media networks, 
                                                          
117 This thesis adopts a broad definition of ‘information’. Information is defined as something that refers 
not only to communications media and the messages transmitted, but also to the increasingly material. 
‘information content’ of all things, including weapons and other sorts of systems (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 





which offered unique, secure and free communication to coordinate attacks and achieve IO 
objectives. ISIS adversaries opted to use account blocking and content suppression strategies 
to defeat ISIS and hinder its propaganda machines used for recruiting jihadi, fundraising and 
carry out lethal attacks (i.e. lone wolf). At first glance, ISIS adversaries successfully 
suppressed ISIS e-jihadists, removing them from popular SMNs especially on Twitter, and 
YouTube. Meanwhile, the rise of anonymous and cloud computing communication 
technologies enabled ISIS to shift its activity to newly formed applications, including 
Telegram, Justpaste and Sendvid. Moreover, this new digital media environment offered 
anonymity, and security to ISIS e-jihadists, which increased the number of digital swarmers 
across the globe. In other words, the OODA loop cycle of ISIS IO was faster compared to its 
adversaries. Therefore, maintain flows of information of ISIS through swarm operation was 
quite successful. 
 
To understand information warfare occurred and how ISIS managed to maintain information 
loops during degrading operation from lenses of ANT is that, ISIS managed to establish 
heterogeneous networks that enables it to enrol and translate more network actors to its 
networks. The use of anonymous sharing portals, encryption applications, digital media 
platforms and other digital media logistics as network actors have leveraged its networks and 
helped it to carry out stigmergic operations without direct coordination between network 
agents. With that being said, the speed of information processes and disseminations enables 
ISIS to operate inside the OODA of its opponents.  
 
To this end, the detailed analyses of centric information warfare occurred between ISIS and 
its adversaries, I conclude that ISIS managed to operate inside the OODA loop of its 





compared to its adversaries. In doing so, swarming of multiple digital media environments of 
ISIS e-jihadists was greater than operation degrading ISIS digital capabilities. As collectives 
of e-jihadist depended on secure, robust, networked, encrypted communication has prevailed 
in the battle of information environment. In other words, disrupting IO of ISIS by suspending 





































    As of writing the concluding chapter of this thesis, two stigmergic operations occurred. 
The first was the Paris attack that occurred on the 13th of May 2018, and the second was the 
capture of five top ISIS leaders in Syria on the 10th of May 2018. To understand these two 
incidents from a stigmergic perspective is to consider that the Paris attacker left information 
signs. In this case, the attacker posted a video to the internet expressing his intention to carry 
out an attack on behalf of ISIS. On the surface, the attack appears as a ‘lone wolf' operation, 
but the attacker was simultaneously operating as a node in a swarm who adapted to the digital 
media network norm without being part of a physical terrorist network. The case of the 
captured ISIS leaders was an example of the dynamic of quantitative stigmergy. That is 
because the architecture of the Telegram enabled networking between the digital environment 
and other network actors. The information feedback between the digital environment and 
actors has led to suppress these loose swarms which lead to their capture. In other words, 
understanding the signal and reacting to it as an emergent communication has led to the 
capture of ISIS leaders.  
 
However, for terror networks, the message does matter; for anti-terror powers, it's essential to 
counter terror messages before it gets attention. The battle in the 21st century is over the 
control of information. Using a mixed-method approach, this thesis sets out to answer the 
main research question: What was the role of ISIS digital media logistics in resisting attempts 
to degrade its IO objectives between 2014 and 2016? In addition, secondary questions of: Did 
ISIS' three communication strategies of weaponisation, stigmergy, and manoeuvring create a 





networks? And, were the counter strategies of degrading operation has been successful to 
obliterate ISIS' IO objectives? 
 
To answer the main question, (see chapters 3, 4 and 6) using screenshots and ANT, the thesis 
traced ISIS' digital media logistics and examined ISIS' dynamics of message assemblages, 
and processes of information aggregation and dissemination to understand: the role of digital 
media logistics in the restructuring of ISIS networks, sustain flows of information, create 
dynamic loop of information, and enhance the production of propaganda content. Tracing of 
ISIS' digital media logistics also explains how ISIS succeeded to mobilise jihadists (both e-
jihadi and active combatants) who played a critical role in leverage of ISIS networks and help 
to achieve its IO objectives. 
 
To understand the paradigm shift in ISIS' communication strategy, this thesis has explored 
ISIS' IO and counter-narrative responses from an information warfare perspective. This study 
has examined ISIS' digital media logistics as toolkits of its IO strategy (see section 4.2). It has 
explored the ways that ISIS generates and disseminates its messages to achieve its political 
agenda (see section 3.6). 
 
In this thesis, ANT was used as theory and methodology to understand the role of network 
actors in establishing terror networks (see section 4.15 and 6.5). This theory suggested that 
the change of agency of network actors can change a network's dynamics and purpose of use. 
ANT is used to explain how social media was developed as a tool to facilitate communication 
between human actors; however, it soon became a tool for the spread of fear and recruitment. 
That is, the agency of these platforms changed when the purpose of their use change. 





non-human—in message assemblages and flows of information. In other words, this thesis 
showed how decentralised messages are generated and disseminated with or without being 
intentionally mediated, in which this thesis refers to as stigmergic operations of ISIS 
networks (see section 7.7). For example, bots and applications have been designed for self-
automation of information dissemination which sustains information flows. As Fisher (2015) 
noted that "this type of behaviour is evidenced by the ability of Jihadist groups to continue to 
disseminate content in the face of concerted efforts by Western governments and social 
media platforms to disrupt their channels of communication" (Fisher, 2015, p. 5). 
 
This thesis identified three main challenges involved in countering the ISIS narrative, 
information loop and the logistics of message assemblages (see chapter 5), that are: the 
weaponisation of multiple information environments, stigmergic swarming, and information 
warfare. To examine the counter strategy operation of ISIS adversaries that aims to answer 
the second question, this thesis identified three phases of countering ISIS' IO objectives: 
disruption of information flows, countering its narrative and open hacking operations. Using 
screenshots methodology, this thesis comprehensively identified methods that were used to 
attack ISIS' digital media logistics and counter its narrative. It highlighted how ISIS' 
adversaries have established a holistic approach to address ISIS' leveraging of its networks 
via social media platforms (see section 5.2). By investigating the counter-strategies used by 
ISIS' adversaries, this thesis identified three ways to combat the upsurge of ISIS online 
content: account suspensions and hacking operations. This thesis also highlighted the 
important strategies used to degrade the digital capacity of ISIS, that include: whack a mole 






To answer the third research question, this thesis has highlighted ISIS' IO operation strategy 
in the weaponisation of information media environments, stigmergic swarming operations, 
and manoeuvre information warfare strategies to evade degrading operation. This thesis has 
argued that attacking the digital media logistics of ISIS networks in the period between 2014 
and 2016 was unsuccessful, as ISIS adapted stigmergic swarming operation of information 
environments. In other words, a paradigm shift in terror communication occurred, through 
which ISIS maintained its existence in information environments, the speed of message 
dissemination and sophistication of message assemblage. This logistical operation allowed 
ISIS to maintain its network structure, despite its adversaries attempts to dismantle or disrupt 
it. As Rose (2014) stated,  
 
Now, in the age of YouTube, Twitter, smartphones, cheap cameras, and software, the 
superpowers no longer control information. Ironically, the beneficiaries of this media 
democratisation are a medieval theocracy hell-bent on eradicating democracy from the face of 
the earth. 
 
Through this thesis has become increasingly clear that information logistics are essential for 
the generation and dissemination of messages of terror and that ISIS effectively harnessed 
this strategy, while its adversaries responded and reacted, attempting to keep pace. 
 
To understand how information warfare occurred between ISIS and its adversaries, this thesis 
examined three case studies to show how ISIS weaponised social media platforms and 
outmanoeuvred its adversaries in the information environments (see sections 6.2, 6.9 and 
7.2). ISIS' digital activity was traced through its favourite microblogging platform (i.e., 
Twitter), anonymous sharing portals (i.e., JustPaste.it, sendvid.com, dump.to) and encrypted 






To contextualise the information warfare that occurred in the digital sphere, this thesis used 
and expanded on Boyd's OODA loop manoeuvre warfare model (see section 7.3). This 
approach revealed that the speed of command, resilience and swarming operations gave ISIS 
superiority over its adversaries in the information environment. This study indicated that IO 
and information warfare are both military actions, which seek to gain information superiority 
over an adversary. For this purpose, this thesis referred to the concept of auftragstaktik 
(mission-based tactics). As used in this thesis, the OODA loop is useful in understanding 
asymmetrical (i.e., uneven) digital warfare, wherein the fighting entities are not equal in 
terms of military capacity. This thesis revealed that guerrillas strategically harnessed multiple 
information environments to outmanoeuvre their adversaries, by operating inside the 
information loop of their adversary. Further, this thesis has explored that the weaponisation 
of information environments helped ISIS to carry out auftragstaktik operations. 
 
This thesis demonstrated the fluidity and agility of information sharing portals that are free, 
easy to access and encrypted. They have galvanised the message and communication of ISIS. 
These portals have also enabled ISIS to become more sophisticated and organised, which is 
evident by the productions that exploit the features of the horror genre. Digital media 
technologies have been used to shape a new genre of horror production and as such, the 
organisational structures of terror groups, such as ISIS, have become more sophisticated. 
 
ISIS' intention was to threaten the security of Western nations and other coalition forces who 
had joined forces against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. As such, it is important to study and 
understand the proliferation of information, made possible by the widespread usage of 





became domains for secure, convenient and free-access communication for terror 
organisations. This thesis contributes to understanding the cybersecurity threat posed by ISIS 
and other emergent terror networks. It demonstrated how Twitter and anonymous portals 
helped ISIS establish dynamic information and content loops. Encrypted communication 
applications facilitated secure communication between potential recruits to support the 
physical attacks. These messages exploited the terror genre, spreading effectively to potential 
jihadists and inspiring individuals to carry out attacks outside the Islamic Caliphate.  
 
To highlight aspects of information warfare that occurred between Islamic terror 
organisations and their adversaries before the rise of ISIS, this thesis focused on case studies 
of three terror organisations and examined the ways they harnessed social media and satellite 
channels to gain superiority over their adversaries in the information environments (see 
section 1.6, 1.10 and 1.15). Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah have depended on information 
as a weapon in the face of well-equipped adversaries. The asymmetrical warfare carried out 
against these organisations (especially Hamas and Hezbollah) affected their media production 
techniques, which they used to gain sympathy and support from the international community. 
Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda's IO aimed to spread fear through the production of sophisticated 
propaganda videos. However, the advancement of internet and mobile phone technologies 
allowed ISIS to build decentralised and distributed networks by using these technologies for 
their new C2 operation centres. 
 
This thesis also demonstrated the lessons learned from the digital activism during the Arab 
Spring uprisings and its role in shaping new waves of terror in Syria and Iraq. Further, this 
thesis examined the role of social media platforms in political polarisation, the bifurcation of 





examined the Arab Spring uprisings from a networking perspective and explained how the 
uprisings changed the dynamic of network tendencies (see sections 2.3 and 2.8). 
Additionally, the study of the Arab Spring uprising was addressed from an information 
warfare perspective, such as the Egyptian Government's internet connection shutdown and 
the role of the Syrian Government in tracking activists, misinformation, deception, and 
propaganda. 
 
Two of the most important outcomes of this research was the documentation of ISIS' IO (see 
sections 3.5 and 4.8) and the countermeasures that were carried out by ISIS' adversaries (see 
sections 5.3 and 5.4). The effective use of auxiliary sharing portals—which maintained 
communication, flows of information and PSYOP—by Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and 
ISIS, through which open source information environments were used for the spreading of 
fear and propaganda is what Clausewitz (1832) theorised as a "continuation of a war by other 
means". 
 
An interesting finding of this research was that the collaboration of networks of ISIS' 
adversaries have played a role in promoting ISIS' terror narratives and directing its messages. 
The symbiotic relationship between the media and terror is evident in the media's coverage of 
terrorism, which unintentionally advertises terror organisations' messages and incites more 
terrorism, which then produces more media coverage. Stern and Modi (2010) argued that 
successful terror organisations "respond to changes in their environments by changing their 
mission and changing their shape" (Stern & Modi, 2010, p. 282). As Farwell (Farwell, 2010) 
argued, "This means filling the media space, from the ground up, because every moment of 






Although this thesis addressed ISIS’ IO and its adversaries' counter-narrative strategies, it 
was beyond the scope of this study to address processes of recruitment and radicalisation, 
which are the main concerns of governments and counterterrorism agencies. This thesis 
highlighted the role of PSYOP as part of ISIS' IO strategy to recruit potential jihadists. 
However, the objectives that underpin radicalisation, such as recruitment to violent 
extremism, is beyond the scope of this thesis, a study of these processes need to be studied on 
a case-by-case basis. That is, every individual has a different motive or psychological 
explanation for their decision to join ISIS or other violent extremist groups. 
 
It was beyond the scope of this thesis to address the geopolitical polarisation and influences 
of international and local powers in the complex warfare between guerrilla groups, such as 
sectarian struggles, and ideological, political or economic interests. In addition, it was beyond 
the scope of this study to explore the fight over hegemony and control of resources, which 
has also affected information warfare in digital media. Further research must investigate 
Russian, the US, Turkish, Iranian and Israeli direct and indirect involvement in the logistical 
supply of militant group who are operating inside Syria and Iraq to understand how this 
involvement has shaped information warfare. It is necessary to investigate the ideological 
struggle between the Sunni insurgent groups, such as Al-Nusra (Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham) 
versus ISIS and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham versus Al-Nusra, to understand the complexity of the 
geopolitical spheres among clandestine organisations that share the same ideology and 
enemy. The role played by Israel in supporting ISIS by attacking the Syrian army needs to be 
studied further. Similarly, this thesis did not address the symbiotic relationship between 
mainstream media and widespread terror messages and how this affects radicalisation. This 





briefly in its discussion of ISIS' message assemblages and speed with which these messages 
were mediated within ISIS' information warfare. 
 
As this research extensively examined the phases of the degrading operation—particularly 
hacktivism—against ISIS, it briefly described the role of the UCC in hacking and spreading 
misinformation against its adversaries. UCC hackers did not wage large-scale operations; 
however, they were part of swarming activity to maintain flows by keeping information loops 
across multiple information environments. There is the possibility for future research to be 
conducted in this area. 
 
Another important aspect of ISIS' IO, the role of women jihadi and children (Cubs of the 
Caliphate), was not discussed in this thesis. Although women and children were an integral 
part of ISIS' IO strategy, this thesis treated all human actors equally, without mentioning the 
gender of jihadists. However, future research could investigate the specific targeting of 
women and children by ISIS' IO strategy.  
 
Although important elements were highlighted in this research, the study of the overall media 
logistics of ISIS' networks addressed in this thesis could be expanded upon. For example, it 
was beyond the scope of this these role of Facebook, YouTube, Daily Motion, archive.org, 
Pinterest, and Kik; they have only been discussed briefly. Other information logistics—such 
as the use of TOR, VPN, Photoshop software, memes and digital graphics—that have been 
widely used by ISIS were not examined in this thesis. 
 
This thesis explained how ISIS carried out its comprehensive swarming operation of digital 





strengthen the Islamic Caliphate with more recruits, and leverage its network and financial 
aid. ISIS has created a virtually leaderless organisational structure, which encouraged the 
recruiting of more online jihadi, who contributed to the maintenance of ISIS' network 
structure. It also demonstrated how the open-source information environments have 
globalised and leveraged ISIS networks by creating alliances with other Islamic terror 
networks, such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. With these 
networks in place, individuals were mobilised. Active jihadists travelled to the land of ISIS, 
others acted on behalf of ISIS in their countries and others chose to become digital jihadists. 
 
When examining ISIS' or other terror organisations' use of digital media logistics, it must be 
considered that within the dynamic world of the internet, things are unpredictable. As such, 
so are the terror organisations that rely on them. Many years ago, scholars spoke of the 
existence of a virtual caliphate. Between 2013 and 2016, it became reality. Despite the fall of 
ISIS' capital cities in both Syria and Iraq in 2017, its online presence remains. ISIS' 
continuous online activities suggest the rebirth of a virtual caliphate is inevitable. The impact 
and influence of such a network will make the task of effectively countering ISIS an immense 
task. For this reason, research—such as the study represented in this thesis—is imperative to 
inform governmental and other actors in waging effective countermeasures. Some of the most 
effective countermeasures of ISIS, both online or on the ground, is that ISIS adversaries built 
a decentralised structure of command and control operations. The influx of anti-ISIS fighters, 
particularly from the Shia sect who arrived in Syria and Iraq from Iran, Lebanon, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have established a new dynamic of guerrilla vs guerrilla warfare. 
This new form of warfare was successful to conquer ISIS and crumble the caliphate.  
Likewise, in the information domain, the successful operations carried out by anti-ISIS 





The collaboration between government security agencies and hacker collectives have 
paralysed ISIS’ communication strategy and its internet activities at the same time it helped 
in making of ISIS’ operation visible on social media. That is, the flagging of content or 
reporting of ISIS’ accounts on Twitter make the content and ISIS accounts visible. For 
example, I have tracked ISIS accounts and located their propaganda content simply by 
monitoring the activity of ‘CtrlSec’ on Twitter.  
 
This collaboration is considered a possible countermeasure strategy in terms of understanding 
the trade-offs. Dealing with ISIS online activities also resulted in confusion and lack of 
counter strategy taken by platform administrators. Social media administrators mobilised 
thousands of its employees and collaborated with hacker groups such as ‘CtrlSec’ to flag 
content and suspending accounts of ISIS members. This strategy created confusion in the 
system as thousands of accounts were suspended by mistake, including mine. As an ISIS 
scholar, I am unable to retain my suspended YouTube account. False flagging has also 
affected some media channels such as ‘Al Jazeera’ and other thousands of accounts who are 
tweeting in the Arabic Language.  
  
This thesis shows an important lesson that can be understood from combating ISIS, or any 
type of terror organisation or guerrillas on the ground or in the information domains; that the 
network structure is a crucial factor of winning or losing battles. In other words, in combating 
terrorism, an auftragstaktik operations must be carried out by governments and security 
agencies which is structured as a form of decentralised vs decentralised networks.  
  
To this end, this thesis contributed to an understanding of organisational dynamics, by 





Research into these sharing portals is necessary due to the rise in usage of these portals by 
violent groups, such as the white supremacist and alt-right. Their online activity has increased 
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